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FEW provisions in the Internal Revenue Code are the object of more po-
lemics and pulpiteering than those governing taxation of foreign income. Yet
the profusion of studies, tracts, books and bills on foreign taxation seldom
actually concern foreign taxpayers "-,except to the extent that an American
owned corporation is a "foreign" taxpayer because it has a foreign charter,
does business abroad, and is taxed as a "foreign corporation" under the Code.
The "legitimate" foreign corporation gets only peripheral attention in current
dialogues; the nonresident alien is virtually ignored.2 Recent experience with
balance of payments deficits and a lagging growth rate, however, emphasizes
the importance of the foreigner in our economy-apart from his traditional
role as customer.3 The United States no longer has a monopoly on exportable
wealth, science, or mass media artistic products. The United States can use
more investment from abroad and will increasingly need the art and technology
of other countries as they continue to advance.
The swiftly accelerating interactions among nations mid the revolutions in
transportation and communication have both created and made possible the fl-
fillment of demands crossing national and continental boundaries. Products
produced in Pakistan are daily consumed in France; movies made in Japan
are viewed in Norway; communication satellites promise enormous develop-
ments in worldwide dispersion of technology, art, and ideas. The creator of a
tAssistant Professor of Law, Yale Law School I am indebted to my colleague, Pro-
fessor Boris I. Bittker, for invaluable comments on, portions of the text. He is in no way
responsible, however, for any of the conclusions reached or errors made in this article.
1. For a bibliography see OwExs, THE FOREIGN TAx CREDIT xxvii (1961). The "tax
haven" provisions of the Revenue Act of 1962 (Ixrr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 951-64, as
amended by Revenue Act of 1962 [hereinafter cited as I.R.C.]) concern primarily "con-
trolled foreign corporations," defined as a foreign corporation more than 50 per cent of the
voting stock of which is owned by United States shareholders. I.R.C. § 957(a).
2. Among the most recent works on aliens are PHIL.LPs, UNITED STATES TAXATi0.n
OF NoNREaDsNT ALIENS A.ND FOREIGN CoRPOA Io Ns (1952) ; Allam & Coggan, Aliens and
the Federal Income Tax, 5 TAx L. REv. 253 (1950); Weyher & Kelley, The Income Tax-
ation of Aliens-Some Riddles and Paradoxes, 9 TAx L. REv. 371 (1954).
3. On the relationship of the taxation of foreign income to the gold flow, see Anthoine
& Bloch, Tax Policy and the Gold Problem: An, Agenda for Inquiry, 61 COLUm. L. Rv.
322 (1961).
HeinOnline -- 72 Yale L.J. 1093 1962-1963
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
book, an invention, or an idea may have a worldwide market for his wares, and
he may have a wide choice of places and methods by which to exploit them.
Tax burdens can significantly influence the owner of a patent, copyright, or
similar property in his choice of methods of exploitation, and in deciding
whether to exploit his foreign rights abroad or to produce the products covered
by the rights domestically for export. In the recent hearings on the Revenue
Act of 1962, some attention was paid to the possible impact of the tax structure
on the exodus of United States-produced patents and processes, and the effect
of this migration on domestic investment and economic growth. 4 The corollary
of this problem also deserves inclusion in current studies of tax reform. If the
tax burden on local exploitation of foreign owned patents and copyrights can
significantly affect the foreigner's choice of licensing his rights for foreign
production and export to the United States or licensing them for domestic pro-
duction, the tax burdens on the foreign-owned patents and copyrights 0 may
have an impact on the United States economy far out of proportion to the
revenue raised by the tax.
Taxation of the non-national has taken a posterior position in current dis-
cussions partly because of the spreading network of tax treaties between the
United States and the countries which produce most of our imports. The
treaties commonly grant relief from taxation of royalties and other income
earned here by specified residents and corporations of treaty countries. But
they have only limited application and are merely mitigative; they do not im-
4. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 10650 Before the Scnate Committee on Finance, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 6, at 2703-08; pt. 8, at 3683-91; pt. 11, at 4565-67. See generally, the
President's Tax Message, urging critical examination of "certain features of our tax system
which, in conjunction with the tax systems of other countries, consistently favor U.S. pri-
vate investment abroad compared with investment in our own economy." Message frons the
President of the United States Relative to Our Federal Tax System, H.R. Doe. No. 140,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
5. The terms "patent" and "copyright" are used in this article in 'a very loose and
imprecise sense. When used together, the words are meant as a shorthand expression for
the legal rights to prevent unauthorized use and/or reproduction of inventions, writings,
designs, processes, formulas, artistic expressions and ideas, whenever the idea or expression
has reached such form, concreteness, or development that the tax law regards it as "prop-
erty," which should be treated as a patent or copyright is treated. The subject matter thus
extends far beyond the contours of the statutory monopolies on patents and copyrights and
includes trade secrets, unpatentable secret processes and formulae, and industrial "know-
how" acquiring the status of "property" for tax purposes. All personal property, tangible
or intangible, is ultimately the product in, part of someone's personal efforts. Determining
the point at which personal efforts have culminated in intangible "property" has been a
problem plaguing lawyers and metaphysicians for years. Few incursions into that interest-
ing and fundamental thicket will be made here. See generally, on the tax aspects of the
definitional problem, Creed & Bangs, "Know-How" Licensing and Capital Gaits, 4 PATENTr,
TRADEmARK, AND COPYRIGHT J. OF RES. & ED. 93 (1960); Duffy, Doing Business Ibroad.
Use of American Know-How, N.Y.U. 20Tn INsT. ON FED. TAx. 1269 (1962).
Where the statutes, treaties or decisions draw distinctions between various kinds of artis-
tic and intellectual property, "copyright" and "patent" will refer herein to more specific
concepts but will not, unless the context requires, refer exclusively to the rights granted
under titles 17 U.S.C. (copyrights) and 35 U.S.C. (patents).
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pose tax or close fissures in local law. Where they are applicable their scope
is uncertain as the terms are inadequately defined and to some extent take their
meaning from domestic law.
The tax treaty program is invaluable, but only if it rests upon a consistent,
clarified statutory scheme for taxing foreigners. This we do not have. More-
over, so long as countries which remain outside the treaty network have sub-
stantial economic intercourse with the United States, reappraisal of our present
statutory scheme should not be postponed.
THE BASIC SCHEME
The United States income tax is imposed upon the worldwide income of all
individuals who are either citizens or residents 0 of the United States and upon
corporations created or organized under federal or state law.7 Relief from
"double taxation" resulting from income taxes imposed by other nations upon
foreign source income is provided by a tax credit 8 or a deduction from gross
income,9 at the option of the taxpayer.
Nonresident aliens and foreign corporations are taxed by the United States
only upon income derived from sources within the United States.") These tax-
payers are divided into two basic classes: those engaged in business in the
United States and those not so engaged. Those engaged in business here are
taxed at regular corporate or individual rates on all income from United States
sources. 1 Foreign corporations not engaged in United States business, re-
ferred to as "nonresident foreign corporations,"'- are taxed at a flat 30 per
cent rate on "fixed or determinable annual or periodical" income and upon
certain gains from timber and coal.' 3 Nonresident aliens who are not engaged
in business here are taxed only on "fixed or determinable annual or periodical"
income and other specified gains.14 Those individuals having income of the
kinds covered which is $15,400 or less are taxed at a flat 30 per cent rate 15
6. I.R.C. § 1 imposes a tax on "every individual" and § 61 defines gross income to in-
clude income "from whatever source derived." The scope of these provisions is limited,
however, by the special provisions for nonresident aliens in § 871.
7. I.R.C. § 11 imposes a tax ort the income of "every corporation." The distinction be-
tveen foreign and domestic corporations is created by the definitions of foreign and domes-
tic corporations in § 7701(a) (2), (3) and the special provisions for taxing foreign cor-
porations in §§ 881, 882.
8. I.R.C. §§ 901-05.
9. 1.LLC. § 164.
10. I.TLC. §§ 872, 882(b). Definitions of income from sources within and without the
United States are contained in §§ 861-64.
11. Individuals in this class are taxed at the same rates as citizens and residents, I.R.C.
§ 871(c), and corporations pay the same rates as domestic corporations, I.R.C. § 882(a).
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.881-1. Foreign corporations engaged in business in the United States
are "resident foreign corporations," I.R.C. § 882.
13. I.R.C. § 881(a).
14. I.R.C. §§ 871(a), (b).
15. 1.1.C. § 871(a) (1).
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without deductions or personal exemptions. 1 Those with more than $15,400
taxable income are taxed at progressive rates after personal exemptions 17 and
deductions attributable to domestic source income,' 8 or at the flat 30 per cent
rate-whichever method produces the greater tax. 19
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESENT FRAMEWORK
Revenue Act of 1936
The dichotomy of nonresident aliens and foreign corporations engaged in
business here and those not so engaged entered the Code in the Revenue Act
of 1936.20 Under the earlier Acts, the entire net income from United States
sources, including capital gains, was subject to tax.21 However, except for
foreign taxpayers whose income was withheld or who had property here sub-
ject to distraint, little revenue was collected since the Treasury relied on the
"honesty" and "willing cooperation" of aliens against whom it had been unable
to enforce the tax.22 The 1936 Act separated aliens and foreign corporations
who were engaged in a trade or business or had an office or place of busi-
ness 23 in the United States, and continued to tax them on their entire domes-
tic source income. Other nonresident aliens and foreign corporations were
taxed only on "fixed or determinable annual or periodical" income, a concept
borrowed from the withholding provisions where it had been used since
1913.24 The withholding rate and the taxing rate were equalized, and both
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.873.1(b). See note 25 in!ra.
17. Only one exemption is permitted an alien who does not reside in Canada or Mexico.
I.R.C. § 873(d).
18. I.R.C. § 871(b). Deductions for charitable contributions or gifts provided by § 170
are limited to contributions or gifts to domestic corporations, funds or foundations created
in the United States § 873(c).
19. I.R.C. § 871(b).
20. 49 Stat. 1648 (1936).
21. See Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 680, §§ 11, 12(b), 13(a), 212(a), 213,
231(a).
22. Statement of Arthur Kent, Acting Chief Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue,
Confidential Hearings on H.R. 12395 Before the Senate Finance Committee, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 90 (1936). See also H.R. REP. No. 2475, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. at 9-10
(1936) ; S. REP. No. 2156, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. at 23 (1936).
23. Section 160 of the Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 861, deleted the reference to office
or place of business, leaving as the sole criterion, engaging in trade or business here. When
present, the office or place of business phrase caused difficulties of interpretation and invited
foreign taxpayers to establish offices primarily for purposes of getting favorable tax treat-
ment. Cf. Aktiebolaget Separator, 45 B.T.A. 243 (1941).
24. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 168. The 1936 Act, however, added divi-
dends to the specified items constituting "fixed or determinable annual or periodical" In-
come, both for purposes of withholding (Revenue Act of 1936 [hereafter referred to as 1936
Act], 49 Stat. 1648, §§ 143(b), 144(a)) and for purposes of taxation (§§ 211(a), 231(a)
1936 Act).
1096 [Vol. 72 :1093
HeinOnline -- 72 Yale L.J. 1096 1962-1963
FOREIGNERS AND THE INCOME TAX
were computed without deductions or exemptions.25 Thus the tax, with minor
exceptions,2 6 was only upon income which was subject to withholding. Filing
a return in most cases was not required,27 as the tax withheld would ordinarily
equal the tax due. The decision to exempt most income not subject to with-
holding reflected both the impracticality of enforcing the more comprehensive
tax and the desire to encourage investment from abroad, since capital gains
were exempt. 28
Rate Increases on New Class of Aliens
Soon after the 1936 Act went into effect, Congress discovered that a wealthy
nonresident alien might pay less tax at the flat rate than a citizen who was
25. The 1936 Act did not deny deductions and personal exemptions as clearly as it might
have, although the Finance Committee's Report indicated that deductions and personal ex-
emptions were not to be allowed. See S. REP. No. 2156, supra note 22, at 21. Denial of de-
ductions and exemptions is implied by the statutory language: "... . there is hereby imposed
for each taxable year, in lieu of the tax imposed by section 1, on the amount received...
-as interest... dividends [etc.] ... or other fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains
... a tax of 30 percent of such amount." I.R.C. § 871 (a) (1). See also ILR.C. § 881(a).
The Regulations take the position that neither deductions nor personal exemptions are
allowed under I.R.C. § 871 (a) (1) [Treas. Reg. § 1.873-1(b)].
26. The basic statutory definitions of income subject to withholding (Q 143(b), 1936
Act) and income subject to tax (§ 211(a), 1936 Act) were identical; and this is still the
case. I.R.C. §§ 871(a) (1), 1441(b). But the 1936 Act exempted certain dividends from
withholding, although still subjecting them to tax, and gave the Commissioner authority to
exempt other taxable items from withholding. Section 143(b), 1936 Act. The disparity be-
tween withholdable and taxable income was further widened when Congress in 1950 im-
posed a tax on certain capital gains which are not subject to withholding. See I.R.C. §§
871(a) (2), 1441(a).
27. See statement of Mr. Beaman, Hearings on HR. 12395 Before the Senate Finance
Committee, supra note 22, at 87. Section,217(b) of the 1936 Act and § 6012(a) of the present
Code, gave the Commissioner authority to exempt nonresident aliens taxable under I.R.C.
§ 871 and nonresident foreign, corporations taxable under I.R.C. § 881 from the duty to file
returns. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6012-1(b) (1) and 1.6012-2(g) (1), provide that such taxpayers
need not file returns if their tax liability is satisfied at source, although a return is a pre-
requisite to allowance of deductions, if any, to which a nonresident alien is entitled. 1.RC.
§ 874 (b).
28. The Committee Reports on the 1936 Act stressed the difficulty of enforcement, al-
though mentioning that nonresident aliens not engaged in business here and nonresident
foreign corporations would "not be subject to the tax on capital gains, including gains from
hedging transactions," and opining that the exemption "will result in additional revenue
from the transfer taxes and from the income tax in the case of persons carrying on the
brokerage business.' H.R. REP. No. 2475, supra note 22, at 9. The Finance Committee, how-
ever, suggested that the principal increase in revenue would result from withholding of
dividends, theretofore not required. S. RaP. No. 2156, mpra note 22, at 21.
The impact on foreign investment was considered in the Hearings on the Revenue Act
of 1936 Before the Committee on Ways and Means, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 161-74, 369-83
(1936), and the decision to exempt capital gains is hard to explain unless this policy was
behind it. See Angell, The Nonresident Alien: A Problem in Federal Taxation of Income,
36 CoLu . L. Rav. 908 (1936).
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taxed at progressive rates.2 9 This was remedied in the 1937 Act3 0 by divid-
ing nonresident aliens not engaged in business here into two classes. In one
class were those whose "fixed or determinable" 3' income was $21,600 or less.
This class continued to be taxed at the flat rate. In the second class were those
aliens whose income exceeded $21,600. This group was allowed deductions
attributable to United States income and personal exemptions and was taxed
at ordinary rates applicable to citizens. This method of computing the tax,
however, was to apply only if the tax so computed exceeded the flat rate be-
fore deductions and exemptions. The $21,600 figure selected as the break-off
point was the amount at which the tax calculated at ordinary rates would
approximately equal the tax due under the flat rate. Thus, when tax rates were
substantially increased in the 1942 Act,32 the break-off point was reduced to
$15,400, its present figure, where the effective rate on citizens and residents
was approximately equal to the new flat rate of 30 per cent. Under this scheme
a nonresident alien not engaged in business here can pay more tax than an
alien with the same amount of income who is engaged in business, since the
latter, though taxable on his entire income from domestic sources, is allowed
deductions. The nonresident alien not engaged in business here can pay less
tax than one engaged in business only if he has income from United States
sources, such as capital gains, which is not included in his tax base.
Capital gains of aliens present in the United States
Prompted by the presence of wealthy wartime and postwar immigrants who
retained legal residences elsewhere and thus were not taxed on stock and com-
modity transactions, 3 3 Congress in 1950 partially retreated from the 1936 ex-
emption of capital gains. Nonresident aliens not engaged in business but pres-
ent here 90 days or more during the taxable year were subjected to tax on all
net capital gains realized during the year from United States sources.'1 The tax
base of those nonresident aliens not engaged in business who were here less
than ninety days was broadened to include net capital gains "effected" during
the alien's presence here.35 No distinction was made between long and short
term gains; both were taxable in full at 30 per cent.30 Capital losses were per-
mitted only to offset capital gains, not as deductions from other income, and
29. See H.R. REP. No. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1937).
30. Revenue Act of 1937, § 501, 50 Stat. 830.
31. In the interest of brevity, "fixed or determinable" will hereafter often be used as
shorthand for "fixed or determinable annual or periodical."
32. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, §§ 103, 106, 56 Stat. 802, 807.
33. See Zareh Nubar, 13 T.C. 566 (1949) ; H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
57 (1950).
34. Revenue Act of 1950, § 213, 64 Stat. 936, now I.R.C. § 871(a) (2) (B).
35. I.R.C. § 871(a) (2) (A).
36. I.R.C. §§ 871(a) (2) (A), (B). The alternative tax imposed by § 871(b) upon
aliens with taxable income exceeding $15,400 is, however, computed at regular rates. Thus
the 25 per cent maximum rate and the alternative 50 per cent deduction of net long term
capital gains (§ 1201, 1202) would apply to such aliens, together with progressive rates on
other taxable income, if such method produced a greater tax than the 30 per cent flat rate.
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no carryovers were permitted.3 7 Capital gains effected by an alien not present
in the United States at any time during the taxable year remained exempt, as
as did all capital gains of nonresident foreign corporations.
Base broadening in the 1954 Code
The 1954 Code added a third category of income taxable to nonresident
aliens.3 9 It consists of certain items "considered to be gains from the sale or
exchange of capital assets" and subject to the 30 per cent rate regardless of
the alien's presence in the United States.40 The items are: certain distributions
from exempt pension trusts,41 employee annuities,42 certain gains from timber
and coal,43 and, the only one that concerns us here, gains from patent transfers
described in section 1235.44 Only gains from sales of timber and coal were
added to the tax base of nonresident foreign corporations.
45
Thus, unless a treaty provides otherwise,40 a nonresident alien or foreign
corporation engaged in business here is taxable on net income from patent or
copyright assignments if the income is from United States sources. Nonresi-
dent foreign corporations and nonresident aliens not engaged in business here
are taxed on such receipts from patents or copyrights as is "fixed or deter-
minable annual or periodical" income from United States sources; the alien
is also taxed on transfers constituting a "sale or exchange of a capital asset"
if the alien is present here as provided in section 871(a) (2). Under some
conditions, moreover, the income from a patent may be taxable whether or not
it is "fixed or determinable" and regardless of the alien's presence.
47
The statutory developments since 1936 have thus created a two-layered
definition of taxable income of foreign taxpayers not engaged in business in
this country. The income of these taxpayers must satisfy two definitions before
it is taxable by the United States. It must be both (1) "fixed or determinable
annual or periodical" or one of the specified capital gains, and, (2) derived
37. Moreover, as to aliens present less than, 90 days and taxed only on gains effected
while present, only capital losses effected while present here may be deducted in computing
the net capital gains subject to tax. I.R.C. § 871(a) (2) (A).
38. See H.R. REP. No. 2319, supra note 33, at 100. Also the gains of aliens present here
less than 90 days which are effected when the alien is outside the United States are not
taxed under the 1950 amendment.
39. I.R.C. § 871(a) (1).
40. The alternative tax applied to aliens with taxable income in excess of $15,400
[I.R.C. § 871(b)] also requires application of capital gain rates to these items in determin-
ing whether the 30 per cent flat rate or ordinary rates are applicable. See note 36 supra.
41. As described in I.R.C. § 402(a) (2).
42. As described in I.PC. § 403 (a) (2).
43. As described in I.,C. § 631(b) and (c).
44. I.P.C. § 871(a) (1).
45. I.RC. § 881(a).
46. I.R.C. § 894 provides: "Income of any kind, to the extent required by any treaty
obligation of the United States .... shall be exempt from taxation.. . ." Substantial exemp-
tions are granted by treaty on- the income from patent and copyright proceeds in many
cases, as is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 185-215.
47. If it is an "amount described in ... Section 1235." I.R.C. § 871(a) (1).
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from sources within the United States. To the extent income is from foreign
sources it is not taxable even though it is "fixed or determinable" or is other-
wise within the "tax-imposing" provisions.
Part I of this article deals with the "tax-imposing" provisions, sections
871 and 881, which must be applicable before the question of source of income
arises. Thus, it concerns only nonresident aliens and foreign corporations not
engaged in a United States business. The more basic problem of source of
income, a factor in the tax base of all non-nationals, is treated in Part II.
I. THE TAX-IMPOSING PRovIsIoNS
Proceeds of patent and copyright assignments as "fixed or determinable
annual or periodical" income
The meaning of the four adjectives, "fixed or determinable annual or peri-
odical" is a middle-aged mystery. The Code specifies several types of income,
such as dividends, interest, and salaries, which are considered to be "fixed or
determinable annual or periodical," then adds a catchall, "or other fixed or
determinable annual or periodical" income.48 "Royalties" from patents and
copyrights are not listed specifically but were subject to withholding before
the 1936 Act, and the Regulations have consistently stated that royalties are
"fixed or determinable annual or periodical. '49 Income from the "sale of per-
sonal property," however, has always been considered outside the "fixed or
determinable" concept. 0 Thus, the cases and rulings have usually centered on
the characterization of the transaction as an exempt "sale" or a taxable "li-
cense."
The Rationale of the Sale Exemption-Disinguishlng Net Income front
Returns of Capital
Most of the items upon which withholding had been required prior to 1936
were ordinary income items, such as interest and salaries, upon which there
was no cost to be deducted before arriving at taxable income and upon which
expenses attributable to the income were minimal or non-existent.5 1 It appar-
48. The tax is imposed upon "the amount received ... as interest (except interest on
deposits with persons carrying on the banking business), dividends, rents, salaries, wages,
premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or deter-
minable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income.... ." I.R.C. §§ 871(a), 881(a).
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-2. See Commissioner v. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369, 382 (1949).
50. "Income derived from the sale in the United States of property, whether real or
personal, is not fixed or determinable annual or periodical income." Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-2
(a) (3). Similar language has appeared in the Regulations since 1924. Commissioner v.
Wodehouse, supra note 49 at 382.
51. Withholding was not required on insurance premiums as "It was not the intent of
Congress to require withholding of gross income where ... little income (and sometimes
even a loss) is derived therefrom .... The intent was to include only such kinds of gross
income as have a very high content, so to speak, of net income." I.T. 1359, 1-1 Cum. BULL,
292, 294 (1922). See also I.T. 2836, XIII-2 Cum. BULL. 81, 82 (1934): "The use of tile
words 'fixed or determinable' income iri connection with the withholding provision . , evi-
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ently seemed practical and fair to Congress in 1936 to withhold a fixed per-
centage of such receipts and to impose a tax equal to the amount withheld.
However, when an alien sold property the Treasury before 1936 had not
required the purchaser to withhold any of the purchase price.5 2 Apparently it
was thought that to require the purchaser to withhold a fixed percentage of the
entire proceeds would be vexatious and harmful to foreign investment, since
the amount withheld would frequently bear no relation to the net income then
subject to tax. Compelling the purchaser to withhold an amount determinable
only by reference to the seller's basis was seemingly thought impractical.5o
Congress in 1936 pretty clearly intended to continue to exempt such items from
withholding and from taxation.
A system of flat-rate taxation is not easily adapted to gross proceeds con-
stituting, in part at least, a return of capital. In fixing the flat rate on aliens
approximately equal to the effective rate on income of domestic taxpayers,5
Congress implied that only items consisting substantially of net income were
ordinarily to be taxedY5 In exempting sales of personal property, Congress
apparently recognized the impracticality of fitting within the scheme of flat rate
taxation and withholding proceeds which might consist entirely of a return of
dences an intent that the tax shall be deducted. at the source from those payments which are
definitely known to constitute income as distinguished from gross proceeds."
52. See, e.g., I.T. 1679, I-1 Cum. BuLu. 140 (1923); cf. I.T. 1232, I-1 Cum. BuLl.
207 (1922) ("sale" of patent).
53. An article contemporaneous with the Revenue Act of 1936 explained the proposed
changes as follows:
No withholding at the source is possible, for in the majority of instances the Ameri-
can agent who accomplishes the sale has no record of the cost, and without the cost
taxable gain cannot be computed. It would be futile for Congress to undertake to
exact a contribution out of the sales price as an alternative. In the first place, such a
statute presumably would be unconstitutional as a capital levy. In the second place,
in the absence of a cost figure, the transaction might result in a loss and not a gain
and so work gross inequality. Finally, the rule would so harass foreign investors that
foreign funds inevitably would be driven elsewhere...
Angell, The Nonresident Alien: A Problen in Federal Taxation of Iscome, 36 CoLum. L
R-v. 908, 911-12 (1936).
54. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
55. The inclusion of "rents" in I.R.C. §§ 871(a) (1), 881(a) as "fixed or determinable"
income probably deserves to be called an exception, for rental proceeds will often bear little
relationship to net income. Another possible qualification, exists in the case of "annuities,"
also expressly listed as "fixed or determinable" income. If the gross proceeds ot an annuity
contract were subject to withholding before 1936, and to tax after 1936, then an alien pur-
chaser of an annuity would ordinarily be taxed on returns of capital. In I.T. 2183, IV-2
Cu. Burr. 66 (1925), the Treasury ruled that a nonresident alien receiving annual pay-
ments on an annuity contract was "subject to Federal income tax" on "the entire amount
of the annuity payments" and the payments were "subject to withholding at the rate of 6
per cent." The annuity contract, however, was purchased for the alien by her former em-
ployer. It is possible--but not revealed in the ruling-that the annuity was compensation
for services rendered irr the United States and was therefore taxable in full on that ground.
Before 1934 a domestic annuitant was not taxed on annuity payments until he recovered
his cost. See Egtvedt v. United States, 112 Ct. Cl. 80 (1948). The Revenue Act of 1934,
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capital, or might even represent a loss. 0 Yet if this is the rationale underlying
the "sale" exemption, it should be recognized that the "sale" concept is in-
adequate for distinguishing items consisting of income and those constituting
returns of capital. The method of disposition sheds no light on the cost of ac-
quisition or production. A copyright or patent owner, for example, may be
realizing a loss whether he "sells" all his rights for a lump sum or "licenses"
partial rights for periodic payments. 57 The policy of excluding items consti-
tuting in substantial part a return of capital arguably should have resulted
either in taxing all patent and copyright transfers or none-or, at least, should
have resulted in a different scheme for taxing income from such property.
Nonetheless, "sales" were exempted while "rentals" and "royalties" were
taxed in full. The legacy of the courts, then, has been to distinguish between
"sales" and "licenses" where one of the main purposes of the distinction can-
not be given effect. If the taxpayer disposes of rights for an amount which
barely covers his cost or expense in acquiring or disposing of the item, it
would seem at once inconsistent with congressional policy to impose a tax of
30 per cent on the entire proceeds. Yet there is no statutory warrant for an
ad hoc investigation into the expenditures of each foreign taxpayer before
deciding whether his receipts shall be taxed or exempt. So long, however, as
a "sale" is exempt, the foreign taxpayer who is potentially subject to a capital
levy on "license" proceeds has an alternative to a confiscatory tax. Hence, the
need for a distinction remains until the system of flat-rate taxation is elimi-
nated. 5s
§ 22(b) (2), 48 Stat. 687, included in income the portion of each annuity payment which
did not exceed 3 per cent of the total cost of the annuity. Under § 72(b) of the 1954 Code,
a portion of each annuity payment is excluded from gross income equal to the ratio the in-
vestment in the contract bears to the expected return under the contract. All these provisions
were presumably intended to apply to the nonresident alien. Thus "annuities" under I.R.C.
§§ 871 (a) (1), 881(a) and their predecessors probably refers to that portion of an annuity
payment which is "gross income" under §§ 61, 72. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.871-7(d).
56. In 1954, however, when Congress added to the tax base of nonresident aliens cer-
tain items "considered to be gains from the sale or exchange of capital assets," I.R.C, § 871
(a) (1), the practical problems of withholding did not seem insoluble. Congress made these
items subject to withholding too. I.R.C. § 1441 (a), (b). The Regulations permit the with-
holding agent to rely upon the written statement of the taxpayer as to the amount of gain
he has, and to withhold no more than this amount. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-3(d) (2).
57. In Commissioner v. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369 (1949), the Court recognized the
purpose of the "sale" exemption, but failed to recognize its inadequacy:
Those words [annual or periodical] are merely generally descriptive of the character
of the gains. . . which arise out of such relationships as those which produce readily
withholdable interest, rents, royalties and salaries consisting wvholly of incomne, espe-
cially in contrast to gains, profits and income in the nature of capital gains front
profitable sales of real and personal property. [Emphasis added.]
337 U.S. at 393-94. Similar statements appear in the Brief for Petitioner at 13, 57.
58. Suppose nonresident alien X "purchases" a patent from nonresident alien Y, the
"price" being 80 per cent of the proceeds X gets from exploiting the patent. X "licenses"
the patent in the United States, receives "royalties" of $100,000, $80,000 of which he owes
Y. Could X have $100,000 "fixed or determinable" income, taxable at 30 per cent? If so, he
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The doctrine of indivisibility
Lacking a clear functional basis for defining "sale," the courts and the Com-
missioner have looked to other guides-one of which has been the distinction
between a "sale" and a "license" developed in patent and copyright litigation.
The distinction between a "sale" and a "license" is an old one in patent and
copyright law, designed to describe the proper parties to an infringement ac-
tion. Unless a plaintiff was the assignee of all rights in the copyright or patent
possessed by his assignor, it was held that he had no standing to sue for in-
fringement without joining the assignor who retained "title."m' 3 The procedural
justification for this result rested on the fear that an infringer might be held
liable twice for the same wrong. A transfer of all rights under the patent or
copyright was called a "sale"; assignment of anything less than all rights was
a "license."
After some earlier rulings indicating transfers of partial rights were "sales,"Co
the Commissioner in 1933 discovered and adopted the indivisibility doctrine
would be $10,000 in the red (not counting expenses). If the transaction between X and Y
is considered a "license," the $80,000 Y gets from X might also be "fixed or determinable."
Does the United States take 30 per cent of this too, even though Y may have paid $100,000
for the patent?
The Regulations state that "amounts received," as used in § 871(a) (1) means "gross
income," Treas. Reg. § 1.871-7(b) ; but they also say that the tax is imposed upon "the gross
amount received from sources within the United States." Treas. Reg. § 1.882-3(a). "Gross
income" is not really defined in the Code. (See I.R.C. § 61.) The Commissioner has ruled
that statutory exclusions from "gross income," e.g., §§ 104, 105, 106, are applicable to non-
resident aliens, Rev. Rul. 56-514, 1956-2 Cum. BuLL. 499; but whether gross receipts may
otherwise be reduced before the flat tax rate is applied seems doubtful. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-
6(a) provides that "gross income' from the sale or exchange of property means the excess
of the amount realized over the unrecovered cost; but that the term ordinarily includes
gross receipts in the form of rentals and royalties. Depreciation is a "deduction" under § 167
and aliens taxed under § 871(a) (1) are denied deductions, as noted supra note 25.
The cases on "deductions" under § 871 (a) (1) are not illuminating. In Rohmer v. Com-
missioner, 153 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1946), the author's agent collected the $10,000 lump sum
"royalty" and withheld 10 per cent as his commission. Rohmer %was taxed on the full amount:
"Since the tax is on the gross income from United States sources, such an e'pense item
could not properly be deducted." See also Evelyn M. L. Neill, 46 B.T.A. 197 (1942) (gross
rentals on land taxable in full) ; Dupre v. United States, 45 A.F.T.R. 1141 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)
(alimony taxable in full without deduction of attorney's fees spent in getting judgment) ;
but cf. Otto H. Wittschen, 5 T.C. 10 (1945) (alien trust beneficiary taxable only on net
income of trust).
The likelihood of a confiscatory tax would be considerably lessened if § 871(b) were
amended to permit aliens with incomes over $15,400 to pay ordinary rates after deductions
even if the tax so computed is less than the flat rate before deductions. (See discussion of
this provision at text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.)
59. See, e.g., New Fiction Publishing Co. v. Star Co., 220 Fed. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1915);
Fulda, Copyright Assignments and the Capital Gains Tax, 58 YALE L.J. 245, 247-49 (1949).
60. O.D. 988, 5 Cum. BuL. 117 (1921) ; I.T. 1231, I-1 Cum. But.u 206 (1922) ; I.T.
2169, IV-1 Cu.ar. BULL. 13 (1925).
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for determining if there was a "sale" of a copyright for tax purposes.,, The
doctrine asserted that a copyright was indivisible and could not be partially
assigned, either as to time, place, or particular rights or privileges and that a
grant of limited rights was therefore not an assignment or sale of an interest
but a mere "license." Accordingly, the Commissioner ruled against a "sale"
of serial, movie, and dramatic rights in books, on the ground that the proceeds
were "royalties" from a "license" even though paid in a lump sum.
0 2
Promptly accepted by the Tax Court, the doctrine was soon swallowed by the
Second Circuit. In Rohmer v. Commissioner,63 an author who was a citizen
and resident of England assigned the American and Canadian serial rights in
his novel to an American magazine publisher, retaining movie, stage, and book
rights. The publisher paid Rohmer's American agent a lump sum of $10,000
for the rights. The Commissioner assessed the flat rate tax under the prede-
cessor of section 871(a) (1) on the entire $10,000. Rohmer sued for a refund,
contending the proceeds were not "fixed or determinable annual or periodical"
because the transaction was a "sale of personal property" and also because the
consideration, having been paid in a lump sum, was not "annual or periodical."
The court rejected both the taxpayer's arguments:
Where a copyright owner transfers ... substantially less than the entire
"bundle of rights" conferred by the copyright, then payment therefor,
whether in one sum or in several payments, constitutes royalties within
the meaning of section 211(a) (1) (A). [Now section 871(a) (1)]. For
such a transfer is the grant of a license. Payment for the grant of such a
license.., is no less a royalty paid for such use when disbursed in a single
amount .... It is like interest paid for several years in one sum or rent
paid in advance for the use of a building for a period of years.
'04
A few years later, P. G. Wodehouse repeated Rohmer's arguments to the
Fourth Circuit. 5 Wodehouse, in 1938 and 1941, had assigned for lump-suni
payments the North American, and in some instances also the South American
serial rights to three novels and an article; he also assigned the book rights
in one of the novels to a different publisher for a lump sum. Disagreeing with
the Second Circuit, the Fourth Circuit criticized the Rohmer decision for rely-
ing on cases concerned only with copyright law and questions of an assignee's
61. I.T. 2735, XII-2 Cum. BULL. 131 (1933). This ruling concerned source of income
but its reasoning was later applied in other questions involving assignments of patents and
copyrights.
62. Ibid.
63. 153 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1946). In Sabatini v. Commissioner, 98 F.2d 753 (2d Cir.
1938), involving source of income, the court had even earlier applied the indivisibility doc-
trine to find there was no "sale."
64. 153 F.2d at 63. Revenue Act of 1940, § 211(a) (1) (A) was the predecessor of
I.R.C. § 871 (a) (1). It did not mention royalties. The court inferred that Congress, in bor-
rowing the "fixed or determinable" concept from the withholding provisions, approved the
interpretations placed on the latter in the Regulations. And as noted supra, note 49, the
Regulations stated that "royalties" were subject to withholding.
65. Wodehouse v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 986 (4th Cir. 1948), reild, 337 U.S, 360
(1949).
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standing to sue for infringenent. 6 Such decisions, the court said, were con-
cerned with procedural matters and "did not undertake to controvert the un-
deniable fact that serial rights, book rights, dramatic production rights and
motion picture rights of a literary production are property rights which may
be and are separately and effectively bought and sold in the literary market."(
Holding the payments exempt as "proceeds of the sales of personal property,"
the court said, "WAe cannot suppose that Congress intended to exempt the
proceeds of a single sale of all the rights in a literary production to one per-
son, but to tax the proceeds of separate sales of parts of the whole."' s The
court added that the "plain meaning of the statutory terms" 60 required the
holding that payment in a lump sum for serial rights is not "annual or peri-
odical" income even if the transaction is a "license" rather than a "sale."
The Supreme Court resolved the conflict by reversing the I'odehouse case
and holding the payments taxable.70 In doing so, it contributed little but con-
fusion. The majority opinion, written by Mr. justice Burton, is mainly devoted
to pointing out that "royalties," in the abstract, were subject to withholding
prior to the 1936 Act and were income from United States sources. In its
preoccupation with demonstrating that royalties were taxable, the Court came
close to begging the real question-whether the payments were "royalties" or
sales proceeds. Apparently agreeing with the Commissioner's surprising posi-
tion that "fine questions of title, or of sales or copyright law''"7 were not in-
volved in the case, the majority did not rely on the doctrine of indivisibility.72
The Court said there was no suggestion in the history of the 1936 Act "that
lump sum advance payments of rentals or royalties should be exempted from
taxation while at the same time smaller repeated payments of rentals or royal-
ties would be taxed and collected at the source."73 To have exempted non-
resident aliens from such readily collectible taxes, reasoned the Court, "would
have discriminated in their favor against resident citizens of the United States
who would be required to pay their regular income tax on such income .... 0174
In short, the Court was unvilling to construe the statute to permit aliens to
66. 166 F.2d at 989. E.g., Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Howells Sales Co., 282 Fed. 9
(2d Cir. 1922) ; New Fiction Publishing Co. v. Star Co., 220 Fed. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
67. 166 F.2d at 989.
68. Id. at 990.
69. Id. at 991.
70. Commissioner v. Vodehouse, 337 U.S. 369 (1949).
71. Id. at 376. The Commissioner's eschewing of fine questions of copyright law is sur-
prising because it was on such grounds that he had prevailed in Rohmer v. Commissioner,
153 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1946), which in turn was based on the doctrine of indivisibility dating
back to I.T. 2735, supra note 61, which had relied on such authorities on copyright law as
Corpus Juris and Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Howell Sales Co., 282 Fed. 9 (2d Cir. 1922).
72. 337 U.S. at 376.
73. Id. at 391.
74. Ibid.
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go untaxed on United States source income which was readily withholdable.1
As a result, the content of the exemption of sales of personal property was left
obscure. The Court apparently conceded that the "sale" of a copyright was
exempt 76 but seemed to leave no room for a "sale" of "limited rights." 77 Thus,
while appearing to reject the doctrine of indivisibility the Court seems also to
have embraced it.
The opinion abounds with question-begging equivocations, exposed both by
the dissent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter 78 and by the commentators.7 But how-
ever feeble the attempt, the Court sought to avoid formalistic distinctions and
to ground its decision in policy. Apparently, however, the only policy con-
sidered was the need for revenue. Congress, unlike the Court, chose to forego
tax on some sources of withholdable revenue from nonresident aliens. There is
force, therefore, in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting charge that the Court's
decision was guided by fiscal considerations which Congress chose not to write
into law.80
Mr. justice Frankfurter, describing the legislation as "precise," excoriated
the majority for relying on "long prior practice," which in his view was either
irrelevant or ill-conceived. 81 Rejecting the notion of indivisibility, he agreed
with the Fourth Circuit that the doctrine arose in a procedural context and
had no bearing on the tax question. In his view, if there is an exclusive trans-
fer of any one of the rights granted by the Copyright Act "under terms of
payment which do not depend on future use by the transferee, . . . [tax law]
should reflect business practice in recognizing that the proceeds are from 'the
sale of personal property' . .. ,82 He could not see why a lump sum transfer
of exclusive but partial rights should be taxed when Congress clearly chose to
foregoe taxation of a single disposition of all the rights.
83
75. "One advance payment to cover the entire 28-year period of a copyright comes
within the reason and reach of the Revenue Acts as well as, or even better than, two or more
partial payments of the same sum." Id. at 394.
76. Id. at 384, 388, 393-94.
77. See id. at 392.
78. Id. at 401. Joined by Justices Murphy and Jackson.
79. See, e.g., Fincke, AnL Analysis of the Income Aspects of Patents, Copyrihlts, and
Their Analogues, 5 TAx L. REv. 361, 365-71 (1950).
80. 337 U.S. at 409.
81. Id. at 404. The majority, for example, relied on decisions such as Sabatini v. Com-
missioner, 98 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1938), and I.T. 2735, XII-2 Cum. BuLL. 131 (1933), which
adopted the indivisibility doctrine and held that proceeds from transfer of partial rights were
taxable as royalties. Justice Frankfurter said these decisions were ill-founded because based
on "a metaphysical view of copyright law" and were irrelevant-or nearly so-as they did
not involve the "fixed or determinable" concept; they merely held that the proceeds were
income from United States sources, an issue not in the Wodehoiuse case. It is problematical
whether the majority understood the difference in issues. See, e.g., 337 U.S. at 371, where
the Court said the case turned on "the meaning of 'gross income from sources within the
United States.'" However, the majority may have felt that a "royalty" under the source
rules was so clearly a "royalty" under the taxing provisions as not to merit comment,
82. 337 U.S. at 424.
83. Id. at 424-25.
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The Method of Payment as a Criterion of "Salc"
Though suggesting in his Wodehouse dissent that taxation might turn on
whether the transferor retained a participating interest producing recurring
receipts, Mr. Justice Frankfurter may merely have been adhering to his fre-
quently preached principle of deciding only the case before the Court. It is not
clear that he would have taxed V~rodehouse had the consideration been a typical
royalty arrangement, for this, too, might have been a "sale." Certainly, "busi-
ness practice" commonly included such an arrangement.
There was, however, some support for the view that "annual or periodical"
refers to the method of payment and that a casual, non-recurring payment was
not subject to withholding before the 1936 Act. Early rulings under the with-
holding provisions excluded from withholding requirements racetrack win-
nings,84 prizes won in an art contest,8 5 and a selling commission on a single
transaction. 6 Periodicity seemed to be required in these early rulings with the
only likely justification that it would be unduly burdensome to require with-
holding where there was merely a temporary relationship between the payor
and payee.
87
The periodicity question, however, was apparently not decided by any court
before 1936.88 There is no evidence that the Treasury's position on periodicity
84. S. 957, 1-Cum. BuLL. 184 (1919).
85. G.C.M. 21575, 1939-2 Cux. BuLu 172.
86. O.D. 907, 4 Cum. BUIL. 232 (1921). See also Bulletin B. Treasury Department
(1920), Income Subject to Withholding, p. 11:
This phrase [Fixed or determinable, annual or periodical income] refers, generally,
to gross income subject to taxation, which is... paid from litne to thne. A salesman
who works by the month for a commission on sales, and is paid monthly, receives
income of this character. On the other hand, carnings of lawyers and doctors arc not
usually within . . .this provision of the lawu (unless paid on a regular retainer).
[Emphasis added.]
87. There were no reasons given in the rulings for the conclusions reached. (They were
revoked recently in reliance on Wodehouse, Rev. Rul. 58-479, 1958-2 Cum. Buu. 60.) It is
possible, though improbable, that the Treasury may briefly have had adherents to the now
quaint notion that income includes only recurring receipts. The theory is propounded in
Plehn, The Concept of Income, as Recurrent, Consumable Receipts, 14 Am. Ecox. REv. 1
(1924), and is apparently law in much of South America. See Froomkin, Some Problems
of Tax Policy in Latin Amzerica, 10 NAT'L TAx J. 370, 372 (1957).
88. Some courts after 1936, but before Wodehouse, had rejected the notion that peri-
odical payment was a necessary element of "fixed or determinable annual or periodical"
income. See Commissioner v. Raphael, 133 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1943), which held that in-
terest paid in lump sum was taxable. "Because the interest gain is not payablc periodically
makes it nonetheless interest income when paid." Id. at 445; De Nobili Cigar Co. v. Com-
missioner, 143 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1944). But cf. General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 139 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1944), holding that down payments on, patent rights were not
taxable, even if they were "royalties." The Second Circuit in Rohmer v. Commissioner, 153
F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1946), tortuously construed its General Aniline opinior to have held there
was a "sale."
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was known or approved of by Congress. 9 Moreover, the statute, in specifying
that "interest," "rents," "annuities," etc. "and other fixed or determinable an-
nual or periodical gains, profits, and income" were subject to withholding-
and to taxation after 1936 9 0-tends to confirm the Wodchouse majority's
conclusion that the words "annual or periodical" were "merely generally de-
scriptive of the character" of the income subject to tax.9 1 In specifying that
"interest" was taxable, Congress is not likely to have meant only interest paid
periodically. The items of income specified are items ordinarily paid period-
ically, but the statute suggests a purpose to tax them regardless of how they
are paid. Thus, a "royalty," if it is income of the general character covered
in the statute, is taxable even if paid in a lump sum. Conversely, a "sale,"
even if the price is paid annually or periodically, is not taxable as it is not the
kind of transaction covered. Yet even after this is decided, the fact that the
transferor's compensation is a lump sum, rather than paid in installments or
geared to exploitation of the property, might be relevant in determining
whether there was a "sale." The Court in Wodehouse, however, did not ap-
pear to think so.
The Wodehouse decision was at least clear that payment in a lump sum
would not convert what otherwise would be a taxable royalty into an exempt
"sale." But Wodehouse did not render the method of payment immaterial.
In Bloch v. United States,92 a nonresident alien who granted to a domestic
corporation an exclusive "license" to "make, use, exercise and vend" products
covered by his patent throughout the United States and its territories for the
life of the patent, was held taxable on receipts which were measured by sales of
the patented product because the payments were not part of a fixed, specified
sum. Only the taxability of sums received in the 1940's was in issue, but the
court ventured that a $40,000 lump sum paid Bloch in 1935 upon execution
of the contract "was not subject to withholding when made and not taxable
as a royalty." The consideration based on sales of the product was held to be
taxable "royalties" because Bloch had retained "an interest in the profitable
exploitation of the patented articles." The Second Circuit thought the method
of payment crucial, apparently classifying the transaction as a "sale" to the ex-
tent of the lump sum and as a "license" to the extent of the participating pay-
ments. Thus, payment for all the United States rights may be "purchase price"
89. However, the Regulations since 1918 have provided: "The income need not be paid
annually if it is paid periodically; that is to say, from time to time, whether or not at regular
intervals." This statement is now contradicted by the one which follows it: "The fact that
a payment is not made annually or periodically does not, however, necessarily prevent its
being fixed or determinable annual or periodical income." Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-2(a) (2).
This "qualificatior" was not present in earlier regulations. See, c.g., Treas. Reg. 101, Art.
119-5, Revenue Act of 1938.
90. I.R.C. §§ 871(a) (1), 881(a).
91. 337 U.S. 369, at 393 (1949). See also Rohmer v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 61, 63 (2d
Cir. 1946) : "The phrase ... is descriptive of the nature or type of income, regardless of
the actual manner of payment"
92. 200 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1952).
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to the extent paid in a lump sum and substitution of participating royalty pay-
ments for a lump sum may therefore convert what would otherwise be exempt
"purchase price" pro tanto into taxable "royalties." Many courts would quail
at the conceptual difficulty of such a part "sale," part "license" approach 
0 3
and no subsequent court has taken it up. The Commissioner's position is un-
clear.
In a ruling involving facts similar to those in Bloch, the Commissioner
seemed to reach a contrary result. 4 There a nonresident foreign corporation
granted to a domestic corporation "the exclusive right and license" to manu-
facture, use and sell patented devices in the United States and Canada during
the lives of the patents. A lump sum characterized by the parties as an "advance
on royalties" was paid in 1929. The contract provided for subsequent annual
payments based on each device manufactured but subject to a specified mini-
mum annual sum. The -issue was the taxability of payments received in 1953.
Without mentioning whether the payments in question consisted of the guaran-
teed minimum or were measured by the units manufactured, the Commissioner
ruled that the transaction, being "a grant of all the patentee possessed under
the patent," was a "sale" and thus not "fixed or determinable annual or peri-
odical." Wodehouse was read as not overturning the "well-settled rule that
the exclusive grant of all the rights under a copyright or patent was a sale ...
with the tax consequences attendant upon the sale of any personal property by
a nonresident alien." The Commissioner also read Wodehouse as holding that
a transfer of less than all the rights in a patent or copyright would be taxable
"whether it be called a sale or a license." Bloch was distinguished as follows:
[I]t can hardly be said that an economic interest.., has been retained
where there is a total consideration to be paid not dependent in any way
upon the volume of sales or production. As no economic interest is re-
tained, the instant transaction is a sale with periodic payment of the pur-
chase price, in the nature of an installment sale.05
One difficulty with this reasoning is that it does not seem to apply to the
facts. The taxpayer clearly retained an "economic interest" dependent upon
production. If merely specifying a minimum annual payment in a contract
otherwise calling for payments measured by the products manufactured will
convert a taxable license into an exempt sale, then all rationality in this area
seems to be gone. The Commissioner's ruling may imply that if all rights are
granted and a royalty arrangement is buttressed by a guaranteed annual pay-
ment, then the royalties, even if they exceed the guaranteed minimum, will be
"sales proceeds." Or the ruling may mean that whether the proceeds are from
a "sale" or a "license" will vary from year to year, being "sales price" when
the guaranteed minimum is paid, and "royalties" when the minimum is ex-
93. As was suggested by Judge Clark in his concurring opinion, 200 F.2d at 66-67.
94. Rev. RuL 57-317, 1957-2 Cuis. BuLL 909.
95. Id. at 912.
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ceeded. Either approach seems ludicrous. More likely, the Commissioner dis-
agreed with Bloch and was willing to treat as a sale any transaction wherein
all United States rights are granted, whether or not the transferor retains a
participating economic interest.0 6
The capital gains context: the demise of indivisibility for domestic taxpayers
A "sale" is a chameleon, capable of as many meanings as there are jobs for
it to perform. It is pressed into service many times for many purposes, within
and without the Internal Revenue Code. Besides serving as a criterion for
carving out a category of income which is not "fixed or determinable" tinder
sections 871 (a) (1) and 881 (a), a "sale" is also a condition of capital gains
treatment under section 1222. Thus, domestic taxpayers pursuing capital gains
on the income from patent and copyright assignments have often sought "sale"
classification for their transactions.97
For more than two decades, the Commissioner's principal weapon against
the allowance of capital gains on copyrights and patents was the indivisibility
doctrine.98 The application of the doctrine to a domestic taxpayer received its
first judicial test in Goldsmith v. Commissioner,9" where the Second Circuit
ruled on capital gains treatment of income from an exclusive grant of motion
picture rights by an American playwright. Judge Learned Hand, joined by
Judge Swan, said that where the grant is exclusive, perpetual, and in a partic-
ular medium, the author is required to protect the licensee against other in-
fringement; the right of the assignee to exclude others is "property" within the
capital gains provisions and its grant is a "sale." Judges Hand and Swan, how-
96. See also, Eterpen Fianciera Sociedad v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 100 (Ct. Cl.
1952). There, payments for an exclusive "license" to "make, use and vend" patented products
throughout the United States were based on a percentage of net sales. The court held the
payments were "fixed or determinable," not because the consideration was indeterminate
but because the court thought a contemporaneous option agreement belied the stated in-
tention in the "license" agreement to grant all rights in the United States.
97. I.R.C. §§ 1201, 1202 provide for special treatment of "capital gain," defined under
§ 1222 to mean the "sale or exchange" of a capital asset. Although "sale" has been differ-
entiated from "exchange," Gruver v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 363, 366 (4th Cir. 1944), it
"sale" probably includes an "exchange." It is so defined in § 864, which deals with source of
income. At any rate, there seldom is reason for making a distinction.
As discussed more fully, infra, amendments of the Code in 1950 eliminated copyrights
created by the taxpayer from capital asset status, and § 1235 of the 1954 Code specifically
grants capital gains treatment to certain transfers of patents by inventors even though on
a royalty basis. Thus, since 1954, there has been little interest in the "sale'-"license" dis-
tinction among domestic authors and inventors.
98. In its first pronouncement on copyright transfers, the Treasury ruled that an
author's assignment of movie rights in his play was a sale of property for capital gains pur-
poses. I.T. 2169, IV-1 Cum. BULL. 13 (1925). But after its 1933 ruling adopting the it
divisibility doctrine, I.T. 2735, XII-2 Cum. BULL. 131 (1933), the Service contended that
copyrights and patents were incapable of being sold piecemeal.
99. 143 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944).
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ever, concluded the property was held for sale in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, and thus was within one of the statutory exclusions from capital assets.100
Goldsmith got little comfort from Judge Hand's dictum but later courts
eventually accepted it. In Herwig v. United States, 10 the Court of Claims
allowed capital gains treatment of an assignment by Kathleen Winsor of ex-
clusive motion picture rights in her novel, "Forever Amber." The court said,
"the exclusive and perpetual grant of any one of the 'bundle of rights' which
go to make up a copyright [is] a 'sale' of personal property rather than a mere
'license.' "102
After the government's loss in Herwig, it capitulated on the divisibility
question, modified its 1933 ruling, and announced that "a copyright proprie-
tor's grant of the exclusive right to exploit a copyrighted work in a particular
medium effects a transfer of property," but "a grant of less confers only a
license."' 03 The ruling added, however, that such a grant would only be a
"sale" if the consideration is not measured by use or profitability of the copy-
righted work and is not payable periodically over a period generally cotermi-
nous with the grantee's use of the copyright. The latter contention-that in-
terests in copyrights could be "sold" for capital gains purposes only if the
consideration was a fixed sum-had earlier been rejected by the Tax Court
where all rights had been parted with.'0 4 But later in Cory v. Commissioner,105
a percentage of the sales price of books sold was held not to be the proceeds
of a "sale" of the book rights by both the Tax Court and the Second Circuit.
The combination of a partial assignment plus retention of a participating in-
terest was too much for either court to take.1°
The Commissioner had also announced a similar requirement of a fixed sum
for "sale" treatment of patent assignments in a 1950 ruling 0 7 and he re-
100. Revenue Act of 1938, § 117(a) (1), 52 Stat. 500, now I.R.C. § 1221(1). Judge
Chase, in a separate opinion announcing the court's result, accepted the doctrine of indivisi-
bility. 143 F.2d at 467.
101. 105 F. Supp. 384 (Ct Cl. 1952).
102. Id. at 389. The court even suggested that a grant of reproduction rights limited to
certain cities or to specified languages might be a "sale." 105 F. Supp. at 388. It is not clear
from the opinion whether the taxpayer's entire consideration was a fixed sum or whether
part of it was determined on, a royalty basis. See id. at 385.
103. Rev. Rul. 54-409, 1954-2 Ctm. BuLT 174. The Commissioner stressed the fact,
relied upon by the Fourth Circuit in Wodehouse v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 986 (4th Cir.
1948), rev'd on other grounds, 337 U.S. 369 (1949), that various rights in copyrighted
works are "purchased and sold" in the literary market. He also conceded that whether a
grantee has sufficient rights to sue for infringement "has nothing to do with the question of
what rights in a literary work do or do not constitute property."
104. Richard W. Te Linde, 18 T.C. 91 (1952).
105. 230 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1956), affirming 23 T.C. 775 (1955).
106. Judge Frank said that evert though a transfer of part of the bundle of rights for a
fixed sum or of all the rights for bn, indeterminate sum might be a "sale" of property for
capital gains purposes, where the transfer is "both (1) a transfer of part of the cluster of
rights and (2) for an amount wholly indeterminable at the time of the transfer, no such
sale occurs.' 230 F-2d at 944.
107. Mim. 6490, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 9.
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affirmed this position in 1955,108 although he had frequently been trounced in
court.10 9 In 1958, however, the Commissioner acquiesced in the judicial on-
slaught"o and ruled that measuring consideration by production, sale or use
of patents would not prevent a sale for capital gains purposes.'1 ' A caveat
was added, however: retention of other rights in addition to "interests resem-
bling royalties" might preclude a "sale.""1
2
The latest word from the Treasury is Revenue Ruling 60-226,113 where the
Commissioner interpreted his 1958 patent ruling as permitting consideration
received by the owner of patent "for the assignment of the patent, or the grant-
ing of an exclusive license to such patent," to be "treated as the proceeds of
a sale of property, for Federal income tax purposes, even though the consid-
eration ... is measured by production, use, or sale of the patented article."
114
Concluding that patent and copyright transfers should be treated alike, the
Commissioner retreated from his earlier position 115 and said that considera-
tion for a grant of exclusive rights in a medium of publication for the life of
a copyright would be treated as proceeds from a sale of property even if mneas-
ured by the copies sold, performances given, or exhibitions made.
Thus, the Commissioner has conceded not only that an exclusive grant of
partial rights in a patent or copyright or a grant of all the rights subject to
a retained royalty interest may be a sale, but, contrary to Cory v. Commis.
108. Rev. Rul. 55-58, 1955-1 Cumt. BULL. 97.
109. See Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258 (1946) ; Carl G. Dreymann, 11 T.C. 153 (1948)
cf. Allen v. Werner, 190 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1951).
110. See also Roy J. Champayne, 26 T.C. 634 (1956) ; Leonard Coplan, 28 T.C, 1189
(1957):
111. Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 408, revoking Mim. 6490, supra note 107;
Rev. Rul. 55-58, supra note 108.
112. Ibid.
113. Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 26.
114. Id. at 22, emphasis added. This seems a charitable interpretation of Rev, Rul,
58-353, supra note 111, since all the Commissioner conceded in that ruling was that a grant
of all rights, subject to a participating royalty interest and a right of termination- for secu-
rty purposes, was a "sale." He seemed to withhold approval of sale treatment for partial
but exclusive grants subject to a royalty interest such as was involved in Cory v. Commis-
sioner, 230 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1956), affirming 23 T.C. 775 (1955). It is not yet clear, how-
ever, what the Commissioner means by an "exclusive license." Presumably, assignment of
an undivided interest in all rights under the patent is an, "exclusive license." Less clear,
however, is whether an. assignment of rights limited to a particular industry or geographical
area would qualify; or whether assignment of the right to use the invention, but not to
assign it; the right to manufacture and sell, but not to use the patented products, etc., is, in
the Commissioner's view, an "exclusive license." Since the Commissioner in Rev. Rutl,
60-226 said "property rights of patents and copyrights are similar in substance" and sald
his new position on copyrights was the same "position . . . taken in the case of patents," it
seems likely that all or some of the aforementioned slices of patent rights may be "exclusive
licenses," hence, "sales."
115. See Rev. Rul. 54-409, note 103 supra.
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sioner,'-' an exclusive assignment of partial rights with periodic payments
based upon exploitation may be a sale "for Federal income tax purposes. '1 7
Relationship of a capital gains "sale" to the fi'ed or determinable concept
In his 1954 ruling renouncing the indivisibility doctrine, the Commissioner
cautioned that the taxability of assignments by a nonresident alien was a sepa-
rate and distinct question from the qualification of a citizen for capital gains
treatment." 8 Thus a "sale of property" under section 1222 is not necessarily
a sale of property under sections 871 or 881. The courts have often "put to
one side" cases involving aliens as irrelevant for decision under section 1222,111
and vice versa.' 20 Frequently, however, they seem to consider the cases inter-
changeable and the inquiry, identical..
2 '
The Committee Reports on the 1936 Act explicitly stated that "capital gains"
are exempt. 12 2 Moreover, the Revenue Act of 1950 which added section 871
(a) (2), imposing a tax on net gains "from sales or exchanges of capital as-
sets" by aliens present here implies that such gains by aliens not present are
exempt, i.e., not "fixed or determinable" income.m Arguably, therefore, the
capital gains concept of "sale" is also applicable to carve out a category of in-
come which is not "fixed or determinable" under sections 871(a) (1) and
881 (a). If so, Commissioner v. Wodehouse retains little force.'2 4 The assign-
ment in that case (serial rights) would clearly qualify as a "sale" under the
116. See notes 105 and 114 supra.
117. Rev. Rul. 60-226, supra note 113.
118. Rev. Rul. 54-409, supra note 103. Rev. Rul. 60-226, supra note 113, contains no
such caveat.
119. See, e.g., Herwig v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 384 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
120. See, e.g., Rohmer v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1946).
121. See, e.g., Carl G. Dreymann, 11 T.C. 153 (1948); Eterpen Financiera Sociedad
v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 100 (Ct. Cl. 1952) ; Broderick v. Neale, 201 F.2d 621 (10th
Cir. 1953). Several commentators argue, or assume, there should be no difference. See, e.g.,
Fulda, Copyright Assignments and the Capital Gains Tax, 58 YALE L.J. 244, 261 (1949);
3B MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL Ixcoam TAxATioN 579 (1957).
122. See note 28 supra.
123. The House Report on the 1950 Act states:
A nonresident alien [who has not been present in the United States at any time dur-
ing the taxable year] ... is not affected by this ... bill, insofar as his capital gains
derived in, or his capital losses allocable to, the United States are concerned. Gains
derived in the United States on sales or exchanges of capital assets effected by such
an individual during the taxable year are not subject to tax in the United States.
H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1950).
124. The taxpayer in the Wodchortse case argued that what constitutes a "sale" for
capital gains purposes also constitutes a "sale" for purposes of taxing nonresident aliens,
relying on the Committee Reports, note 28 supra. Brief for Respondent, Commissioner v.
Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369, p. 10. Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, accepted the argument.
337 U.S. at 423. However, the only decision in the capital gains field supporting the lower
court's concept of a "sale" was Goldsmith v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944) ;
hence little was made of the issue. The Wodehouse majority was not even stirred to men-
tion it.
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criteria of Revenue Ruling 60-226 ;12; so would the transactions in many other
cases lost by aliens and foreign corporations. 2 6 The proceeds of most assign-
ments by aliens, formerly taxable, may now be exempt without any change in
the legislation directly affecting these taxpayers and notwithstanding the con-
sistent opposition of the courts and the Commissioner to such an expansive
definition of the sale concept under sections 871(a) (1) and 881 (a).
A literal approach may be possible, however. Even if the "sale" of a capital
asset is exempt unless the alien is present in this country as provided in section
871 (a) (2), the same result is not literally required when the "sale" is of a
non-capital asset. The "sale" criteria of Revenue Ruling 60-226 can be applied
to decide if income from a patent or copyright which is a capital asset is "fixed
or determinable" under sections 871(a) (1) or 881 (a), and more stringent
requirements conceivably could be applied to assignments of non-capital assets.
The indivisibility doctrine and the fixed sum requirement might be dusted off
and put back to work. Thus, if a nonresident alien-not present in the United
States-assigned serial rights in a book, the income would not be "fixed or
determinable" if the copyright was a capital asset and would therefore be ex-
empt; but if the copyright was not a capital asset-because held primarily for
sale in the ordinary course of business 127 or because held by a taxpayer whose
personal efforts produced the property 128 -the income would be "fixed or de-
terminable" and would be taxable under Wodeho use.
120
The result of this approach would be that in many cases aliens and foreign
corporations which produced a copyright themselves would be taxed on the
proceeds of a partial assignment, while a purchaser of a copyright could dispose
of his rights piecemeal, free of tax, provided he did so while not present in the
United States. The policies that could support such distinctions are not ap-
parent.
Admittedly, taxing partial assignments of an alien who created a copyright
by his personal efforts while exempting assignments by one who purchased the
property is remotely relevant to the purpose in the 1936 Act to tax nonresident
aliens only on proceeds consisting substantially of net income.130 The typical
alien author may have spent less money in producing his work than the typical
alien who purchased a copyright has paid for the property, and the author
would not normally be permitted to treat all of his expenses as investments,
anyway. Hence, the proceeds of an assignment by the alien author may carry a
higher proportion of profit than those of his counterpart who bought the copy-
right. Yet such a dichotomy is a crude criterion for distinguishing net income
125. Supra note 113.
126. E.g., Estate of Marton, 47 B.T.A. 184 (1942); Rohmer v. Commissioner, 153
F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Bloch v. United States, 200 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1952).
127. I.R.C. § 1221(1).
128. Or by a person who holds the property with the author's basis. I.R.C. § 1221
(3) (B).
129. Commissioner v. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369 (1949).
130. See text at note 55 supra.
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from returns of capital. Surely there are enough exceptions to make it unreal-
istic and inequitable.
The distinction would not apply to patents. In 1950, copyrights produced
by the personal efforts of the taxpayer were eliminated from the "capital as-
set" category, but patents created by the personal efforts of the taxpayer were
not.131 Hence, the amateur alien inventor may be able to qualify his patent as a
"capital asset" and his gain as capital gain. 132 The proceeds from the "sale"
would not be "fixed or determinable" even though the proceeds of the "sale"
of partial rights by his author counterpart would be. Of course, the inventor
might avoid classification of his income as "fixed or determinable" only to have
it taxed, if it is an "amount described" in section 1235. But as will be discussed
in detail later,133 it is quite possible that he can avoid section 1235 and hence
avoid tax altogether if he is not present in the United States.
Moreover, the distinction between purchasers and producers of copyrights
would not apply to assignments of partial rights by an alien who purchased a
copyright but holds it for sale in the ordinary course of business, for his prop-
erty would not be a capital asset, 3 4 and his income might therefore be "fixed
or determinable." On the other hand, if he used the property in a trade or
business but did not hold it primarily for sale, the property, although not a
capital asset, would be a section 1231 asset. His gains might therefore be "con-
sidered" capital gains and thus not "fixed or determinable."1
35
Another possible interpretation is that income from transactions in capital
assets meeting the criteria of "sale" established for capital gains are not exempt
if they otherwise would fall within the vague criteria of the "fixed or determin-
able" concept. Thus, if all rights must be assigned for the transfer to be a "sale"
which does not produce "fixed or determinable" income, a transfer of partial
rights could be taxed under sections 871 (a) (1) or 881(a) even if the gain
were capital gain and the transferor was never present in the United States.13 G
But this interpretation would not only seem to require taking substantial liberties
with legislative history ;137 it would also produce paradoxes of its own. For ex-
131. See text at note 153 infra.
132. See text at note 155 infra.
133. See text at notes 175-79 infra.
134. I.R.C. § 1221(1).
135. Depreciable property used in a trade or business is also excluded from the definition
of "capital assets." I.R.C. § 1221(2). But § 1231 permits net gains from such property in
most cases to be "considered as gains... from sales or exchanges of capital assets." Patents
and copyrights are depredable. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3. Gains from such property may
therefore be capital gains, hence, not "fixed or determinable" income. The conclusion that
§ 1231 gains are to be treated as capital gains for purposes of §§ 871, 881 is, of course, far
from inexorable.
136. Provided, of course, the alien who "sells" the property here is present less than
90 days during the year and "effects" the "sales" while he is not present, so as not to come
within I.R.C. § 871(a) (2).
137. See notes 28, 123 supra. It should be noted, however, that while the Committee
Reports refer to exempt "capital gains" and "sales or exchanges of capital assets," there is
no evidence that Congress, either in 1936 or in 1950, actually had in mind anything but stock
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ample, a nonresident alien who assigned serial rights in a book which was a
capital asset would be subject to tax under Rohmer on his entire proceeds and
no losses on other transactions would be allowed. 138 Yet if the alien "effects"
the assignment while present here, the specific provisions of section 871 (a) (2)
would be applicable since he has "sold" a capital asset. Only his gains would
then be taxed at 30 per cent, and only to the extent they exceed capital losses
effected while present here. It would therefore be possible for the alien's pres-
ence in the United States to result in a considerable tax reduction, an outcome
antithetic to the apparent purpose of Congress in enacting section 871 (a) (2),
which was to impose a greater tax burden on aliens present here than on those
never, or only temporarily, accepting our hospitality.189
Whether income is "fixed or determinable" should not depend on whether
the rights assigned are technically capital assets. If sales of capital assets do
not produce "fixed or determinable" income-and it seems clear they do not-
sales of other patent and copyright interests, using the same criteria of "sale,"
should also produce income which is not "fixed or determinable."
It is remotely possible that this is the Commissioner's present position. In
his latest ruling that an exclusive license for the life of a patent or copyright
is a "sale" for "Federal income tax purposes," even if the rights assigned are
limited and the consideration is paid on a royalty basis, 140 the Commissioner
may have intended to exempt such transfers made by aliens and foreign cor-
porations taxed under the "fixed or determinable" concept. A bit more born-
bast is to be expected, however, in a ruling reversing a quarter-century's judi-
cial development. The Commissioner's ruling acquiesced in a steady stream of
losses to domestic taxpayers, 41 not to aliens against whom the Commissioner's
indivisibility doctrine had proved an effective weapon.142 It is unlike the Com-
missioner to concede so quietly. When the question arises, therefore, the Com-
missioner may attempt to extricate himself and revert to narrower concepts
of "sale" in taxing aliens. The cul-de-sac in which the Commissioner will find
himself, however, is largely attributable to Congress and the courts, for the
most reasonable interpretation of the statute is that a "sale" under sections
871 (a) (1) and 881 (a) and under section 1222 is the same thing, whatever that
thing may be, and the courts have told us what it is.143
CAPITAL GAINS TAXABLE UNDER THE 1950 AMENDMENTS
We have noted that every fluctuation in case law interpretation of "sale"
for capital gains purposes may also affect the alien under the "fixed or deter-
and commodity transactions. The "liberties" would be taken with what the Committees said,
rather than what they probably meant to say.
138. See note 58 supra.
139. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
140. Rev. Rul. 60-226, mupra note 113.
141. See cases cited in notes 104, 109, 110 supra.
142. See, e.g., cases cited in note 126 supra.
143. However, as suggested at text accompanying note 233 infra, the Commissioner
may have conceded a little too much in Rev. Rul. 60-226, supra note 113.
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minable" concept: what helps the domestic taxpayer also helps the alien. But
in imposing a tax under section 871 (a) (2) on "sales or exchanges of capital
assets" by an alien present in the United States, Congress created another tax
base which oscillates with every modification-legislative or judicial-of the
definition of "capital assets." In this instance, however, Congress has put the
alien on one side of a see-saw and the domestic taxpayer on the other side. When
Congress takes away a tax preference from domestic taxpayers by restricting
the definition of "capital asset," it creates an exemption for aliens by creating
a class of income from a "sale" which is not taxable as a capital gain under
section 871(a) (2). When it confers a tax privilege on domestic taxpayers by
enlarging the capital gains device, it imposes a new tax on aliens. The most
interesting ingredient in this quaint formula for foreign taxation is that Con-
gress seldom seems to notice what is happening on the alien's side of the see-
saw. An illustration may be taken from the Revenue Act of 1950, the same
Act in which the capital gains tax on aliens present here was first imposed.
Prior to 1950 there was no tax on "sales" of copyrights by nonresident aliens
not engaged in business here since the "sale" of property is not "fixed or deter-
minable." The 1950 Act, however, by imposing a tax on "sales or exchanges of
capital assets" by aliens present here 90 days or who effect the gains while here,
made some copyright sales by nonresident aliens taxable. The professional alien
author, since his property is held for sale in the ordinary course of business
and is not a "capital asset,"''x was apparently not affected. Only the amateur
or one who purchased the copyright for investment would have been subjected
to the tax under section 871 (a) (2).
But in the same Act, Congress enacted the so-called "Eisenhower Amend-
ment," sections 1221 (3) and 1231 (b) (1) (C), designed to close a "loophole"'14
through which amateur authors like former President Eisenhower 40 received
capital gains rates on the products of their personal efforts.147 Section 1221 (3)
provides that a "capital asset" does not include "a copyright, a literary, musical,
or artistic composition, or similar property, held by... a taxpayer whose per-
sonal efforts created such property," or a taxpayer whose basis is determined
by reference to the author's basis.' 48 Section 1231 (b) (1) (C) contains a similar
144. I.R.C. § 1221(1).
145. This description is the Senate Finance Committee's. See S. REP. No. 2375, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1950).
146. Mr. Eisenhower received a rumored million dollars or so at capital gains rates
for "Crusade in Europe." See N.Y. Times, June 2, 1948, p. 31, col. 5.
147. See generally Miller, Capital Gains Taxation of the Fruits of Personal Effort:
Before and Under the 1954 Code, 64 YALE L.J. 1, 8-11 (1954) ; Kragen & Barton, The Tax
Dilemnm of the Entertainer, 31 So. CAr_ L. REv. 390, 401 (1958).
148. The author's donee and a corporation receiving the property as a contribution to
capital in certain instances (see LR.C. § 362) are thus denied capital gains treatment. A
purchaser or a legatee is not affected by the amendment. Moreover, the Service has ruled
that I.R.C. § 1221(3) does not apply to motion pictures created by a corporation because
of the multiplicity of skills and persons involved, and the use of substantial amounts of
capital. Rev. Rul. 55-706, 1955-2 Cum. BuLu. 300.
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exclusion from the definition of property used in a trade or business, which is
entitled to quasi-capital gains treatment.140 Thus, the amateur alien atthor's
copyright is no longer a capital asset or a section 1231 asset; his gain is no
longer gain from "the sale or exchange of capital assets" under section 871
(a) (2) and any income from the "sale" of this non-capital asset is tax free since
it is not "fixed or determinable" income.
Without the "Eisenhower Amendment," section 871 (a) (2) would have re-
sulted in taxation of sales of copyrights by amateur alien authors satisfying the
requirements of presence in this country. Professionals would have remained
exempt. The amendment therefore had the laudable effect of preventing unwar-
ranted distinctions between amateur and professional alien authors. But few
would suppose Congress had this in mind. By depriving domestic amateur
authors of capital gains treatment, Congress seems inadvertently to have allowed
nonresident alien amateur authors to sell copyrights tax free even though present
here 90 days or more.
About the only alien copyright owner potentially subject to tax tinder section
871 (a) (2) is the alien who purchased the property. 10 His copyright may still
be a capital asset. But if before selling his copyright, he first holds it primarily
for sale in the ordinary course of business, he may thereby take the property out
of the "capital. asset" category,'"' its sale outside the terms of section 871 (a) (2),
and its proceeds out of the clutches of the Commissioner. 1 2
PATENT ASSIGNMENTS AND SEcTIoN 1235
Employment of capital gains criteria to measure the nonresident alien's tax
base reaches its reductio ad absurdum in the 1954 Amendment of section 871
(a) (1). Under this amendment, the nonresident alien is taxable on income from
specified patent assignments whether or not the proceeds are "fixed or determiin-
able" and regardless of the alien's presence in the United States. The patent in-
come which is so taxable is that which constitute "amounts described in . ,
section 1235." Section 1235 was conceived and created for the purpose of con-
ferring a succulent tax preference on domestic inventors. Why the provision
was also used to define the alien's tax base is a puzzle; the apparent effects of
such use are preposterous.
149. Net gains from sales or exchanges of depreciable property used in, the trade or
business, together with certain other gains and losses, are usually "considered as gain-.,,,
from sales or exchanges of capital assets held for more than 6 months." I.R.C. § 1231 (a),
150. However, Rev. Rul. 55-706, supra note 148, indicates that many copyrights which
are the result of institutionalized creative efforts may still be capital assets or § 1231 assets,
151. I.R-C. § 1221(1).
152. Of course, if he was this determined to avoid tax he would merely stay out of the
United States, making I.R.C. § 871 (a) (2) inapplicable to his "capital gain."
Since there was no amendment of the capital asset definition in 1950 which excluded
patents transferred by the amateur inventor, he, along with the alien who purchases a patent
for investment, may be subject to the tax under I.R.C. § 871 (a) (2) if present in the United
States. He, too, may apparently avoid the tax under that section, either by staying out of
the United States while he effects the "sale," or by converting the patent to a noncapital
1118 [Vol. 72 : 1093
HeinOnline -- 72 Yale L.J. 1118 1962-1963
FOREIGNERS AND THE INCOME TAX
Section 1235
The 1950 revenue bill, as it passed the House, denied capital gains treatment
to inventors as well as authors.153 But the Senate deleted the references to in-
ventors because "the desirability of fostering the work of... [amateur] inven-
tors outweighs the small amount of additional revenue which might be obtained
under the House bill. . . ."15 Thus, from 1950 to 1954 all domestic authors and
professional inventors paid ordinary rates while amateur inventors could qualify
for capital gains.' 5 Section 1235 of the 1954 Code eliminated the distinction
between amateur mad professional inventors and permitted both to get long term
capital gains. The avowed purpose of the new provision was to "obviate the
uncertainty" caused by the Commissioner's 1950 ruling that indeterminate pay-
ments precluded a sale 156 and "to provide an incentive to inventors to contrib-
ute to the welfare of the Nation....
Section 1235 (a) grants long term capital gains treatment for a transfer "of
all substantial rights to a patent, or an undivided interest therein which includes
a part of all such rights" even though the compensation is periodical and meas-
ured by use, productivity, or sales of the patented product. It applies, however,
only to transfers by a "holder," defined as the individual inventor or one who
purchases the invention before it is reduced to practice.'6 6 A corporation, the
inventor's employer, a relative,6 9 or a purchaser after reduction to practice is
not a "holder." Moreover, section 1235 does not apply to transfers by a "holder"
to a relative or a corporation in which the "holder" owns, directly or indirectly,
25 per cent of the stock.'60
The section did not substantially liberalize the requirenents for a "'de."
161
In eliminating the six-month holding requirement for long term gains and in-
cluding professional inventors, however, the provision had the purpose and effect
of granting a substantial tax reduction to a significant group of taxpayers.1
asset before disposing of it. Since 1954, however, he must get clear of I.R.C. § 1235 before
these problems arise. By then his imagination and his spirit may have been exhausted.
153. H.R. 8920, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., § 209(a) (1950).
154. S. REP. No. 2375, supra note 145, at 44.
155. See Note, A Comparison of the Tax Trealment of Authors and Irventors, 70
HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1427 (1957).
156. Mim. 6490, 1950-1 Ctm. Bum- 9.
157. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 439 (1954).
158. I.R.C. § 1235(b).
159. A related person, for purposes of I.R.C. § 1235(b), includes a spouse, ancestors,
and lineal descendants, but does not include brothers and sisters. I.RLC. § 1235(d).
160. Ibid.
161. I.R.C. § 1235 clearly rejected the Commissioner's position in Mfim. 6490, supra
note 107, that indeterminate consideration would preclude a sale. But this was suprerogatory
in view of the decisions. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Hopkinson, 126 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1942);
Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258 (1946).
162. Few provisions in the Code have kindled more fire from the commentators than
the statutory distinctions between authors and inventors. See, e.g., Cary, Pressure Groups
and the Increasing Erosion of the Revenuc Laws, FEDERAL TAX PoLicy ron Ecmiomc
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Effect on nonresident aliens
The nonresident alien neither engaged in business nor present here paid no
tax before 1954 on gain from transfers of patent rights satisfying the vague
requirements of a "sale."163 Only if here 90 days or more or when the "sale"
was effected, and only if the patent was a capital asset, would he be taxed under
section 871 (a) (2). A professional inventor, having no "capital gains," 10 4 even
though present 90 days or more, was probably not subject to tax on a "sale" of
his rights, whereas the amateur inventor might be taxed if present in the United
States.165
The 1954 amendment of section 871 (a) (1) to include in the tax base of all
nonresident aliens, inter alia, "amounts described in ... section 1235, which are
considered to be gains from the sale or exchange of capital assets," eliminated
the dubious discrimination between amateur and professional alien inventors
and removed the presence requirements, making the alien taxable, even though
never present here, on patent assignments falling within section 1235. It also
compounded confusion. 66
A tax on gross receipts or on gain?
An alien is permitted no "deductions" from his "fixed or determinable" in-
come before computing his tax at the flat 30 per cent rate. As earlier noted, the
decisions indicate that the flat rate on "royalty" income which is "fixed or deter-
minable" is on gross receipts. The alien is not permitted to deduct or offset
against his royalties any expenses for producing, or costs for purchasing, the
GROWTH AND STABILITY, JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE EcONOMIc REPORT, 84th Cong., Ist Sess,
260, 263; Pilpel, Developments in Tax Law Affecting Copyrights in 1954, 33 TAxES 271
(1955).
163. See Kimble Glass Co., 9 T.C. 183 (1947) ; Commissioner v. Celanese Corp., 140
F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
164. His patents would be held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business
and thus would be excluded from the definition of "capital assets" by I.R.C. § 1221(1).
165. As noted at text accompanying notes 149, 150 supra, a similar distinction between
amateur and professional alien authors was accidentally precluded by the "Eisenhower
Amendment."
166. The Committee Reports disclose little on the purpose of this change in I.R.C.
§ 871(a) (1). The House bill broadened the tax base of both nonresident aliens and non-
resident foreign corporations to include income "considered gains from the sale or exchange
of capital assets" but no reason was given. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A245
(1954). The purpose may merely have been to make clear that several provisions in the
1954 Act (e.g., I.R.C. §§ 402(a)(2), 631) which conferred capital gains treatment on
ordinary income items, were not intended to benefit aliens and foreign corporations by
broadening the exemption of capital gains of aliens not present here. Thus, preserving exist-
ing law may have been the only motive. There is even opinion that existing law as to non-
resident alien patent owners was not changed by this amendment. See Mann, Capital Gailis
Treatment of Patent Transfers, 44 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 97, 110-11 (1962).
The Senate Finance Committee gave I.R.C. §§ 871 (a) and 881(a) their present forms,
broadening the tax base only as to specific items "considered to be gains" etc. Presumably,
it was thought superfluous to tax foreign corporations on § 1235 transactions since a cor-
poration cannot qualify as a "holder" under § 1235. See S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 157
at 416.
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patent or copyright. 67 If "fixed or determinable" income does not include re-
ceipts from exclusive assignments of partial rights on a royalty basis, this harsh
result will not affect most aliens as their proceeds will not be "fixed or deter-
minable." But a similar trap may lie within section 871 (a) (1)'s tax on
"amounts described in... section 1235"--for it is not clear whether "amounts"
refers to gross receipts or gain.
Section 1235 does not in terms describe any "amounts"; it describes a "trans-
fer."'168 In defining the transfer, it specifies that although the "payments in con-
sideration of such transfer" are periodical or contingent, the transfer shall still
be treated as a sale.169 It is therefore conceivable that "amounts" in section 871
(a) (1) refers to payments received for the transfer, and such payments are
taxed at 30 per cent without reduction for the holder's costs. To the extent that
proceeds from patent assignments under section 1235 would otherwise be tax-
able as "fixed or determinable" income, reading "amounts" in section 871 (a)
(1) as equivalent to payments received would be consistent with the decisions
indicating gross royalties are "fixed or determinable" and therefore taxable at
30 per cent. But many patent assignments may be within section 1235 which
would be "sales"---even under the indivisibility doctrine-and the proceeds
therefore would not be "fixed or determinable." Proceeds from a transfer of all
rights under a United States patent, even on a "royalty" basis, were probably
not "fixed or determinable" income before 1954,170 but such a transaction may
now come within section 1235, making the entire "amount" taxable at 30 per
cent. And if, as suggested earlier, the criteria of "sale" for capital gains pur-
poses are applied to treat partial assignments as "sales" and therefore not tax-
able at the fiat rate as "fixed or determinable" income, the effect of the amend-
ment of section 871 (a) (1) is even more drastic. If interpreted to levy a flat tax
on the proceeds received in a section 1235 transaction, it would adversely effect
many transfers of partial rights in patents wlich would otherwise be exempt.
There is evidence, however, that "amounts described in ...section 1235"
refers to gains from patents therein described, rather than proceeds.,' And the
167. See note 58 supra.
168. A transfer .. . of all substantial rights to a patent... by any holder shall be con-
sidered the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than six months, regard-
less of whether or not payments in, consideration for such transfer are (1) payable




170. See text accompanying notes 94-96 supra. Of course, an alien present here might
be taxable on net capital gains under I.R.C. § 871(a) (2), but he would be permitted to
deduct his basis under that section. As to the possibility of avoiding United States tax by
executing the sale abroad, even where § 1235 is applicable, see part 11 infra.
171. In the case of amounts described in... Section 1235 ... the amount required to
be ... withheld shall, if the amount of such gain is not kmown to the withholding
agent, be such amount, not exceeding 30 per cent of the proceeds ... as may be
necessary to assure that the tax. . . withheld shall not be less than 30 per cent of such
gain. [Emphasis added.]
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description in section 871 (a) (1) of such amounts as "considered to be gains
from the sale or exchange of capital assets" is hardly appropriate if gross royal-
ties was the intended meaning. Moreover, if section 871 (a) (1) were construed
as imposing a tax on gross receipts it would create a conflict with section 871
(a) (2) which imposes a tax on capital gains of aliens present here. An alien
present here 90 days or more who "sold" a patent which was a capital asset
would be taxable on his gain under section 871 (a) (2), but, if his transfer was
also within section 1235, would be taxable under section 871 (a) (1) on his pro-
ceeds. The weight of the evidence, and certainly of the equities, suggests that
section 871 (a) (1) should be read as taxing gain rather than receipts. Even if
read as reaching only gains, the provision represents a substantial departure
from existing law.
Thus, as to transactions which did not qualify as "sales" and therefore would
have been taxable as "fixed or determinable" under section 871 (a) (1) before
1954, and which now fit within section 1235, the 1954 amendment may have
liberalized the tax treatment of nonresident aliens by permitting them to deduct
their basis on the patent.' 72 But if the decisions and rulings involving "sales"
for capital gains purposes also carve out a category of proceeds which is not
"fixed or determinable" under section 871 (a) (1), then the nonresident alien
was exempt before 1954 on many sales which now may fall within section 1235
and produce taxable gains. Congress, without any evidence of premeditation or
malice aforethought, imposed a new tax on nonresident alien inventors while
reducing the tax on domestic inventors "to provide an incentive to inventors to
contribute to the welfare of the nation." 73
Transfers "described in section 1235"
Section 871 (a) (1) does not make all gains from patent transfers subject to
tax; it expressly includes only "amounts described" in section 1235. In trans-
actions not fitting within section 1235, income from patent assignments will still
be taxable only if "fixed or determinable" or within the limited category of
capital gains covered by the presence requirements of section 871 (a) (2). Exist-
ing law was not affected by section 1235 as to transactions outside its scope.17"
Thus, all patent transfers by non-holders, or by holders to related persons in-
cluding the holder's corporation, which transfers are not covered by section
I.R.C. § 1441(c) (5). The Regulations also state that the tax is on "gain recognized onl
certain transfers of patent rights by an individual." Treas. Reg. § 1.871-7(b) (3).
172. Some transfers not within' I.R.C. § 1235 might still be taxable on the gross pro-
ceeds. Thus, a § 1235 transfer by a "holder" might sometimes receive preferential treatment.
This result would at least seem consistent with the general purpose of § 1235 to favor in-
dividual inventors as opposed to institutional inventors.
173. See note 157 supra.
174. In enacting this section, for the specific purposes set forth in this report, your
committee has no intention of affecting the operation, of existing law in, those areas
without its scope. For example, the tax consequences of the sale of patents ... by
individuals who fail to qualify as "holders," or by corporations, is to be govened
by the provisions of existing law as if this section had not been enacted.
S. REp. No. 1622, supra note 157 at 441.
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1235,175 may still be exempt if "sold" while the alien is not present here, or if
the patent is not a capital asset. A nonresident foreign corporation may be able
to exploit patents here tax free while the individual inventor cannot. The in-
vitation to contrivance is apparent. An alien inventor wanting to avoid tax may
consider the possibilities of a transfer abroad to a relative or a controlled for-
eign corporation for tax free exploitation here.170 Or he may have his corpora-
tion employ him to invent for it, and have the corporation-as a non-holder,
not subject to tax on capital gains-market the patents here tax free.
Furthermore, all transfers by the inventor himself to unrelated persons
are not within section 1235. It may be possible for the inventor to convey an
exclusive license in a limited geographical area which is not within section 1235
but is nevertheless a "sale," exempt unless the inventor is present in the United
States. Section 1235 refers to a transfer of "all substantial rights."'177 Conceiv-
ably, therefore, a transfer of partial rights, which may be a "sale" and not "fixed
or determinable," may not be covered by section 871 (a) (1),178 with the anom-
175. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-1(b).
176. If such a transfer is not within I.R.C. § 351 (nonrecognition of gain or loss on
certain transfers of property to a controlled corporation) and is not a gift, the inventor
might be taxable in theory. However, unless the foreign transferee is subject to the obliga-
tion of withholding (see I.R.C. § 1441 [a]) the tax on, the transfer would be difficult to col-
lect. Moreover, since a transfer to a relative or controlled corporation is not within I.R.C.
§ 1235, it would not be subject to tax-if the inventor is not present here-unless it pro-
duced "fixed or determinable" income. Furthermore, as suggested infra, part II, the income
might not be from United States sources.
177. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(c), provides that a transfer of "all substantial rights"
under § 1235 does not include a license limited geographically, functionally, or in time. The
reference to geographical limitations is probably only to intracountry restrictions. The
Regulations define "patent" under § 1235 to mean a patent granted under title 35 U.S.C. or
any foreign patent granting similar rights. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(a). Hence, all rights
under a United States patent apparently constitute "all substantial rights" under § 1235.
178. "It is the intention of your committee that, if the mode of payment is as described
in subsection (a) [of § 1235], the sale of a patent by any 'holder' must qualify under the
section in order for such 'holder' to obtain. capital gain treatment." S. REr. No. 1622, supra
note 157 at 441. The "mode of payment" referred to is periodical or contingent (see note
168 supra). Query, therefore, whether a transfer by a nonresident alien "holder" for a ln1np
sum is taxable under LR.C. § 871(a) (1) ? The thrust of the quoted provision of the Com-
mittee report seems to be that if payment is periodical or contingent, all substantial rights
must be transferred by a holder for his gain to qualify. Arguably, therefore, a transfer of
less than all substantial rights, whether in a lump sum or on a royalty basis, may never-
theless be a "sale" qualifying for capital gains treatment under the general provisions of
§§ 1221, 1231 though not satisfying the special requirements of § 1235. Such transfers by
nonresident aliens, therefore, may conceivably be exempt capital gains not taxable as
"amounts described in... section 1235." Cf. Leonard Coplan, 28 T.C. 1189 (1957), holding
that a transfer of a patent to a family owned corporation wvas a sale of a capital asset even
though the transfer, by a "holder" to the corporation, did not satisfy § 1235. This decision,
and Treas. Reg. § 1235-1(b) have been read as holding that § 1235 does not in any way
preclude "sale" treatment under § 1222, and that geographically limited transfers may
qualify under § 1222, even though made by a "holder." See SuREY & .Rrm,,, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 757 (1960); Clark, Tax Aspects of Operating Patents: Income from
a License Agreement as Capital Gain or Ordinary Income, PATENT LICEZSING (P.L.I.
1958), 91, 111-12. But cf. Kirby v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 571 (S.D. Tex. 1960).
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alous result that piecemeal dispositions may be exempt I'D while the transfer of
the whole bundle is taxable. The law would then have made a 180 degree turn
from its course of a decade before.
Summary
Whatever the wisdom or merit in the domestic tax policies reflected by the
1950 copyright amendment and the 1954 amendments relating to patents, these
provisions are pregnant with infirmities where nonresident aliens are con-
cerned. In plugging the copyright "loophole" in 1950,180 Congress was ap-
parently heedless of the relationship of the capital gains provisions to the sec-
tions governing nonresident aliens, even though in the same act the capital
gains concept was used in broadening the alien's tax base. Congress in 1954
saw a relationship between capital gains and section 871, but it takes a con-
jurer to discover the congressional purpose in partially displacing the "fixed
or determinable" concept with section 1235, a provision conceived simply and
solely to confer a subsidy on domestic inventors. Perhaps Congress thought
long term capital gains treatment for professional inventors was not enough
and the tax burden on nonresident alien inventors should be increased to give
resident inventors a competitive advantage. The prudence of such a policy is
dubious if the purpose of section 1235 was to stimulate United States tech-
nological and industrial development. But even if this were the congressional
design it provides little help in interpreting the statute. Moreover, whatever
changes in policy regarding nonresident alien authors and inventors were
intended by the 1950 and 1954 amendments, there are enough cracks and
crevices in the scheme to guarantee ineffectuality.
An alien who is present here, or expects to be present, and intends to dis-
pose of a copyright, or an interest therein, can easily enough conform the
transaction to the sale criteria of the Commissioner's latest ruling,18' and if
his copyright is a capital asset he can probably convert it to a non-capital as-
set by first holding it for sale in the ordinary course of business. Thus, his
gain will not be capital gain within section 871 (a) (2). Even if capital gain, the
income will not be taxable to an alien present less than 90 days who effects the
"sale" while he is not present .18 2 Alternatively, he may be able to use a cor-
poration to dispose of the property as a nonresident foreign corporation is not
taxable on, capital gains.18 3
179. On the question of what kinds of assignments of partial rights may be "sales,"
see note 114 supra; Vincent A. Marco, 25 T.C. 544 (1955) ; United States v. Carruthers,
219 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1955) ; First National Bank v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 818 (D.
N.J. 1955).
180. See text accompanying note 145 supra.
181. Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 Cumr. BULL. 26.
182. See note 38 mspra.
183. Other than gains from timber and coal. I.R.C. § 881(a). The Commissioner, of
course, is not wholly impotent to deal with some of the grosser manipulations. The corporate
entity has been and can be "disregarded" under a number of principles. See generally,
BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 12-17 (1959).
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The nonresident alien disposing of a patent can also employ the corporate
device, and several others, to avoid the tax on capital gains levied by section
871 (a) (2) or the tax on patent assignments imposed by section 871 (a) (1) .14
A tax scheme which encourages such maneuvering and lays such a penalty on
those not clever enough to outflank it denands reappraisal.
THE TAx CONVENTIONS: A WAY OUT OF THE MoMsS?
The tax treaties between the United States and most Commonwealth and
Western European countries, and a few others, 8 5 doubtless diminish the prac-
tical importance of the statutory arcana, as most grant some relief from tax-
ation of royalties by countries from which the royalties are remitted. But many
countries not parties to the conventions still have a substantial impact on the
United States economy. Moreover, even where the treaties are applicable,
their terms may provide only illusory or incomplete relief. When compared
with the statutory developments previously discussed, the treaty provisions
also seem replete with ambiguity.
Exemption of royalties
The typical treaty exempts residents and corporations of one contracting
state from taxation of specified types of income by the other provided the tax-
payer is not engaged in business through a permanent establishment in the
taxing state.186 The broadest of exemptions regarding patents and copyrights
applies to "royalties and other amounts paid as consideration for the use of,
or for the privilege of using, copyrights, patents, designs, secret processes and
formulae, trademarks, and other like property."18 7 Many treaties do not go
this far. 88 Several specifically exclude motion picture rentals from the exempt
184. See note 178 mupra and related text.
185. Japan, Pakistan, Honduras, Union of South Africa. Conventions with India, Israel,
United Arab Republic, and Luxembourg have been signed and await Senate ratification.
Negotiations are in progress with several South American and African countries.
186. There is little uniformity in defining the classes of persons who are exempt. The
United Kingdom treaty, for example, exempts royalties received from the United States by
a United Kingdom resident (including a corporation managed and controlled in the United
Kingdom) who is subject to tax on the royalties in the United Kingdom and who is "not
engaged in trade or business in the United States through a permanent establishment
situated therein," or if so engaged, the royalties are "not directly associated with the
business carried on through the permanent establishment." Art. VIII (1). Compare the
Treaty with Sweden which exempts royalties of a Swedish resident or corporation without
limitation to those so engaged in business or having a permanent establishment here. Art. VI.
The Regulations for the Swedish treaty, however, exclude a Swedish corporation doing
business here on the ground it is a resident of the United States. There is no similar limita-
tion on individuals. See § 25.8 T.D. 4975,1940-2 CuM. Bumi. 54.
187. Treaty with United Kingdom, July 30, 1946, Art. VIII (1). For similar, but not
identical provisions see Treaty with Switzerland, October 13, 1951, Art. VIII; Treaty with
France, October 18,1946, Art. 7.
188. The Treaty with the Union of South Africa, December 13, 1946, contains no
royalty relief other than for natural resources, and no exemption is provided even for
natural resource royalties. Protocol, Art. III.
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category.180 Others merely provide for reduced rates on certain types of royal-
ties.190 And the conventions with Canada and Australia confine the exemption
to royalties on literary or artistic works.' 9 '
Even though a nonresident alien or foreign corporation is within the class
of taxpayers entitled to exemption under a treaty and his property is included
in the classes of property on which royalties are exempt, he is aided by the
treaty only if his income is "royalties" or "royalties and other amounts," as
the treaty may provide.1 2 Herein lies the quagmire. The conventions custom-
arily provide that terms not defined in the treaty shall have the meaning ac-
corded them under the laws of the taxing country. 93 "Royalties" are not de-
fined apart from their description in most of the treaties as payments "for the
use of" or for the "right to use" the specified property. Therefore, what con-
stitutes a "royalty" for the "right to use" a patent or copyright is, for purposes
of the exemption from United States tax, presumably determined by United
States law. Does the treaty exemption thus depend upon the chameleonic dis-
tinction-developed mainly in the capital gains context-between "sales" and
"licenses" and their correlative bifurcates, "purchase price," and "royalties"?
Which test is applicable if the criteria of a sale under the "fixed or determin-
able" income concept are different from those for capital gains purposes? And
what of still different criteria that may be applied in determining standing to
sue or other non-tax questions, the results of which are often described in
terms "sales" or "licenses" ?194
189. E.g., Treaty with Canada, June 17, 1942, Art. XIII C; Treaty with Australia,
May 14, 1953, Art. X; Treaty with Finland, March 3, 1952, Art. VIII; Treaty with
Greece, February 20, 1950, Art. VII.
190. E.g., Treaty with Japan, April 16, 1959, Art. VII (15%); Treaty with Canada,
June 17, 1942, Art. XI (limiting tax on all income not exempt to 15%).
191. Treaty with Canada, June 17, 1942, Art. XIII C; Treaty with Australia, May 14,
1953, Art. X.
192. Some of the treaties exempt "royalties" for the "right to use" specified property
(see e.g., Treaty with France, October 18, 1946, Art. 7; Treaty with Greece, February 20,
1953, Art. VII) while others exempt "royalties and other amounts" for the right to use
specified property (e.g., Treaty with Denmark, December 8, 1948, Art. VIII; Treaty with
Norway, June 13, 1949, Art. VII; Treaty with Switzerland, October 13, 1951, Art. VIII).
Whether the difference is significant is problematical. It has been suggested that a "royalty"
applies only to intangible property and does not include "rentals." PHILLIPS, UNITED STATES
TAXATION OF NON-RESIDENT ALIENS AND FOREIGN CORPoRATIONs 290 (1952). Several
conventions or protocols, however, have defined "royalties" to include motion pleture
rentals. See Treaty with Belgium, October 28, 1948, Art. IX (2) ; Treaty with France,
October 1, 1946, Art. 7(b).
193. See, e.g., Treaty with Belgium, October 28, 1948, Art. II (2) ; Treaty with Den-
mark, December 8, 1948, Art. 11 (2) ; Treaty with Greece, February 20, 1953, Art. 11 (2);
Treaty with United Kingdom, July 30, 1946, Art. II (2).
194. See text accompanying note 59 supra. Another possibility is that "royalties" as
used in the treaties refers not to what is a "royalty" for purposes of taxation under the
"fixed or determinable" concept [I.R.C. §§ 871 (a), 881(a)] but under the rules for deter-
mining source of income. I.R.C. §§ 861(a) (4), 862(a) (4), specify the geographical origin
of "royalties," whereas I.R.C. §§ 861 (a) (6), 862(a) (6) specify the origin of income from
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It is not clear why consideration for a "license" should always be a "royal-
ty," or why consideration for a "sale" is necessarily not a "royalty." A trans-
action may be a "sale" for several purposes yet the consideration may conceiv-
ably be for the "right to use" the property. Indeed consideration for all sales
could be so described, though the term ordinarily refers to consideration for
a transfer of something less than complete ownership. If all consideration for
patent and copyright assignments was intended to be exempt under the trea-
ties, different language would have been appropriate. But if countries were
willing reciprocally to exempt royalties received by nonresident aliens, it is
not evident why they would have wished to draw the line at purchase price. 115
If the nonresident alien inventor assigns his patent rights in a limited geo-
graphical area to a United States manufacturer for periodic, contingent com-
pensation, why should the fact that our courts and Commissioner decide such
a transaction is a "sale"''0 prevent treaty exemption where the basic policy
behind such a characterization is the granting of preferential rates to domestic
taxpayers and stimulation of patent and copyright assignments? If the Com-
missioner's latest ruling defining a "sale" to include assignments of limited
rights on a royalty basis 197 correspondingly confines the scope of the royalty
exemption under the treaties but does not have the same effect on the "fixed
or determinable" concept,198 then many taxpayers in treaty countries will find
themselves subject to a United States tax, and domestic assignees, insensible
of these niceties, may be liable for the tax which they should have withheld.10
It seems likely, however, that a "royalty" which is "fixed or determinable" is
also a "royalty" under the treaties. The likelihood that a treaty exemption
will not apply to "royalties" taxable as "fixed or determinable" income seems
remote.
But an alien might "sell" his patent or copyright and his gain might be
taxable as a capital gain if the presence conditions of section 871(a) (2) are
a "sale" of personal property. The courts, however, seem to equate the criteria of a
"royalty" for source of income purposes with the criteria of a "royalty" for purposes of
defining the "fixed or determinable" concept. See text accompanying notes 264-65 in ra.
195. This would have seemed particularly true of the United States before 1950 be-
cause "sales" were not included in the "fixed or determinable" concept and were therefore
exempt by statute. Thus unless an alien or foreign corporation was engaged in business he
would not have to rely on treaty exemption of "sales.' And if the alien or foreign corpora-
tion was engaged in business here through a permanent establishment, most treaty exemp-
tions would not apply to him. The 1950 amendment making capital gains of aliens present
here taxable [I.RIC. § 871 (a) (2) ] and the 1954 amendment making patent transfers under
§ 1235 taxable regardless of presence [I.1RC. § 871(a) (1)] complicates the question, to
say the least.
196. See notes 114, 178 supra.
197. Rev. Rul. 60-226,1960-1 Cum. BuuL. 26. See note 113 supra.
198. Le., proceeds can be received in a "sale" for treaty purposes and will not be exempt
as "royalties" under the treaties, but are nevertheless "royalties" under I.R.C. §§ 871(a) (1),
881(a) and taxable as "fixed or determinable" income. As suggested at text accompanying
notes 139-43 supra, however, what is a "sale" for capital gains purposes should also be a
sale for "fixed or determinable" purposes, at least under the present statutory scheme.
199. See I.RtC. §§ 1441, 1461.
1963] 1127
HeinOnline -- 72 Yale L.J. 1127 1962-1963
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
met, or the gain from a patent might be an "amount described in ... section
1235," taxable regardless of presence and "considered the sale ... of capital
assets. ' '2°° If capital gains criteria of a "sale" limit the treaty exemptions of
"royalties," there is a substantial gap in treaty protection,2 0' whether or not
the "fixed or determinable" concept is also confined by such criteria. That tax-
ation of such transactions accords with the expectations of the signatories
seems doubtful. Even more doubtful is that Congress, when enacting the 1950
amendment imposing tax on certain capital gains, and in 1954, when imposing
the 30 per cent tax on "amounts described" in section 1235, gave any consid-
eration to the possible impact of these provisions on the "royalty" exemptions
under the tax conventions.
Exemption of capital gains
Taxpayers protected under Canadian, Swedish, and United Kingdom trea-
ties may get some relief from other provisions peculiar to these conventions.
Each contains a clause exempting "gains . . . from the sale or exchange of
capital assets.1202 The use in these treaties of technical "sale or exchange of
capital assets" terminology suggests a desire for precision.20 3 And literal inter-
pretation of the terms would, of course, extend the exemption to gains from
patents and copyrights which are from "sales of capital assets." These clauses
were included and the treaties ratified before the 1950 amendment imposing
tax on capital gains of aliens present here, and were therefore considered
largely restatements of existing law.20 4 The Senate refused to ratify similar
200. I.R.C. § 871(a) (1).
201. I.R.C. § 894 provides that gross income does not include income exempted by
treaty but this is little help in determining the effect of the 1950 and 1954 amendments on
the treaty exemptions inasmuch as the definition of "royalties" under the treaties is left to
domestic law.
202. Treaty with Canada, March 4, 1942, Art. VIII; Treaty with Sweden, March 23,
1939, Art. IV; Treaty with United Kingdom, April 16, 1945, Art. XIV. The French Treaty
exempts gains from "the sale or exchange of stocks, securities or Commodities." Art. 11.
The Treasury construes the term to include only commodities "of a kind customarily dealt
in on arn organized commodity exchange." Section 7.421, T.D. 5499, 1946-1 Cum. BuLL. 146.
203. Literal interpretation is also suggested by the Regulations under the Canadian
and United Kingdom Treaties which merely refer to the statutory definition of "capital
assets" (I.R.C. § 1221) for "what constitutes capital assets" under the respective treaty,
See § 7.29, T.D. 5206, 1943-2 Cum. BULL. 537 (Canada) ; § 7.523, T.D. 5569, 1947-2 Cu.
BULL. 115 (United Kingdom). The Regulations under the Swedish Treaty do not define the
scope of the exemption, other than to exclude gains from real property, held taxable under
Art. V of the treaty notwithstanding the exemption of capital gains in Art. IX, by the
Tax Court in Jan Lewenhaupt, 20 T.C. 151 (1953), aff'd per euriam, 221 F.2d 227 (9th
Cir. 1955). But there is no evidence in available interpretive materials that anything other
than stock, securities, and the like, were actually considered within the scope of the treaty
exemptions. See, e.g., Technical Memorandum of the Treasury Dept. on Swedish Convention,
1 7351 CCH Tax Treaties; First Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the
Income Tax Convention with the United Kingdom, 1 8153 CCH Tax Treaties.
204. See Technical Memorandum on Swedish Convention and First Report of Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, supra note 203.
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provisions 205 in later treaties, but the 1950 amendment did not impair the pre-
existing treaty exemptions.2°8
An unresolved question, however, is whether the Canadian, Swedish, and
United Kingdom Conventions incorporate all the niceties of United States
capital gains law; whether, for example, the exemption includes gains "con-
sidered to be sales or exchanges of capital assets"207 under the Code even
though what was sold was not a "capital asset." Patent assignments under
section 1235, which are taxable under section 871 (a) (1) to all nonresident
aliens who are "holders," are "considered to be gains from the sale or exchange
of capital assets" although under the general definition of the term "capital as-
sets" and the decisions construing it, patents sold by a professional inventor
are not capital assets.208 Moreover, patents or copyrights used in a trade or
business are not "capital assets"2° 9 but gain from them may be treated as cap-
ital gain under section 1231 and presumably taxed under section 871(a) (2)
if the presence requirements are satisfied.2 10 Is it possible that these items may
be taxable under the Code but not within the treaty exemptions of "sales or
exchanges of capital assets"? Statutory modifications which confer capital
gains treatment on gain, such as that of a professional inventor, which is not
literally gain from the "sale or exchange of a capital asset," may confer ex-
emption under the treaties. One writer has expressed this view,211 but the
treaties and available interpretive materials are silent on the question.2 1- The
reason, of course, is that the treaties were executed before Congress began
using the capital gains device to subsidize personal efforts, as in the case of
the professional inventor under section 1235.
Construing the treaty exemptions of capital gains as also exempting items
"considered to be" capital gains under the Code seems sound when applied to
205. Treaty with Denmark, December 8,1948, Art. XII; Treaty with Ireland, Septem-
ber 13, 1949, Art. XIV; Treaty with the Netherlands, April 29, 1948, Art. XI.
206. Section 214 of the Revenue Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 937, preserved existing treaty
obligations. See also Special Ruling, f 1267 CCH Tax Treaties, to the effect that the capital
gains exemption in the Canadian Treaty was not affected by 1950 Code changes.
207. The device of conferring capital gains status on certain income by "considering"
it to be capital gain has become popular in recent years, not only to correct obvious defini-
tional defects, as by I.R-C. § 1232 which considers retirement of a bond as a sale or exchange,
but also to effect substantial changes in policy, as in I.R.C. § 1235 (patents), § 421 (employee
stock options), §§ 402, 403 (pension fund distributions), §§ 631(b), (c) (timber and coal
dispositions).
208. The patent of a professional is held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business and is within the statutory exclusion of I.R.C. § 1221(1). See, e.g., Harold Avery,
47 B.T.A. 538 (1942).
209. I.R.C. § 1221(2).
210. See note 149.rupra.
211. PHILLTPS, UNrrED STATES TAXATION OF NoNRESIDENT ALIENS AND FoMaWo
CoRPORATioxs 302 (1952).
212. See note 203 mipra.
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a treaty which exempts both "royalties" and capital gains 218 but creates per-
plexing problems under the Canadian treaty which exempts capital gains but
does not exempt industrial royalties.214 Suppose a Canadian resident disposes
of a United States patent, his consideration being measured by the successful
exploitation of the patent. Are his "royalties" taxable under section 871 (a) (1)
as "amounts described in section 1235" or are they exempt under the treaty as
proceeds from "the sale or exchange of capital assets" ?215
If the exemptions in the Canadian, Swedish, and United Kingdom treaties
were intended to incorporate all the minutiae of American capital gains law,
it seems unlikely that the scope of the exemptions was intended to be frozen
as of the effective date of the convention. The capital gains concept is no-
toriously fluid and it would seriously detract from the utility of a tax treaty
to tie it too tightly to the past. But if the scope of a treaty provision is to ex-
pand and contract with statutory modifications, Congress should be more mind-
ful of the foreign tax consequences of its domestically oriented legislation.
If Congress intended by section 871 (a) (1) to tax patent transfers of aliens
exempt by treaty on "royalties" by the expedient of calling a section 1235
transfer a "sale or exchange of a capital asset," its cleverness may have boom-
eranged as far as the Canadian, Swedish and United Kingdom treaties are
concerned. For Congress may thereby have brought such transfers within the
capital gains exemptions. Of course, the members of Congress had no such
thing in mind. They had very little in mind.
The solution to the treaty problem in the future is to define in the treaty
what is exempted rather than leaving the treaty terms to be defined by the
conflicting and contradictory legal concepts of each contracting party. The
solution to the statutory problem is to decide what the national policy is and
frame a new statute to carry out that policy. Whatever the present policy, it
is not served by the existing framework.
RELEVANCE OF THE CAPITAL GAINS POLICIES TO NONRESIDENT ALIENS AND
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
The labyrinth created by the capital gains provisions, sections 871 and 881,
and the tax treaties, seems largely the product of legislative and administrative
oversight. What emerges is not a flattering picture of the legislative process.
The scheme for taxing nonresident aliens and foreign corporations should
either be stripped of its dependence upon capital gains concepts, or explicit
study should be made of the parallels and divergencies of capital gains policies
and nonresident alien exemptions.
213. On the theory that all income from assignments of personal property or the right
to "use" such property was probably intended to be exempt. See notes 195, 204 supra and re-
lated text.
214. The exemption applies to "royalties for the right to use copyrights or in respect of
the right to produce or reproduce any literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic work (but not
inclusive of rents or royalties in respect of motion picture films)." Treaty with Canada,
March 4, 1942, Art. XIII C.
215. Treaty with Canada, March 4, 1942, Art. VIII.
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The capital gains device has been pelted with so much propaganda and
sugared by so many special provisions that the basic purposes of capital gains
have almost been buried. All that can be said with certainty about capital gains
is that they represent something which for various reasons of policy or pres-
sure was deemed deserving of a lower tax rate. To venture beneath this
generality is a hazardous journey.210 Before the 1954 Code, however, it was
generally understood that capital gains rates were intended to apply only in-
come realized from "investments" as opposed to the products of personal
effort.
217
Income from "investments" is separated from income which contains suffi-
cient personal service elements to make it undeserving of capital gains rates
at two levels: In defining "capital assets"218 and in defining "sale or ex-
change."2 19 In a perfect Code the "sale" requirement would define only the
requisite method of disposition and the criteria of a "sale" would not be affected
by the personal effort component of the underlying asset. The "sale" criteria,
being developed and articulated for property having both high and low per-
sonal effort components, are ill suited for screening out undeserving property
from capital gains treatment. Congress, however, has done an inadequate job
in defining "capital assets." 220 The courts and Commissioner have had to fill
in the gaps. Sometimes the transfer of rights has been held not "property" ;--
at other times the courts have merely denied capital gains without spelling out
which was missing, "property" or a "sale." 2 - Occasionally, capital gains treat-
ment has been denied even though the court conceded that the statutory re-
quirements were literally met.22 Often, however, the task of defeating capital
gains on "property" which is not within one of the statutory exclusions has
fallen upon the "sale or exchange" requirement. The pressures thus put on the
definition of "sale" by deficiencies in the definition of capital assets are a bur-
den for which the concept was not built.
216. See Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HMv. L Rsv.
985 (1956); Note, Distinguishing Ordinary Income fron Capital Gain Where Rights to
Future Income Are Sold, 69 Hxv. L. REv. 737 (1956) ; Note, The P. G. La:c Guides to
Ordinary Income: An Appraisal in Light of Capital Gains Policies, 14 STANr. L. Rsv. 551
(1962).
217. See Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 53 (1955). See
generally, Miller, Capital Gains Taxation of the Fruits of Personal Effort: Before and
Under the 1954 Code, 64 YALE L.J. 1, 82-83 (1954).
218. LR.C. § 1221.
219. I.RC. § 1222.
220. A "capital asset" is defined in the Code simply as "property," subject to five
specified exceptions. I.R.C. § 1221.
221. See, e.g., Runyon v. United States, 281 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Helen Miller, 35
T.C. 631 (1961).
222. E.g., Ehrlich v. Higgins, 52 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) ; F. V. Jessop, 16
T.C. 491 (1951).
223. E.g., Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1950).
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Before 1950 when the patents and copyrights of amateurs were both judi-
cially characterized as "capital assets, '22 4 the Commissioner could still hope
to block a tax bounty on many such products of personal effort with the in-
divisibility doctrine.225 The notion of an inherently indivisible patent or copy-
right was vulnerable, however, apart from its metaphysical underpinnings, be-
cause it applied across the board to all patent and copyright assignments re-
gardless of the investment component in the property. Thus, insofar as the
doctrine was justified by the policy of curtailing capital gains for personal
efforts, it was arguably too crude a criterion. Moreover, when applied to
patents and copyrights in which the investment component was substantial,
the doctrine seemed merely a blunt edged supplement to the "sale to custom-
ers" exclusion in section 1221 (1). If property is held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business it is not a capital asset. The
marketing of patents or copyrights in slices would often bring the property
within the "sale to customers" exclusion if the slices were very thin. 220 Thus,
if a taxpayer bought a copyright in a novel, then peddled the book, serial,
movie, dramatic, and television rights in separate "sales" to different "pur-
chasers" he might be denied capital gains treatment, not because there were
no "sales" but because selling his copyright was a business and a substantial
part of his income was not from his investment in the copyright but from his
efforts in peddling it. Used as a substitute for the "sale to customers" excep-
tion of section 1221 (1), the indivisibility doctrine was arguably too inflexible.
When Congress in 1950 removed authors as claimants to capital gains '"2
and when it enacted section 1235 in 1954, it clarified its purposes as to the
character of the property which should be treated as a "capital asset." On
copyrights, Congress confirmed the Commissioner's apparent belief that cap-
ital gains for amateur authors was a "loophole. 2  On patents it went in a
different direction and indicated that the products of inventive effort were
worthy of preferred rates.
About the only function left for the indivisibility doctrine after 1954 was to
define the mode of realization that deserved encouragement. The doctrine no
longer had to serve two functions and was therefore ripe for reevaluation. The
only question was whether it properly described the methods of realizing in-
come from property which warranted relief from progressive rates .2 2  The
224. See Edward Myers, 6 T.C. 258, 266 (1946) ; Evans v. Kavanagh, 86 F. Supp. 535
(E.D. Mich. 1949), aff'd, 188 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1951) ; Herwig v. United States, 105 F.
Supp. 384 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
225. See text accompanying notes 59-62 supra.
226. Cf. Goldsmith v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944); Fields v. Coun-
missioner, 189 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1951).
227. I.R.C. §§ 1221(3), 1231(b) (1) (C).
228. See text accompanying note 145 supra.
229. Amateur inventors whose transfers do not qualify under I.R.C. § 1235, however,
may still claim capital gains under §§ 1221, 1222. To this limited extent the problem of
whether patents and copyrights created by the taxpayer's personal efforts should be "capital
assets" under § 1221 is not clarified by the 1954 Code.
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Commissioner might have concluded-even without prodding by the courts--
that the doctrine was too restrictive. For when Congress enabled professional
inventors and promoters of inventions to obtain capital gains rates even if they
disposed of their property on a royalty basis, it may have seemed unreasonably
harsh to deny investors in patents, who could not qualify under section 1235,2
°
and investors in copyrights, to "sell" their property in slices, especially since
section 1221 (1) would disqualify the property in marketing the slices became
a business.
The Commissioner's position against "sales" subject to a retained economic
interest in exploitation 21 may, like the indivisibility doctrine, have been in-
fluenced by the anomaly of capital gains on personal efforts ;22 and his recal-
citrance may have been buttressed by his lack of success with the indivisibility
theory. This position also needed re-examination after 1954. Inasmuch as Con-
gress specifically approved "royalty" sales on section 1235 transactions, it in-
dicated they were not inconsistent with capital gains treatment. Congress there-
fore weakened the Commissioner's support for both positions and strengthened
the courts' rejections. But Congress did not approve the use of both methods
in combination. Section 1235 authorized capital gains on transfers subject to
royalty rights only where the holder assigned "all substantial rights" in his
patent. Thus, the Commissioner could reasonably have clung to the position
taken in Cory v. Commissioner 233 that a taxpayer could have a "sale" by
either method-all rights subject to a royalty interest or partial rights for a
fixed sum-but not both. Capitulating in Revenue Ruling 60-226,, the Com-
missioner went farther than Congress or the courts required him to go. It is
not unlikely, therefore, that this position may be re-examined.
Taxpayer pressures on the formulation of criteria for the "sale" concept
come from two distinct sources :-to obtain favorable capital gains rates-and
to secure exemptions from tax as "fixed or determinable" income. Both
sources, however, have in common the desire to secure preferred treatment for
transfers which for varying reasons of policy are not deemed amenable to con-
ventional tax treatment. But further resemblance is tenuous.
Persuasive arguments can be made for minimizing deterrents to the realiza-
230. I.R.C. § 1235 applies to transfers by an individual who purchased the patent only
if the purchase was made before the invention was reduced to practice. I.R.C. § 1235(b) (2).
231. See notes 103, 104, supra, and related text.
232. The Commissioner's justification for his position against capital gains on "sales" by
the royalty route, however, was that capital gains were intended to be granted only where
income accruing over several years was telescoped into a single year-as in the case of a
lump sum sale. The Commissioner's position is stated and rejected in Carl Dreymann, 11
T.C. 153, 162-63 (1948). Another argument which might be made against capital gains on
royalty "sales" is that the taxpayer, by retaining a substantial economic interest in the suc-
cessful exploitation of the property, has not terminated his "investment," i.e., risk, in the
property. Cf. Note, Distinguishing Ordinarv Income From Capital Gain Where Rights to
Future Income are Sold, 69 H.xv. L. REv. 737, 742-43 (1956).
233. See note 104 supra.
234. 1960-1 CuM. BuLL. 26, quoted at note 113 supra.
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tion of income from patents and copyrights, whether by foreign or domestic
taxpayers. There is the classic argument that net revenues will be increased
by reducing tax burdens as low tax rates stimulate productive effort and
realization of latent income. Reams of polemic can be mustered on the value
to society of encouraging inventive and artistic effort; and few would deny that
such efforts are of considerable societal value. But the factors which deter
domestic exploitation by the alien are different from those affecting the domes-
tic taxpayer. Few notions call forth less agreement than that of tax deterrents.
But a judgment on the deterrent effect of taxation on socially useful activities
underlies most tax preferences. The domestic owner of a patent or copyright,
subject to tax on his worldwide income, does not have a feasible alternative
to ordinary income rates. If he holds his property off the market and does not
use it himself, it will probably lose its value in a short time. He may avoid
taxation only by failing to exploit. Thus, ordinary income rates do not seem
particularly oppressive. Insofar as ordinary rates may deter him from exercis-
ing his creative efforts, there are already provisions in the Code permitting
him to spread income over several years and thus to mitigate the sting of
progressive rates on bunched income.23
The nonresident alien or foreign corporation, however, may have attractive
alternatives to avoid United States tax while exploiting the United States
rights. In some cases, the author or inventor may hire out to a foreign firm
to write or invent for it ;26 if his property is already created, he can assign it
to a foreign firm, or use it himself, and export the products produced from his
patent or copyright to the United States. In many such instances, no United
States tax will be due.237 The relative attractiveness of exploiting abroad and
235. I.R.C. §§ 1301, 1302.
236. If the alien's services are rendered abroad none of his compensation will be from
United States sources. I.R.C. § 862 (a) (3).
237. As is discussed in Part II, if "title" to tangible goods imported to the United States
passes outside the United States the income from the sale of the goods is foreign source
income. Thus, the alien's profit on United States patents and copyrights can be derived
from United States markets free of United States tax. When the owner of a patent or copy-
right exploits it by publishing and selling books or building and selling patented machines,
part of his income from sale of the books or machines is theoretically derived from his copy-
right or patent. If the patent or copyright is valuable at all, it contributes to the profitability
of the sales of the product. Moreover, when the owner sells a book or a machine, he is
granting an infinitesimal portion of his rights under the copyright or patent-the right
to a limited use of the product. He retains, however, the more substantial rights to permit
others to use or reproduce the work. Hence, he has not in any practical sense "sold" or
granted a "license" of his patent or copyright. To the very limited extent that his monopoly
rights are "granted" by the sale of the product, and to the extent that profit from the sale of
the product is theoretically attributable to the patent or copyright monopoly rather than to
his efforts and capital in producing and marketing the tangible product, it is disregarded as
de ininimis. Theoretically, the income attributable to the patent or copyright could be segre-
gated from the income attributable to the capital and effort expended in producing and
marketing the product, and this income could be allocated and taxed under different criteria,
The practical difficulties, however, require that such income be treated as merged in the
income from the goods and that it be taxed under the same criteria.
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exploiting locally will vary from property to property,m 8 country to country
and must take into account tariff and import restrictions, relative costs of manu-
facture and many other factors. But it seems undeniable that local exploita-
tion of patents and copyrights by nonresident aliens and foreign corporations
will often be deterred by taxation,239 whereas this is not so clear in case of
the domestic taxpayer who is subject to United States tax on his worldwide
income.
The broad policy questions involved in taxing foreign authors and inventors
seem never to have been considerel by Congress. And the courts and the
Commissioner seem generally to feel that any patent or copyright proceeds
which can be withheld ought to be taxed.240 Yet whether a patent or copyright
is "sold" or "licensed"--however those terms are defined-has no bearing on
whether a tax can be withheld on the proceeds. What determines whether a
tax can be withheld is whether the purchaser or licensee is subject to the
jurisdiction and effective control of the United States. Generally, this means
that if a patent or copyright is assigned by a nonresident alien to a United
States resident, a tax can effectively be withheld; if the assignment is made to
a foreigner having little contact with the United States, detection of the trans-
action and enforcement of an obligation to withhold is unlikely. What happens,
in effect, is that transfers by foreigners of patents and copyrights for domestic
exploitation may be subject to tax; transfers between foreigners for the pur-
pose of exploiting the United States market by producing the patented or
copyrighted product abroad and importing it are not subjected to tax.
This makes no case for exemption of patent or copyright assignments by
nonresident aliens or nonresident foreign corporations. It does at least make
a prima facie case for re-examination of the current tax treatment. It also
underscores the fact that capital gains concepts are not appropriate as criteria
for either imposing a tax on a nonresident alien or exempting him from one,
238. Obviously some intangible rights are not capable of being fully exploited by con-
version into tangible goods which are then sold-e.g., plays and movies.
239. The deterrent effect of a tax levied by the United States on a foreigner will also
vary considerably with the country in which the foreigner is resident. If the country of
residence imposes no income tax or if it exempts from tax the income upon which the United
States tax is levied, the tax will be a deterrent. If the country of residence imposes tax on
its residents which includes in its base the income taxed by the United States, the foreigner's
total tax burden will be increased only to the extent the United States tax is not fully credit-
able against the tax of the country of residence. The United States tax will discourage
activities likely to result in imposition of United States tax both where the tax is not fully
creditable against the tax of the country of residence, and where the latter country's decision
on full creditability cannot comfortably be predicted.
The variations in foreign tax law are too detailed and complex to be gone into here.
It should be noted, however, that the tax conventions contain provisions designed to assure
that the country of residence will grant some relief, in the form of credit or otherwise, for
taxes imposed by the country of source. The scope and meaning of these provisions is dis-
quietingly doubtful. See generally, PHiLLiPs, UNrrED STATES TA.XATION oF No.FsENT
ALE s AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONs 230-33 (1952).
240. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369 (1949), discussed at text ac-
companying notes 70-83 supra.
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although they are apparently employed for both purposes under present law.-"1-
Many of the distinctions created in capital gains criteria seem largely irrelevant
in the taxation of non-nationals. Insofar as the policy of encouraging local
exploitation of foreign owned intangibles is concerned, tax exemptions turn-
ing on whether the patent or copyright was used in a foreign trade or business,
held for sale in the course of a foreign business, produced abroad by personal
efforts, or purchased, seem misplaced. None of these factors would appear to
affect the aliens' alternatives to exploitation free of United States tax.
II. SOURCE OF INCOME
Characterization of income as "fixed or determinable annual or periodical,"
or as one of the "capital gains" specified in sections 871 or 881 does not
make it taxable. As earlier noted, the income of nonresident aliens and foreign
corporations is taxed only if it is both within the taxing provision and is from
sources within the United States.2 42 Foreign taxpayers engaged in business in
the United States are taxed on all income from domestic sources,2 43 so the
source rules are the measure of their tax base. The source of income concept
marks only the outer perimeter of the tax base of nonresident aliens and for-
eign corporations who have no United States business.
The concept of source of income first came into the Code in the Act of
1916 244 as the base for a net income tax on nonresident aliens and foreign
corporations. Elaborations were added in the 1921 Act 245 in response to an
opinion of the Attorney General construing the 1918 provisions as exempting
from United States tax profits made by foreign corporations manufacturing
or purchasing goods in the United States but selling them abroad.2 40 The 1921
Act codified the Attorney General's opinion that income from the purchase
and sale of personal property is derived entirely from the country of sale but
specified that income from property produced here but sold abroad, or pro-
241. To exempt under I.R.C. §§ 871(a) (1), 881(a); impose tax under I.R.C. §
871(a) (2).
242. "In the case of a nonresident alien individual gross income includes only the gross
income from sources within the United States." I.R.C. § 872(a). See also I.R.C. § 882(a)
(foreign corporations).
243. I.R.C. § 871(c), § 882(a), (b).
244. "... there shall be levied ... a tax of 2 percentum ... upon the entire net income
received ... from all sources within the United States by every individual, a nonresident
alien..." Revenue Act of 1916, § 1 (a), 39 Stat. ,756. A similar tax was imposed by § 10 upon
foreign corporations.
The earlier acts had imposed a tax on income "from business transacted and capital
invested within the United States." (Revenue Act of 1909, § 38, 36 Stat. 112, 113; Revenue
Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II, para. G (a), 38 Stat. 172) and upon income "from all property
owned and of every business, trade, or profession carried on in the United States" (Revenue
Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II, para. A, 1, 38 Stat. 166). The 1909 version was characterized an an
"excise" tax by the Supreme Court. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
245. 42 Stat. 244 (1921).
246. 32 Ops. ATr'Y GEN. 336 (1920).
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duced abroad but sold here, shall be allocated to sources partly within and
partly without the United States. 47 Provisions were also included allocating
income from interest, dividends, personal services, transportation, rentals, roy-
alties, and the sale of real property. Now sections 861-864, these provisions
have been retained without substantial amendments for more than forty
years.248 Ill equipped from the beginning to perform the task for which they
were designed, the rules have periodically been given additional duties, differ-
ing substantially from their original purposes, obscuring their policies, and
further befogging their already murky meaning.24 Only the concept of gross
income is more basic. Yet few concepts in the Code have received less analysis
or needed more than the source rules.
In their application to foreign owners of patents, copyrights, and their
analogues, the rules produce a number of anomalies. It may be feasible for
such persons to realize their income in any of three ways differing little, if at
all, in economic consequences, but yielding drastically disparate tax results. If
a foreign taxpayer "licenses" his patent or copyright for use in the United
States, all his income may be from United States sources ;2. if he "sells" such
rights outside the United States, all his income may be foreign income.25 A
third possibility is producing the patent or copyright under a contract for
"personal services," in which event the entire income is attributable to the
country wherein the work was done.2 5 2 Differences between "sales," "licenses,"
247. The Senate Report on the 1921 changes stated, "The present law is both obscure
and economically unsound, inasmuch as the Attorney General has held that where goods are
manufactured or produced in the United States and sold abroad, no part of the profit is
derived from a source within the United States." S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 16
(1921).
248. I.RtC. § 861(a) (3), which provides that "compensation for labor or personal
services performed in the United States" shall be included in United States income, was
amended in 1936 to exclude certain income of a nonresident alien present here for not
more than 90 days and earning $3,000 or less. A 1926 amendment provided for apportion-
ment of income resulting from purchase in the United States and sale in one of its posses-
sions, and vice versa. A 1938 amendment limited such apportionment to purchases in a posses-
sion and sale in the United States [See I.R.C. § 863(b) (3)], sales of goods purchased here
but sold in a possession reverting to treatment as entirely foreign income. I.R.C. § 862(a),
(b).
249. The most troublesome are I.R.C. §§ 921, 922 granting a reduced tax rate to a
"Western Hemisphere trade corporation," one of the requirements of which is that 95 per-
cent of its gross income must be derived "from sources without the United States." The
policies behind this provision are obscure. See Surrey, Current Issues il the Taxation of
Corporate Foreign Investment, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 815, 830 (1956). Among other sections
relying upon source of income concepts whose purposes may not be parallel are I.R.C. § 911
(exemption of certain foreign, source income of citizens living abroad) and I.R.C. §§ 901-05
(foreign tax credit). For a catalogue of provisions raising source of income problems, see
Dailey, The Concept of the Source of Income, 15 TAx L. Rxv. 415, 416 n.5 (1960).
250. I.R.C. § 861(a) (4).
251. I.R.C. § 862(a) (6).
252. I.RhC. §§ 861(a) (3), 862(a) (3).
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and contracts for "services" may be mainly matters of form, yet they determine
the source of the income yielded by the transactions. The source consequences
of labeling a transaction as a "sale," "license," or contract for "services" will
therefore be explored in the remainder of this article.2r,'
Patent and copyright assignments as "sales of personal property"
There is no evidence that Congress considered the matter, but it has never-
theless been held that a patent or copyright is "personal property" which can
be "sold within" or "sold without" the United States as those terms are used
in the source rules.25 4 This assumption certainly puts no strain on the words
of the statute. But in view of the significance of the place of sale under the
source rules, its potential consequences merit evaluation, especially since the
demise of the indivisibility doctrine.
Section 861 (a) (6) provides that income from the "purchase of personal
property without the United States ... and its sale within the United States"
is entirely from United States sources. The converse is specified in section 862
(a) (6).255 Nothing is said about income from property both purchased and
sold within or without the United States. This was apparently too obvious to
require statement since the implication is clear that the place of purchase is
immaterial in determining the origin of income.250 Not so obvious, however,
is the criterion for allocating income derived from the sale of personal property
which was not purchased by the taxpayer. Section 863(b) (2) provides that
income from property "produced (in whole or in part) by the taxpayer with-
in and sold without the United States" or vice versa, shall be treated as derived
partly from domestic, partly from foreign sources and shall be apportioned as
253. The total United States tax consequences to a foreign taxpayer exploiting pat-
ents, copyrights, and similar property, are determined not only by his choice of the license,
sale, or service methods of exploitation, but also by whether he is resident or engaged il
business here. The latter two factors, however, are not matters of form or label and there-
fore will be disregarded, for the most part, in this analysis.
254. See Rafael Sabatini, 32 B.T.A. 705 (1935), reild on other grounds, 98 F.2d
753 (2d Cir. 1938) ; I.T. 2735, 11-2 Cum. BULL. 131 (1933), quoted infra note 288. The
commentators have also assumed that a patent may be "sold without the United States"
within the meaning of the source rules. See, e.g., PHILLIPS, UNITED STATES TAXATION
OF NONRESIDENT ALIENS AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 82 n.129 (1952) ; cf. Eckstrom &
Slowinski, Tax Planning for Foreign Licensing of United States Industrial Properly
Rights, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. OF FED. TAX 969, 984 (1961) (sale of foreign patent may occur
in United States).
255. ". . . income derived from the purchase of personal property within the United
States and its sale without the United States" is from sources without the United States.
I.R.C. § 862(a) (6).
256. See Carding Gill, Ltd., 38 B.T.A. 669 (1938) ; Helvering v. Suffolk Co., 104 F.2d
505 (4th Cir. 1939) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7(a) : "[l]ncome derived from the purchase and
sale of personal property shall be treated as derived entirely from the country in which the
property is sold." An exception not particularly relevant here is made in the statute for ap-
portioning income from purchase of personal property within a possession and selling it i
the United States. I.R.C. § 863(b) (3).
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prescribed by the Secretary. 257 Since the term "produced" is defined to include
"created," 258 an author or inventor's gain would seem to be apportionable un-
der section 863(b) (2). Thus, substantially different sources may be ascribed
to income from sale of a patent or copyright depending upon whether the tax-
payer created or purchased it.2 59 What provision governs, however, if the tax-
payer is a donee, a legatee, or a corporation whid acquired the property as a
contribution to capital? The statute may be construed as expressing the pur-
pose to make the place of sale the entire source of income unless the property
is produced and sold by the taxpayer in different countries. The specification
for property purchased and sold may be interpreted as covering all property
sold but not produced by the taxpayer.2 0 But it need not follow from a con-
gressional purpose to disregard the place of purchase that the mode of acquisi-
tion, if not production, is immaterial. Implicit in the practice of other govern-
ments which disregard the place of purchase in allocating income,20' and at
257. Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3 specifies alternative methods of apportionment of such income.
One method applies where an independent factory price can be established and the produc-
tion and selling activities are in different countries. In such a case, the selling branch is
treated as having bought the property at the factory price. Treas. Reg. 1.863-3(b) (2), Ex-
ample (1). Another method is to allocate half the income according to the ratio of taxpayer's
property used in producing and selling the product located within and without the United
States; the other half is allocated according to gross sales. Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(b) (2),
Ex-ample 2. See also Example 3 (permitting allocation to be based on books of account, with
permission of district director).
258. "[T]he word 'produced' includes 'created', 'fabricated', 'manufactured', 'extracted',
'processed', 'cured, or 'aged'." I.R.C. § 864.
259. It is yet unresolved, however, whether a patent or copyright is "produced" within
the meaning of I.R.C. §'863(b) (2). I.T. 1231, I-1 Cux. Buts.. 206 (1922), held that the
income of ti nonresident alien author who "sold" his novels and manuscripts to an American
publisher was entirely from United States sources. But this ruling was under the 1918 Act
which contained no provisions for apportionment The question seems never to have been
litigated. In another context, it has been argued that I.R.C. § 863(b) (2) does not apply to
foreign patents on inventions produced in the United States on the ground that foreign rights
are "created" under the law of the foreign country. Pugh, Sales and Exchanges of Foreign
Patents, N.Y.U. 20rH INsT. ON FED. TAx. 1305, 1316 (1962). This position, however, seems
unpersuasive. The sale of any property, tangible or intangible, involves a transfer of rights
which may theoretically be "created" by the laws of the country in which the transferred
rights exist. There seems no reason to assume Congress was engaging in metaphysical
sophistry. More likely, it seems to me, is that a patent or copyright is created or produced
where the inventor or author does the work which results in an invention or literary product.
As explained, infra, there may be substantial justification in terms of policy for this result.
260. This interpretation has support from commentators. See, e.g., Pin.Lies, UITED
STATES TAXATION OF NONRESIDENT ALIENS AND FOREGN CRPORATIO;S 90 (1952);
Dailey, The Concept of the Source of Income, 15 TAx L. REv. 415, 445-46 (1960).
261. Most countries apparently do not attribute any income to the country of pur-
chase. See Carroll, Methods of Allocating Taxable Income, IV TAXATzON OF For.MGN
AND NATiONAL ENTERPaSES 117, 126 (League of Nations, 1933). See also, Smith, The
Functions of Tax Treaties, TAXATION AND OPERATIONS ABROAD 276, 281 (Tax Institute,
1960) : "A few countries have even deemed that foreign firms were in some way subject to
income taxation by the mere act of purchasing goods for shipment abroad, a tax policy which
seems quite incompatible with other policies designed to encourage exports."
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least suggested in the history of the 1921 Act, is the desire to encourage sale
of domestic goods for export.262 Exempting foreign purchasers from domestic
tax obviously has this effect. But the domestic economic benefits from encour-
aging gifts, bequests, and capital contributions to foreign taxpayers are not so
apparent. Thus, the income of a foreign taxpayer from the sale of property
neither purchased nor produced by him may also be apportionable. 2U After
forty years, however, no regulations have been adopted and no rulings issued
indicating how, or whether, the income from such property should be appor-
tioned between foreign and domestic sources.
If a patent or copyright may be sold "within" or "without" the United
States as those terms are used in the source rules, then the entire income from
the sale may be allocated to the country within which the sale occurs, pro-
vided the taxpayer acquired the property by purchase. Only if the taxpayer
acquired the property other than by purchase does the statute permit appor-
tionment. Could Congress have intended to permit a foreign taxpayer, even
though engaged in business here, to sell a United States patent or copyright
without incurring tax liability on all or at least part of the income? Could
Congress have intended to tax all the income of a foreign owner of a patent
or copyright, even though he sells worldwide rights, merely because the sale
occurred within our borders rather than without? Could any policy conceiv-
ably be served by such results? Before suggesting some answers to these ques-
tions, it may help to clarify the problem by relating it to the tax-imposing
provisions of the Code.
If a nonresident alien purchases a patent or copyright and sells it "without"
the United States, he need not concern himself with the complexities of "fixed
or determinable" income under section 871 (a), gains from transfers described
in section 1235, or capital gains if present here; he has no income from United
States sources. Only if the sale is "within" the United States and the taxpayer
is a nonresident, not engaged in United States business, must he enter the
briarpatch of section 871 (a) .264 Conceivably, a patent or copyright could be
262. The proposed rule for allocating income from purchase and sale of goods was
explained on the Senate Floor in 1921 as follows:
Mr. WALSH of Montana: ... if the nonresident alien is here importing goods into
the United States he pays?
Mr. SmooT: He pays the tax.
Mr. HITCHCOCK: If he is buying goods in the United States and selling them abroad,
he does not?
Mr. Smoor: He does not.
Mr. HrrcHcocK: That is reasonable.
61 CONG. REc. 6735 (1921).
263. I.R.C. § 863 (a) authorizes the Secretary to provide by regulations for allocating
or apportioning income from sources "not specified" in § 861(a) and § 862(a),
264. If he "produced" the property within the United States or acquired it here other
than by purchase, however, part of his income might be attributed to the United States even
though the sale occurs elsewhere.
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"sold" within the United States for purposes of the source rules yet not be
a "sale" which is exempt from taxation as "fixed or determinable" income. The
courts, however, seem to regard the issues as identical. A case or ruling char-
acterizing an assignment as a "sale" or "license" under the source rules is
considered equally relevant in determining whether or not the income is "fixed
or determinable."26 5 There is, therefore, little likelihood that a foreign trans-
feror of worldwide rights in a patent or copyright who sells the rights with-
in the United States under the source rules would be taxed on the entire pro-
ceeds as "fixed or determinable" income under sections 871 (a) (1) or 881 (a).
Thus, the nonresident foreign corporation-taxed only on "fixed or deter-
minable" income-is probably not taxable on the "sale," even if it occurs with-
in the United States. But the nonresident individual may be taxable on the
gain from the sale of worldwide patent rights if the transaction is ithin sec-
tion 1235 or if he has a capital gain and is present in the United States.0 0
If a nonresident alien or a foreign corporation is engaged in business in the
United States, and thus is taxable on its entire income from United States
sources, it may be taxed on the net income from a sale here of worldwide
rights, whether or not the income arose out of United States business activ-
ities.2 67
Where is a patent or copyright sold?
The Code furnishes no criteria for determining whether a sale is "within"
or "without" the United States. The Treasury Department in 1921 ruled that
income from goods sold to residents of the United States and shipped from
a foreign country F.O.B. shipping point, was not income from United States
sources as "the sales were consummated and the title to the property" passed
abroad.268 Subsequent rulings also applied the title passage concept.20 9 In 1930,
however, the Commissioner retreated from the title passage test, holding in-
stead that the "essential character of the transaction-the contract of sale-
is the decisive factor in determining the place of sale .... ,0 The new place-
265. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Celanese Corp., 140 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1944) ; Estate of
Marton, 47 B.T.A. 184 (1942); Rohmer v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1946);
Molnar v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1946). Sometimes it is not clear which
question the court decided. See, e.g., General Analine & Film Corp. v. Commissioner, 139
F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1944); cf., Commissioner v. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369 (1949).
266. If the alien purchased the property, his entire gain would be taxable by the United
States if the sale occurred here. If he produced the property abroad, however, an allocation
between foreign and United States sources would probably be required and he would be
taxed on only a portion of his worldwide income.
267. If the property was created by the taxpayer abroad, however, an allocation would
be required and only part of the income would be taxed here.
268. O.D. 1100, 5 Cum. BuLL 118 (1921).
269. I.T. 1569, I-1 Cums. BuLL- 126 (1923) ; I.T. 2068, 111-2 Cum. BuL. 164 (1924);
G.C.M. 2467, VII-2 Cum. BuLL. 188 (1928).
270. G.C.M. 8594, IX-2 Cum. Buu.. 354, 358 (1930). This ruling was based on an in-
terpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas
v. Collector, 279 U.S. 306 (1929), which held that sales of goods imported here from the
Philippines occurred in the Philippines.
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of-contract test was not accepted by the courts, 271 however, and in 1947 the
Commissioner reinstated the title passage test, adding a caveat that sales
arranged to avoid taxes would be treated as consummated "where the sub-
stance of the sale occurred. ' '1 2 This is the present test set forth in the regula-
tions.- 3 A destination test was considered by the American Law Institute but
rejected on the ground it would encourage exports and discourage imports,
would be subject to manipulation, and would be difficult to administer.
27 4
The primary focus of the dialogues and decisions on the place of sale has
been on tangible goods sold in international trade by manufacturers or mer-
chandisers. 275 In vacillating among tests of title, place of contract, substance
and so forth, the Commissioner has presumably been concerned with such
goods. Thus he says that passage of ownership and "risk of loss" constitute the
all important passage of "title."
276
The rulings and decisions are not clear on what is meant by "where title
passes. '277 The reference may be to the geographical location of the seller and
buyer when title passes. This is unlikely, however, since seller and buyer are
often in different places at the magic moment. The reference may be to the
place where the last act is done which completes the sale and confers title on
the buyer.27 8 There is also some evidence that the place of sale is ordinarily
271. See, e.g., Commissioner v. East Coast Oil Co., 85 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1936),
affirming 31 B.T.A. 558 (1934), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 608 (1936); Ronrico Corp., 44
B.T.A. 1130 (1941).
272. G.C.M. 25131, 1947-2 Cum. BULL. 85, 86, revoking G.C.M. 8594, supra note 270,
273. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7 (c). In recent cases involving the Western Hemisphere Trade
Corporation provisions, the Commissioner has been urging, without success, an "economic
penetration" test. See, e.g., A. P. Green Export Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 383 (Ct, Cl.
1960). The cases are collected and discussed in Krahmer, Federal Income Tax Treahnent
of International Sales of Goods: A Reevaluation of the Title Passage Test, 17 TAx L. REV.
235, 252-55 (1962).
274. See Surrey & Warren, The Income Tax Project of the American Law Institute,
66 HARv. L. REv. 1161, 1197 (1953). For an argument supporting a destination test on pro-
tectionist and balance-of-payments grounds, see Krahmer, supra note 273, at 259-60.
275. See Krahmer, supra note 273; Brainerd, United States Income Taxation of Inter-
national Sales of Personal Property, 32 TAXES 359 (1954) ; United States v. Balanovski,
236 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957).
276. "... the sale shall be deemed to have occurred at the time and place of passage to
the buyer of beneficial ownership and risk of loss." Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7 (c).
277. See, e.g., United States v. Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. deniled,
352 U.S. 968 (1957).
278. This seems to be the position taken by the Treasury in a recent Western Henn-
sphere Trade Corporation case:
... under the law of taxation, the determination of the passage of title, although tn-
portant to ascertain when it occurred, is not the controlling factor as to the source of
income. It is the event causing that passage which is the determinative factor. Where
did the event take place when title passed.... It is that place that is the situs of the
sale.
Brief for Respondent, p. 78, Barber-Green Americas, Inc., 35 T.C. 365 (1960). It should
be noted, however, that the Treasury's position in a case of this sort should not be projected
upon other source questions inasmuch as different policies are involved. See note 249 supra.
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regarded as the location of the goods when title passes.7 9 The latter view
seems consistent with the notion that transferring risk of loss is an important
earmark of a sale under the source rules. But it seems inappropriate for in-
tangibles because there is no meaningful "risk of loss" and no physical loca-
tion of the property.
If the place of sale of a patent or copyright is the location of the property
when title passes must we become immersed in rarified polemic about the
"situs" of an intangible? Is the majestic maxim liobilia scquuntur persona in
applicable to locate the sale at the domicile of the seller or should we choose
instead the notion that the situs of a copyright or patent is the country whose
laws "created" it? If it is not the locus of the intangible that is determinative,
is it where the contract is made or where the last event necessary to pass
"title" occurs? If the latter, is it conceivable that registration of the patent or
copyright is the "last event" necessary to complete the sale? Suppose the prop-
erty is "sold" and exploited though never registered?
Decisions on place of sale of patents and copyrights
In an early ruling the Commissioner held that a transfer of serial rights in
"certain literary works" by a nonresident alien to a domestic corporation was
not income from United States sources, since "the contract was made abroad,
the sale took place abroad, and payment for such rights is made directly to
the nonresident alien."2o Shortly thereafter, the Commissioner ruled that the
profit of a nonresident alien from the "sale" to American publishers of certain
novels and an option to purchase serial rights in future writings was from
United States sources. The manuscripts were to be delivered in the United
States, payment for the serial rights was to be made only if accepted by the
American publishers, and the contracts were negotiated and payments received
by an American agent.2 8' Both of these rulings were issued during the first
administrative reign of the title passage test. Yet they seem to reflect a place-
of-contract test, not expressly adopted until 1930 for sales of goods. 2 - Thus,
the Commissioner may tacitly have recognized the irrelevance of a title pas-
sage test for copyrights and the like. Since reinstatement of the title passage
279. See Dailey, supra note 260, at 465; Dean & Leake, How to Arrange Foreign Sales
So Title Will Pass "Outside the U.S." for Tax Purposes, 94 J. AccouNTANcy 457 (1952).
But cf. Krahmer, supra note 273, at 251 rt.88. The absence of clarity on this question may
be due to the fact that ordinarily, the last "act" necessary to confer title has reference to
the physical location of the goods. Thus, the title passing act is frequently delivery of the
goods to the carrier or arrival of the goods at destination. Additional complications arise
when documents of title are negotiated in a place other than the location of the goods. See
id. at 246.
280. O.D. 988, 5 Cumn. BuLL. 117 (1921). This ruling was issued the same year as the
Commissioner's adoption of the title passage test in O.D. 1100, 5 Cum. BuLL. 118 (1921).
281. I.T. 1231, I- Ct . BurL. 206 (1922). In I.T. 2735, XII-2 Cums BuLt. 131 (1933),
which adopted the indivisibility doctrine, O.D. 988 as revoked and I.T. 1231 modified on
the ground that serial rights could not be the subject of a "sale."
282. See G.C.M. 8594, IX-2 Cum. BULL. 354 (1930).
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test in 1947, there have been no reported rulings or decisions on the place of
sale of a patent or copyright.
Inasmuch as the proceeds from a "sale" of a patent or copyright are not
"fixed or determinable" income, there was little reason before 1954 for the courts
to decide where a sale occurred. For even though the proceeds of a sale are
deemed from United States sources, they are not taxable unless the foreign
taxpayer is engaged in business here, or unless they are capital gains taxable
because of the alien's presence here, or transfers described in section 1235.
Although patent transactions and section 1235 would seem to create frequent
disputes, none has as yet apparently been adjudicated.
In Sabatini v. Commissioner, however, the issue was presented since the
case was decided under pre-1936 law which taxed the nonresident alien on all
income from United States sources. Sabatini had granted various rights in his
literary works to American corporations. The Board of Tax Appeals held that
lump sum payments for worldwide movie rights in various books were pro-
ceeds from the "sale of personal property without the United States," appar-
ently because the author was in England when the publishers' offers were ac-
cepted.28 3 None of the income from the movie rights was taxable, therefore,
even though the negotiations for the contracts took place in the United States
through American agents. The Board seems clearly to have held that a sale
of such rights occurs where the buyer's offer is accepted.2 8 4 On appeal,28 the
Commissioner did not question the place-of-contract test but denied that a sale
occurred, relying on the doctrine of indivisibility.28 6 The Second Circuit also
did not question the propriety of the place-of-contract test ;287 instead, it held
"there was no transfer of title necessary to a completed sale"-nierely a "Ii-
283. 32 B.T.A. 705 (1935). The Board held that certain sums received for book, serial,
and dramatic rights were "royalties," rather than sales proceeds.
284. Id. at 705 n.1, 713. Query, what would the Board have held if the buyer's offer had
stated that the contract was not to become effective until the seller's notice of acceptance was
received by the American buyer?
285. 98 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1938).
286. The Board of Tax Appeals had cited Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v.
Collector, 279 U.S. 306 (1929), in support of its decision as had the Commissioner in adopt-
ing the place-of-contract test in 1930. In his Sabatini brief, however, the Commissioner
distinguished that case on the ground it involved "tangible property located without the
United States while here the intangible property had a fixed and immovable situs within the
United States." Brief for the Commissioner, p. 15, Sabatini v. Commissioner, 98 F,2d 753
(2d Cir. 1938). There is a lot of other cant about "situs" in the brief (p. 13) but it was urged
in support of the position, that the grant of partial rights was a license-not that the place
of sale was determined by the "situs" of the property.
287. In Rohmer v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1946), cerl. denied, 328 U.S.
862 (1946), the court said about its Sabatini decision:
The tax on aliens at that time included a tax on the proceeds of a sale of personal
property, but not if the property was produced without and sold without the United
States; . . . we assumed that, because the contract was made in England, if the
transaction was a "sale," it was not taxable; holding that it was not a sale, we held
the proceeds were taxable as royalties.
Id. at 63.
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cense" to use property within the United States which was taxable as a "royal-
ty" under the predecessor of section 861(a) (4). Thus the court gave a big
boost to the Commissioner's indivisibility theory and pretty much ended, for a
time, fine arguments about the place of sale.28-
When the issue is resurrected, the meagre precedents suggest that the
Treasury will apply the place-of-contract test, garnished with whatever views
are current in the Department about the "substance" of the transaction. If the
current administrative concept of a "sale" as an exclusive grant of limited
rights on a royalty basis is applicable to the source rules, then it is conceiv-
able that a foreign taxpayer can exploit his rights here piecemeal and, if lie is
careful to negotiate the contract outside the United States, avoid all United
States income tax. If he "effects" a sale in the United States, however, all his
income may be from United States sources, even though he assigns worldwide
rights, if he purchased the property. If he produced it, part of the income
would probably be allocated to the country where the property was produced.
LICENSES
Whatever Congress' reason for exalting the place of sale in allocating in-
come, it at least recognized that the country where the taxpayer produced the
property was entitled to tax part of the income from the sale.2-s Yet it also
provided that if the property is rented or "licensed" abroad, all the income is
derived from the country in which the property is "located" or "used."' -3 If
the transfer is to cover the approximate useful life of the property, the choice
between a "sale" and a "license" may be of little importance, apart from tax
consequences.
If the difference between a "sale" and an exclusive license for the life of a
patent or copyright has become one of nomenclature, ' the resident foreign
288. In his 1933 ruling adopting the indivisibility test, the Commissioner included the
following dictum:
Patents, copyrights, and other franchises have, from the earliest times, been re-
garded as having a fixed and immovable situs in the place where they are exercisable,
the same as real property has in the place where it is situated, although patents,
copyrights, and franchises are personal property. It is plain from the provisions of
[§ 861] that Congress intended to treat lands, patents, copyrights, and franchises
as a single class for the purpose of "rentals or royalties from ... [or] for the use of
or for the privilege of using," but for the purpose of sales it intended to treat real
property as a class by itself and to treat patents, copyrights, and franchises in the
class with all other personal property.
I.T. 2735, XII-2 Cum. Bum- 131-33 (1933). What was "plain" to the Commissioner in 1933
may not be so plain in 1963, particularly ir view of the demise of the indivisibility doctrine
and the consequent commercial feasibility of patent and copyright "sales."
289. I.R-C. § 863(b) (2).
290. I.R.C. § 861(a) (4) provides that "Rentals or royalties from property located or
used in the United States... including rentals or royalties for the use of or for the privilege
of using in the United States patents, copyrights, secret processes and formulas, good will,
trade-marks, trade brands, franchises, and other like property" is entirely United States
source income. The converse is specified in § 862(a) (4).
291. Le., if the concept of a "sale" contained in Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 Cume. Bu,,.
26 is applicable to the source rules.
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corporation creating such property will presumably choose the license label
when exploiting domestically created rights abroad, as there is no room in the
statute for allocating a portion of royalty income to the country where the
intangible was created. 20 2 Conversely, the nonresident alien or foreign corpora-
tion creating such property abroad and exploiting it here may, by labeling the
transaction a "sale" and effecting the sale abroad, seek to avoid all United
States tax.
There are two substantial differences in the methods of allocating income
from a "sale" and from a "license." If the property is "sold," the income is
attributed entirely to the place of sale, or allocated between the place of sale
and the place of production.293 In a "license" transaction, neither the place
where the license contract was negotiated nor the place of production are coni-
sidered, 294 and the criteria are the same whether the taxpayer produced or pur-
chased the licensed property.
In determining where the licensed rights were "used," several early cases
held that where the parties themselves put no price on the foreign and domestic
rights, no segregation would be made-all income was attributed to the United
States.20 5 Later this rule was relaxed and income from copyright licenses to
American publishers with foreign subscribers was allocated among foreign and
domestic sources according to testimony of experts upon the relative values of
foreign and domestic rights, circulation figures, and the "economic common
sense" of the matter. 2 96 Apparently it is thought that intangible property is
"used" or "located" in the United States 207 only if the licensee sells the
patented or copyrighted product to domestic consumers, or exhibits it here, or
perhaps sublicenses it for exhibition or sale to domestic cohsumers. 208 Yet this
292. All income from rentals or royalties of property "located" or "used" abroad is
foreign source income. I.R.C. § 862(a) (4).
293. I.R.C. §§ 861(a),(b), 862(a),(b), 863(b) (2).
294. See note 290 supra.
295. Estate of Marton, 47 B.T.A. 184 (1942); Rohiner v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d
61 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Molnar v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1946).
296. Sax Robmer, 14 T.C. 1467 (1950). See also Wodehouse v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d
987 (4th Cir. 1949).
297. Within the meaning of I.R.C. § 861(a) (4).
298. In I.T. 3296, 1939-2 Cum. BULL. 133, a nonresident alien, resident of the Philippines,
wrote textbooks which were printed in the United States by a domestic corporation and
"sold exclusively in the Philippines." Holding that the author's royalties were not income
from United States sources, the Service said, "there is no commercial publication of the
textbooks within the United States in that the textbooks are not sold within the United
States .... M Company is engaged solely in printing and manufacturing books within
the United States ... and in the vending of such books in the Philippines, the Philippine
copyrights are used and not the United States copyrights." Query, which coypright was
used in reproducing the manuscript in the United States? Wasn't some of the money paid
the author for this privilege? Suppose "title" to the books passed in the United States al-
though the books were intended for Philippine use. Would the alien's royalties then be frotu
United States sources?
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conclusion is not obvious. If an American licensee produces a movie or pub-
lishes a book or builds a machine here, he is exercising rights in the United
States regardless of where he ultimately exploits the product. Thus, it is not
clear why the place where the licensee produces the patented or copyrighted
product should not be included in the allocation formula. Tax law, however, is
supposed to be "an intensely practical matter" and the courts may perhaps be
excused for avoiding this thicket. The ultimate question seems to be what pro-
portion of the consideration was received by the taxpayer for the rights he has
granted in each country. The markets actually exploited by the licensee seem
to the courts to have some relation to the "economic common sense" of the
matter.
29 9
All the decisions, however, have involved rights exploited by production and
sale or distribution of a product. Suppose a foreign patentee were to assign
to a domestic concern the exclusive patent rights in a machine for a fixed sum
and the domestic concern during the first three years of the patent term pro-
duced 1,000 of the items, 200 of which it held in inventory, 300 of which it
used on its own manufacturing process, and 200 of which it exported, hoping,
however, to develop foreign markets for thousands. Dividing the consideration
among foreign and domestic rights in such a case would seem largely a product
of fancy. The parties would probably be left considerable latitude to make their
own allocation between foreign and domestic rights.300 Yet any such allocation
299. An apparent exception is Sanchez v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 815 (1947). There, a nonresident alien had invented and patented a process
for refining sugar and a product used in the process. He granted a worldwide "license" to
an American corporation, the agreement providing for "royalties" based on a percentage
of the sales price of the patented product but specifying that the method of computing the
"royalties" was merely a gauge for determining the royalties due for all the patents. The
licensee sold the product to foreign. customers and included in the sale a sub-license, royalty
free, to use the patented process.
The taxpayer contended that to the extent his process and product were used in foreign
countries, his royalty income wmas from foreign sources. The Court of Appeals rejected his
argument on the ground there were no "royalties" on the foreign patents as the foreign pur-
chasers were permitted, "presumably as part of the inducement to buy at the sales price
charged, to use those patents for nothing." Everything the taxpayer received was a portion
of the sales price of the patented products. Hence, "the petitioner received only proceeds
from a domestic exclusive license and nothing for the use of any foreign property." It seems
difficult to square the court's rationale with the reasoning in, I.T. 3296, supra note 293. The
court seemed to assume that if the licensee sells products covered by a patent and pays the
licensor royalties based on the sales proceeds, the income is all United States income even
though the goods are sold by the licensee abroad for foreign consumption. The court's diffi-
culties probably stem from its confusion of the question of the source and character of the
licensee's income with the source and character of the licensor's income. Compare on this
problem, Ingram v. Bowers, 57 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1932), discussed infra note 305.
300. Cf. Estate of Marton, 47 B.T.A. 184 (1942) : "It would have been a simple matter
for the parties to have segregated the purchase of the domestic from the foreign rights.
This they did not do and we cannot supply that omission by surmise."
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by the parties would be equally arbitrary or impelled solely by tax considera-
tions.301
INCOME FROM SERVICES
All income from "labor or personal services" is attributable under the Code
to the country or countries in which the services were rendered.302 This
method of allocation conceivably could be construed to apply only to individ-
uals and, perhaps, only to "employees." It has not, however, been so inter-
preted. Corporations as well as individuals can render "personal services"
within the source rules 3 and may render services through agents.304
In trying to distinguish between contracts for "services" and "sales" or
"licenses," the courts, in the absence of apparent policy guides, frequently fall
back on formalism. In Karrer v. United States,30 for example, a Swiss chem-
ist entered into a "special employment contract" with a Swiss company. He
performed basic research and the company supplied him with raw materials,
a laboratory, and research assistance. The results, processes for making vita-
mins synthetically, were to be exploited by the company. Karrer, the chemist,
applied for the United States patents, then assigned the patent applications to
an American company with whom the Swiss company had a contract. The
agreement between Karrer and the Swiss company provided that Karrer was
to receive a percentage of the proceeds from the exploitation of the inventions.
The American company paid royalties due under its contract with the Swiss
company directly to Karrer, although it was not required by contract nor
asked to do so. The Court of Claims held that Karrer had no income from
United States sources because he owned no interest in the patents. His income
was derived, not from the use of his property but from his services. The Swiss
company "owned" the patents and the contract between it and Karrer was not
a "royalty" contract as Swiss law treated it as an "employment" contract.
A decision which rests on reasoning that the taxpayer, who has a right to
share in the proceeds, owns "no interest in the patent" has little to commend
it. And a determination of source of income which depends at all upon a
characterization under foreign law of a contract as one of "employment" seems
a bit barren of policy.
Decisions involving copyrights are no more illuminating. In addition to nice
distinctions on whether the taxpayer owned an "interest" in the property, the
courts occasionally seem to consider important whether or not the taxpayer
301. Of course, the Commissioner may not be bound by the parties' evaluations, and
there is evidence that he is not reluctant to rely on surmise in this area. See Rev. Rul.
55-17, 1955-1 Cumd. BuLL. 388 (allocation between license of "know-how" by a foreign
corporation and services rendered abroad).
302. With a minor exception for certain compensation earned here by a nonresident
alien present in the United States for 90 days or less. I.R.C. §§ 861(a) (3), 862(a) (3).
303. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Hawaiian Philippine Co., 100 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1939),
cert. denied, 307 U.S. 635 (1939).
304. See, e.g., Helvering v. Boekman, 107 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1939).
305. 152 F. Supp. 66 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
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was obligated to produce the intellectual product.30' This suggests that the tax
treatment may sometimes turn on whether the property was already in exist-
ence before the agreement was made. Yet it is far from clear that a taxpayer
cannot earn income from personal services even though he supplies pre-exist-
ing property under a carefully worded agreement requiring him to "produce"
property meeting certain specifications. 30 7
At any rate, it is possible for an individual or corporate author or inventor
to produce movies, books, inventions and the like in return for which payment
is made as "compensation for personal services" within the source rules. The
entire income would then be attributable to the country where the work was
created. But if the producer retains "title" and "sells" or "licenses" the result
of its efforts, income may be attributable to entirely different countries.
STATUTORY POLICIES OBSCURED
The paradox is thus completed when the allocation of income from sales and
licenses is compared with the allocation of personal service income solely to
the country where the services were rendered. Suppose X corporation is formed
under a foreign charter to produce a movie or an invention in the United
States. X corporation then enters into one of the following contracts with Y
corporation which is going to exploit the property abroad:
(1) Contract for Services. An agreement by X to produce the movie
or invention for Y, "title" to be vested in Y, and X's compensation to be
a percentage of the royalties (if Y "licenses" the property) and a per-
centage of the gross proceeds (if Y exhibits the film or produces and sells
the patented product) ;
306. In Ingram v. Bowers, 57 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1932), Enrico Caruso got "royalties"
from records made by Victor Co., some of which were sold abroad. Held: Caruso's income
was entirely from personal services rendered in the United States; he owned no interest in
the records and the character of his compensation was not determined by the character of
the money received by Victor. I.T. 2735, X11-2 Cum. Buu. 131 (1933) ruled that "royalties"
received by a nonresident alien author were not income from personal services where the
author agreed with a domestic publisher that the publisher would have the serial rights in
all works to be produced in the future. Ingrain v. Bowers was distinguished on the ground
that Caruso had agreed to sing; here, the taxpayer merely agreed that if he did write books
or stories the publisher would have the right to publish them. But cf. E. Phillips Oppenheim,
31 B.T.A. 563 (1934), where a nonresident alien granted exclusive book rights in the
United States and Canada "in all novels by him published" and agreed to deliver at least
two novels per year. The publisher agreed to pay him advances against royalties, to pay
royalties on all books sold, and to publish at least two books per year. The Board, citing
Ingrain v. Bowers, held the alien's income was from a license and was not from personal
services. See also, G.C.M. 236, V1-2 Cum. BuLu. 27 (1927); Rev. Rul. 55-636, 1955-2
Cum. BuL. 17. On the issue of whether the taxpayer "sold" a patent for capital gains
purposes, or earned compensation for personal services, see Arthur N. Blum, 11 T.C. 101
(1948), aff'd sub ma. Blum v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1950) ; William B.
Stout, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 988 (1949), aff'd sub non. Stout v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d
854 (6th Cir. 1950).
307. Cf. Irving Berlin, 42 B.T.A. 668 (1940). For more on the distinction between
"property" and "services" see note 337 infra.
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(2) Sale. An agreement by X to "sell" and Y to "buy" the property
when it is produced, X's compensation to be on the same terms as in (1),
(3) License. An agreement by X to grant an exclusive "license" of the
property to Y, when it is produced, X's compensation to be on the same
terms as in (1) and (2).
Under the first arrangement, a contract for "services," all the income re-
ceived by X is apparently from United States sources; under the second, a
contract of "sale," all the income is from United States sources only if the
"sale" occurs within the United States; if the "sale" occurs without the United
States, part of the income is allocable to foreign sources. Under the third con-
tract, none of the income is from United States sources, unless the "licensee"
sells or sublicenses the product here; then only the portion, if any, which is
attributable to the "use" of the property in the United States 808 would be
United States income.
Should a decision-maker, confronted with a "sale" or "license" contract,
and desiring to disregard the "form" and grasp the "substance," treat the
transaction as a contract for services, productive of United States income?
"Substance over form," "sham," and similar doctrines are appropriate when
the transaction is not what it purports to be, or when congressional policy
would be thwarted by giving literal content to the statutory terms.300 But
where Congress has specified divergent tax treatment of transactions differing
little in substance, how is a decision maker to distill the essence of the statu-
tory policy? Why couldn't each of these transactions rationally be treated as
a "sale" or as a "license"? Suppose the movie or invention were produced by
X corporation abroad and exploited here by Y corporation? Only by treating
the transaction as a "license" would any of X's income be attributed to the
United States, assuming that a "sale" could be effected abroad.
It often seems to be assumed that since United States rights granted by
an alien are creatures of American law, the income from such rights in a
patent, or copyright, or similar property is derived from United States sources.
Without the protection of United States law the alien would have nothing of
value. This rationale ignores the protection given the author or inventor by
the country or countries in which he had the inspiration and did the work to
produce the property, and without which there would also be no income. The
principle would seem to apply not only to the patent or copyright owner but
also to the foreigner who hires out to invent or create. The value of his ser-
vices, and the compensation he receives, is dependent upon the legal protection
and the market for the patent or copyright given his employer. Thus the prin-
ciple, if valid, would seem to support a tax on the income of the foreigner
employed to produce patents or copyrights exploited (or even exploitable) by
his employer in countries other than the country where the property was
308. See text accompanying notes 295-99 supra.
309. See generally, Blum, Knetsch v. United States: A Pronouncemnct on Tax lvoid.
ance, SUPREME COURT REvIEW 135 (1961).
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created. Conversely, it would deny to the country where the work was done the
allocation of any of the income of the author or inventor. This rationale, there-
fore, is consistent with the statutory treatment of royalties but inconsistent
with the treatment of compensation and with the allocation of income from
sales. It may satisfy abstract notions of jurisdiction to tax, but it falls short
of supplying a basis for allocation or a justification for the extant divergencies
in treatment of sales, licenses, and services.310
The statute gives no clue to the policies which might be served by these
seemingly artificial distinctions. Nor does the statute indicate which of appar-
ently conflicting policies was regarded by Congress as paramount. If the place
of production has the primary claim on income-as indicated by the treatment
of income from services-this policy is totally rejected by the treatment of
licenses and at least partially scrapped in allocating income from a sale.
THE RATIONALE OF THE PLACE OF SALE FACTOR IN INCOmE ALLOCATION
The place of sale is considered an important factor by most states in appor-
tioning interstate income 311 and by other countries in determining the origin
of international income.31 2 Only recently has there seemed to be much analysis
of its justifications, and most of this has been on the interstate level.3 13 The
prominent place of the concept in the Code may be due in part to confusion
of the problem of source with the concept of realization. An early case decided
by the Board of Tax Appeals illustrates the confusion. Deciding under the
1918 Act (before the Code provided for apportionment) that the income of
nonresident aliens who manufactured lace in England and sold it here was
entirely from United States sources, the Board said:
It may be quite reasonable from the standpoint of cost accounting or
other statistical study to say that because manufacturing is part of the
cause of the whole income a reasonable part thereof should be so attrib-
uted and allocated to manufacture. But this does not establish as a fact
that the source of such aliquot part is not sale. Sale was necessary to its
existence and was the most recent if not the entire source. If not the
entire supporting arch, it was the indispensable keystone.
314
310. Another difficulty with this theory is applying it to assignments of "rights" in intel-
lectual products which are in the public domain. The tax-ability of a license of a copyright,
f6r example, is not dependent on whether the "rights" granted by the taxpayer were his
to grant See Sabatini v. Commissioner, 98 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1938).
311. See Developments in Law--Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Intcrsate
Business, 75 HAv. L. REv. 953, 1012 (1962). There is little uniformity, however, in the
weight attached to the sales factor or in the criteria employed in locating the place of sale.
See HELLERSTEN, STATE AND LocAL TAxAmON 293, 307-09 (2d ed. 1961).
312. See generally, Carroll, op. cit. supra note 261, at 116-30.
313. See, e.g., Studenskl, The Need for Federal Curbs on State Taxes on Inlerstale
Commerce: An Economist's Viewpoint, 46 VA. L. REv. 1121, 1131 (1960) ; Harriss, Inter-
state Apportionment of Business Income, 49 Am. EcoN. Ray. 399 (1959); Kust, State
Taxation of Interstate Income: New Dinensions of an Old Problem, 12 TAX EXcC. 45, 60
(1959).
314. Richard Birkin, 5 B.T.A. 402, 406 (1926) (emphasis added).
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This bit of logic was matched by the Second Circuit in denying a similar
claim by English manufacturers:
An enhanced value of manufactured goods prior to sale is an increment
but does not become a profit until reduced to possession by sale ...
[T]here is no way of determining the profit until a sale be realized and
the price becomes known. . . .It was the . . . sale ...which was the
determining factor of whether it sustained a loss or made a profit. The
gross income thus came from sources within the United States 10
There are good reasons for not imposing a tax on accretions to wealth in
the form of appreciation in property values until they are brought to fruition
and given some finality by a sale or other disposition of the property. But
something a bit more solid is needed to justify the determination that the place
where the income is realized is also the place where the tax on the income
should be levied. If this were an adequate basis for allocating income it might
be argued that income is realized where the seller gets his money, or at his
domicile, or where the buyer parts with the money, or where the buyer lives,
and so forth. To determine when a realization of income occurs is difficult but
necessary; to locate it geographically is whimsical and unnecessary.
The emptiness of the notion that the place of sale, because it is the "indis-
pensable keystone" of the realization of income is therefore the origin of the
income need not be belabored. Any other factor in the income producing
process might as logically be assigned the "keystone position" in the income
arch. All may be sine quibus non. Congress did not completely embrace such
a view, since in the 1921 Act it provided for apportionment where the tax-
payer manufactured property in one country and sold it in another.1 0 More-
over, the principle would seem equally applicable to income from rentals, roy-
alties, or even personal services, requiring attribution of the income to the
country in which the realization occurred. Thus the place of contract, place of
payment, or most any other place might be selected as the origin of such in-
come. Congress, however, decided that the source of rental and royalty income
is the country where the property is located or used 317 and that compensation
for labor or personal services shall be attributed to the country where the ser-
vices were performed.318
At the opposite extreme from the position regarding the sale as the critical
event is the view put forth by some economists that because income is ordi-
315. Tootal Broadhurst Lee Co. v. Commissioner, 30 F.2d 238, 239-40 (2d Cir, 1929),
Some of this formalism may have been spawned by Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189
(1920), where the Court, holding stock dividends not taxable, uttered the unfortunate dic-
tum that "'Income may be defined as the gain from capital, from labor, or from both coin-
bined,' provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale ... of capital as-
sets...." Id. at 207. This statement has somehow been read into the foreign income area and
quoted for the proposition that a "sale" of property is the source of the seller's income. See,
e.g., 8 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 45.26 at 59 (1957).
316. Revenue Act of 1921, § 2 17(e), 42 Stat. 245, now I.R.C. § 863(b) (2).
317. I.R.C. §§ 861(a) (4), 862(a) (4).
318. I.R.C. §§ 861(a) (3), 862(a) (3).
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narily the product of human effort and capital resources, the sale merely marks
the end of the process and is not responsible for any of the taxpayer's in-
come, except to the extent that labor and capital are employed in making
the sale. "Economic reality" requires that the factors in the allocation formula
should not stray too far from the physical location of the activities and the
capital employed by the taxpayer in creating the income.3:1 This is roughly
the approach taken by some of our states in interstate apportionment 3 0 and
appears to be the postulate applied in some of the cases in the federal field
where the transaction does not seem clearly to fit any of the specific source
rules.3
21
Yet, ineluctable verity cannot be claimed for this notion. There is no reason
why tariff or sumptuary policies cannot, or should not, be reflected in an in-
come tax. If income is apportioned by a place of sale factor to protect against
foreign competition there is nothing inherently wrong with the method if the
protection is valued enough to offset the resulting disadvantages in lost rev-
enues, retaliation, resource allocation and other consequences of protectionist
decisions. If this was the original congressional purpose, however, reexami-
nation is overdue. Such a purpose is thwarted by either the place-of-contract
or title passage tests since either test gives the parties themselves ample free-
dom to allocate the income to the country of their choice without significantly
restricting their economic alternatives.
A bit of the benefit theory
As a theoretical justification for imposing taxes on non-nationals, various
versions of the benefit theory have received judicial sanction.3a  An older ver-
sion of the theory, rooted in the philosophy of the social contract, was that tax
burdens should be apportioned according to the cost of the governmental ser-
vices or the benefits received from the government by the taxpayer. Used as a
slogan by those opposing tax exemption of the nobility and clergy in eighteenth
century France, the theory in this form has largely been abandoned by the
twentieth century, retaining pristine favor only among reactionary elements
using it as an emotive weapon against progressive rates.:a In contemporary
jurisdictional theory, the concept-often phrased in terms of "protection"--
319. See Harriss, supra note 313, for an elaboration of the theory.
320. Of course, gross sales are often used in the states' apportionment formulas, but
often, it seems, as merely a rough gauge of the sales activity withirt the state. See HELLER-
sTErN, op. cit. stpra note 311, at 305.
321. In Commissioner v. Piedras Negras Broadcasting Co., 127 F2d 260 (5th Cir.
1942), the court was confronted with a claim that a radio broadcasting station operating just
over the Mexican border had income from U.S. advertisers. Held: The entire income was
from foreign sources inasmuch as all the broadcasting facilities and substantially all the
activities occurred in Mexico. But see Korfund Co., 1 T.C. 1180 (1943).
322. See Lord Forres, 25 B.T.A. 154, 161 (1932) ; Wurzel, Foreign Inveshncnt and
Extraterritorial Taxation, 38 CoLum. L. REv. 809, 830 (1938).
323. See SnhoNs, PERsoNA INcomE TAXATiON 3-4 (1938). The principle still has
some vitality, however, in allocating the cost of certain governmental services of a quasi-
commercial nature, e.g., toll highways. See Sairra, FEDEReA. TAX REon 17-19 (1961).
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seems to mean little more than that the taxpayer must have received some
benefit or protection from the state seeking to tax him. 324 Little effort is made
to quantify and relate the cost or value of the benefits received to the amount
of the levy.
3 25
Ability to pay is a currently more respectable criterion, both in domestic
and international tax matters, although the factor of benefits is related to the
ability to pay.326 To the extent that benefits increase economic faculty, they
are relevant in allocating tax burdens. Definitions of source of income should
be pragmatic concepts, reflecting a balance of the need for revenue, the desire
to encourage investment, efficient resource allocation, and reciprocal accommo-
dations by other countries. Yet the benefit concept may still be useful if for
no other reason than it may help us fully to focus on the factors and policies
affecting, and being affected by, the tax system.
To the extent that the tax imposed on the foreign taxpayer exceeds the
benefits he receives from the taxing country, the tax will tend to keep him
out. Therefore, to the extent that revenue is the goal of a tax, substantial cor-
relation between the benefits received and the tax imposed is necessary. "Bene-
fits" in this sense, however, are those privileges or conditions necessary to the
production of income, the magnitude of which is relative to the availability of
alternatives and the taxing nation's effective control over the income producing
conditions. In evaluating a particular source rule, existing alternatives should
be considered, and their relative attractiveness and disadvantages should be
compared with the alternative to which the source rule applies. The method
of allocation should then be judged by considering the effective control of the
government over the more alluring alternatives and the price it will have to
pay to modify or remove them.
Substitute methods of realizing income may exist over which the United
States lacks effective control or which would be too costly to change. It may
be possible, for example, for a foreigner to exploit copyrights, patents, and
their analogues by assigning his rights to a foreign firm which produces the
product and imports it here tax free under the current title passage test. The
greater the tax burden on methods of exploitation over which the United
States has effective control-e.g., production of the property here or assign-
ment to a local entrepreneur-the more advantageous the former alternatives
will become. In considering the maximum revenue which may be raised by a
324. E.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959) : There must be some "' definite link, some minimum connection';" the "'controlling
question is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask a return.'" Id. at 465.
325. On the difficulties of such a task, see Blum & Kalven, The Uneasy Case for
Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CiaI. L. REy. 417, 451-55 (1952).
326. See generally, Report on Double Taxation, General Principles which Govern
International Competence in Taxation, Part II, The Principle of Ability to Pay (League of
Nations, 1923). There is, of course, a good deal of ambiguity in the ability to pay concept
and insofar as the theory has been urged as the final answer to questions of tax justice, it
has been rejected. See Buehler, Ability to Pay, 1 TAx L. Rv. 243 (1946) ; Blum & ICalven,
supra note 325, at 480.
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tax, these alternatives will also have to be weighed and a judgment made as to
the extent to which a given tax scheme may induce taxpayers to avoid the
activity upon which the tax is measured, and hence pay no tax. But revenue
directly raised by the tax is not the only consideration. A tax designed to pro-
duce the most revenue will always have other consequences and these may be
undesirable, either because they may indirectly result in losses of revenue or
because other values are adversely affected. Thus, there are two basic questions:
(1) What are the appropriate criteria for levying a tax which will result in
maximum revenue? (2) How should these criteria be modified to eliminate
consequences more costly in community values than the loss of revenue result-
ing from the modification?
In the case of a tax on patents, copyrights, and the like, exploited by non-
resident aliens, it would seem probable that a tax designed to raise maximum
revenue would be an undesirable tax, and that substantial modification of a
hypothetical revenue raising scheme would be required. Even if revenue were
the sole consideration, however, the present scheme is defective.
The basic alternative to local exploitation-foreign production and import-
could be minimized by several methods. The title passage test for sales of
tangibles could be jettisoned in favor of a destination test; domestic patent or
copyright protection could be denied such imports; tariffs or import restric-
tions could be erected to keep them out. It is not the purpose of this article
fully to evaluate such possibilities; merely to suggest them and, further, to
advance the possibility that any such efforts would be too costly and complex.
They would, in many cases, require renunciation of treaties and would involve
the hazards of retaliation. Yet tax alternatives which apply to substantially the
same activity, i.e., the "sale," "license," and "service" methods of exploiting
intangibles, are arguably not so involved and pervasive as to preclude unilat-
eral reform.
A SINGLE SOURCE FACTOR
All that has been seriously claimed for the title passage test is its "prac-
ticality" or "certainty."3 27 Similar claims might be advanced for a place-of-
contract test for determining where an intangible is sold. Yet it is doubtful
that either of these descriptions is apt. The "certainty" and "practicality" of
such tests depends on the probability of substantial agreement among nations
as to where the contract was "executed" or "negotiated," or where "title
passed." This seems Utopian, particularly in light of the substantial variations
in concepts of contract and sales law. Moreover, when the decision turns upon
formalism unrelated to external reality, the tendency-if the United States
decisions are exemplary-is to decide the way which appears most likely to
enhance the coffers of the decision-maker's country.
The place-of-contract test, however, if uniformly applied by different coun-
tries, would at least have the virtue of reducing or eliminating multiple tax
327. See United States v. Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298, 306 (2d Cir. 1956) ; articles cited
in n6te 279 supra.
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claims and burdens of compliance. If uncluttered by the necessity of allocating
a portion of the income to the country of production, such a test would in
theory at least attribute the worldwide income from patents or copyrights to a
single country. There is, therefore, something to be said for a single factor for
allocating income. If the same factor is adopted by countries whose economies
and international intercourse are relatively balanced, little revenue need be
lost by any. There are several weaknesses, however, in a single factor as
arbitrary and nebulous as the place-of-contract test. As already noted, it is
likely that decision-makers in both the country of the seller and the country
of the buyer-and possibly also in other countries-will attribute the entire
source of income to their own country. The threat of such a result would be
injurious to international trade and would destroy the whole basis for the
single factor formula. Secondly, it is not unlikely that the sale contract will be
negotiated in a country having no substantial connection with the parties, but
a salubrious tax climate. Insofar as the likelihood of success in such ventures
exists, the efficacy of the test would be destroyed. Finally, even if some con-
sensus can be reached on the principles for determining the place of contract,
differences in tax rates of the countries furnish a constant inducement to nego-
tiate the contract in the country imposing the lesser tax, and thus the balance
essential to the success of the single factor is destroyed.
Place of production
If a single factor is to work, it should be something with some empirical
content, such as the place of production-where the invention or intellectual
product was conceived and developed. Even a place of production factor would
not be a panacea. Frequently, production is not confined to a single country.
Some allocation would therefore be required. There is no clear boundary where
production ends and promotion or selling begins. All these activities might
reasonably be included in the concept of production, frequently making alloca-
tion to a single source impossible. The concept, however, could be defined as
the principal place of production, or where most of the activity and assets used
in producing or marketing the property were located.
There are other problems, however. No account is taken in such a test of
property not produced by the taxpayer. Should the income be attributed to
the country of production even though the taxpayer purchased the property
or received it as a gift, bequest, or capital contribution? If the taxpayer pur-
chased the property, the country of production would presumably have been
allocated the income of the seller-producer and would have the option of im-
posing or exempting a tax on that income. It seems impracticable to continue
to view the income of subsequent transferors as derived from the country
where the first transferor created the property. A purchaser's income on resale
should presumably be treated as derived from his activities in purchasing, im-
proving, and marketing the property. If substantial improvements were made
by him, the place where made might be treated, in allocating his income, as
the country of production. But, if, as is often the case, most of his activity was
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in promoting and marketing, the place where most of the activity occurred
might be selected. In either event, whether the taxpayer produced or pur-
chased the property, his income might be attributed to the country where his
principal activities in creating, developing, or marketing the property occurred.
Treatment of the income of a seller of a patent or copyright who acquired the
property by gift, bequest, or contribution to capital is complicated by the pres-
ent tax treatment of such transactions. A contribution to capital of a controlled
corporation which qualifies for nonrecognition under section 351,"2 a gift,a -
and a bequest,330 produce no taxable income under the current statutory pro-
visions. Thus if a foreign corporation produced a patent in the United States,
transferred it, to a foreign based subsidiary under section 351, and the sub-
sidiary then sold the patent, all United States income tax at the corporate level
might be avoided. The parent would have income from United States sources
but no taxable income because of section 351 ;31 and if all the subsidiary's
328. I.R.C. § 351 permits property to be transferred to a controlled corporation in ex-
change for stock or securities without recognition of gain or loss. The corporation acquires
the property with the transferors basis. I.M.C. § 362(a). I.R.C. § 367 limits the ap-
plicability of § 351, in the case of transfers to a foreign corporation, to those transactions
upon which the Commissioner is satisfied, before the exchange, that one of the principal
purposes of the plan is not tax avoidance. If a shareholder transfers property to a foreign
corporation without taking stock in exchange, however, there is a remote possibility that
§ 351, and hence, § 367 will not apply and that the Commissioner's approval is not a condi-
tion to nonrecognition. The theory would be that the transfer was a contribution to capital-
or perhaps, even, a gift-for which no stock was received in exchange, and that no gain
should be recognized even though § 351 is inapplicable. See generally, Pugh, Sales and
Exchanges of Foreign Patents, N.Y.U. 20TH Ixsr. ox FED. TAx. 1305, 1319-21 (1962) ;
Eckstrom & Slowinski, Tax Planning for Foreign Licensizg of Uniled Slates In:duslrial
Property Rights, N.Y.U. 19TH INsT. ON FED. TAx. 969, 987-91 (1961).
329. A gift may result in a gift tax under I.R.C. § 2501(a) if made by a citizen or
resident or a nonresident alien engaged in business in the United States. Gifts of intangibles
by nonresident aliens not engaged in business here are exempt. The nonresident alien en-
gaged in business is taxed only on gifts of such property "situated" in the United States.
IJLC. § 2511(a). On the question of the "situs" of a copyright for gift tax purposes, com-
pare P. G. Wodehouse, 19 T.C. 487 (1952) with Sax Rohner, 21 T.C. 1099 (1954). See
generally LOWNDES & KRAmsR, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFt TAXES 755-60 (Zd ed. 1962)
[Hereinafter cited as LowNros & KRAmxm]. A corporation is not subject to the gift tax. A
gift by a corporation, however, may be treated as a constructive gift by the shareholders.
See id. at 580.
330. Although a bequest produces no taxable income, the fair market value of the
property bequeathed will be subject to the estate tax if the decedent was a resident or citizen
of the United States. I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2031(a). Property of a nonresident alien decedent is
subject to the estate tax only if "situated" in the United States at the time of death (I.R.C.
§ 2103) or, in the case of certain inter vivos transfers, either at the time of death or the time
of transfer. I.R.C. § 2104(b). It has been suggested that patents or copyrights are "situated"
here for estate tax purposes to the extent they "have a value because of the protection af-
forded by American law." LowNDES & KMxtum at 503. If so, the tentacles of the U.S. tax
collector extend far beyond his grasp. Almost any European author, movie producer, or in-
ventor may be a potential source of United States estate tax.
331. But see discussion of I.R.C. § 367 at note 328 supra.
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activities in connection with the patent were outside the United States, none
of its income, under the postulated place-of-production method, would be at-
tributed to the United States. Similar results would follow from gifts or be-
quests to foreign taxpayers.3 32 To prevent such siphoning off of United States
income, further tax restrictions might be imposed on gifts and bequests to
foreign taxpayers and section 351 might be modified so that gain would be
recognized on transfers of patents, copyrights, and similar property by resident
foreign corporations to foreign subsidiaries or by aliens engaged in business
here to controlled nonresident foreign corporations.
Alternatively, the place of production method of allocating income might be
modified so that part of the income of a donee, legatee or contributee would
be allocated to the country where the previous owner produced the property.
Thus, when the foreign subsidiary in the previous example sold the patent it
would have United States income, even though it bad no other substantial con-
tacts with the United States. There seems no apparent reason why a gift or a
contribution to capital, or any other tax free transfer should shift the source
of income from one country to another. If an English author would have
English income were he to sell his copyright, surely a tax free gift to his wife,
or a transfer to his solely owned corporation, followed by a sale, should not
produce a substantially dissimilar result.
Thus, in allocating income from the sale of a patent, copyright or similar
property, it would seem feasible to allocate all the income to the country in
which the taxpayer had his center of activities in connection with the creation,
management and marketing of the intangible property. Where the taxpayer
acquired the property other than through a purchase or taxable exchange, the
center of activities of the transferor with respect to the property could be con-
sidered, together with the activities of the transferee, in determining the source
of the transferee's income.333
Close questions doubtless would arise in locating the principal place of pro-
duction. Various factors would have to be weighed. Where, for example, would
332. Although as suggested in notes 329, 330 supra, the transfers in some cases would
have been subject to gift or estate tax.
333. Drawing the line between taxpayers who should be treated as "purchasers," and
whose income should be allocated without reference to their transferor, and taxpayers whose
transferors should be considered in determining source is not easy. As far as producers
located in the United States are concerned, the source of their transferee's income could be
determined by reference to the center of activities of the transferor whenever the trans-
feree acquired the property with a carryover basis, or, alternatively, whenever the transferor
was not subject to income tax on the transfer (thus, including tranfers by bequest). But how
about the transfer from a non-national who produced the property abroad? Should the
transferee be treated as a purchaser if he acquired the property in a transaction which would
have been taxable to the transferor by the United States if the transferor had had any
United States source income? Or should an attempt be made to "borrow" from the tax laws
of the country of production, treat the transferee as a purchaser if his transferor was taxed by
the country of production? These problems are formidable. But since the present source
rules draw distinctions between taxpayers who "purchased" the property and those who
"produced" it-and leave a lacuna for those who did neither-they exist under the present
scheme as well.
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the source of income be if movie rights were sold, the movie's production
having been planned, financed and managed in the United States but actually
filmed in Mexico? The decision might go either way; and decision-makers in
the United States and in Mexico might be expected to disagree. But at least
the choice would have been narrowed to two countries, each of which has a
substantial connection with the income producing activity. This would seem
preferable to a rule attributing all or a considerable chunk of the income to a
third country wherein the movie maker merely negotiated a contract of sale.
The reasons for preferring a place-of-production test go beyond the desire
for certainty, however. No substantial benefits are conferred on a taxpayer by
a country merely because it provides him with a forum in which to negotiate
a contract disposing of his patent or copyright. He will not suffer severely if
he moves the negotiations elsewhere. Indeed, a substantial tax based upon the
fact that a contract is made in one country rather than another would seem
to serve little purpose other than harassment of foreigners. Providing a place
to produce a patent or copyright is another matter. Most patents and many
copyrights are products, or by-products, of commercial and industrial activity,
and few choices of business location are likely to be greatly influenced by a
tax on patents or copyrights derived from that activity. The advantages of
doing business in the United States, for example, are usually sufficient to stand
the strain of a tax on the income from a patent developed in that business and
exploited abroad. Avoiding a tax levied by the country of production is a much
more costly and complicated performance than eluding a tax based solely on
where a contract was executed. At least it would seem so unless merely by
choosing a "license" label for foreign exploitation that task could be accom-
plished.
Allocating income from a "sale" to the country of production would sub-
stantially coincide with the present treatment of income from services, dimin-
ishing incentives for artificial attempts to circumvent one rule or the other.
But it would still leave an unsatisfactory disparity between sales, services, and
licenses. It would still permit the American based movie producer, filming his
movie in Mexico, to shift a substantial portion of the income to Europe by
"licensing" or renting the film there rather than "selling" his foreign rights.
It would still permit a United States based foreign corporation producing
patents here to avoid all United States tax on foreign licensing.
A possible solution to the problem of overlap between "sales" and "licenses"
would be merely to do away with the distinction for determining source of
income; allocate income from both to the country in which the property was
created.8-
334. Changes in current methods of allocating income from "licenses" would create a
new problem of reconciling the changes with the method of allocating rentals from tangible
property solely to the country where the property is located. I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(4),
862(a) (4). The problem may be illustrated by the movie producer who creates a "copy-
right" when he produces a negative. If he "rents" the negative for foreign reproduction
and exhibition, or reproduces film from it and "rents" the film for foreign e.xhibition, does
he have income from "rentals" of tangible property, "royalties" from a copyright, or some
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A less extreme resolution of the problem would be to define a "sale" quite
narrowly, as, for example, an assignment of all rights within a particular
country for a fixed sum. A "license" could be defined as an assignment of
partial rights in a particular country, or of all rights subject to a retained
economic interest. A portion of the "license" income might then be allocated
to the countries where the license was exploited. At least two reasons might
support such a bifurcation. First, such a result would be a less drastic de-
parture from current concepts of source. Many other countries, in addition to
the United States, regard license income as attributable to the country where-
in the license is exercised.3 31 Second, dispositions on a piecemeal basis, or sub-
ject to a retained royalty interest, may be economically more desirable and
income-productive than larger transfers for a guaranteed sum in which the
transferee assumes all risk and exacts a price for it. Moreover, marketing of
intangibles in slices often involves substantial activity by the taxpayer. When
a novel is written in one country and the author disposes separately of book
movie, dramatic and television rights in another, a lot of promotion by him is
often involved in the second country. And when his compensation is based
on successful exploitation, the licensees, if not his agents or partners in law,
nevertheless have joint interests with him and in pursuing their own, also
further his interests. Since the author is getting a share of the profits from
these activities, it does not seem unreasonable that this should be taken into
account in allocating his income.
These notions should not be stretched so far, however, as to deny the coun-
try of production an ample share of the income, as there still is not a great
deal of difference between a "sale" and a "license" as thus defined. Perhaps
a taxpayer who purchased the property and then licensed it should have all
his income allocated, as is now the case, to the countries where the rights are
exploited. But other taxpayers would have the "personal service" alternative
with which to shift the entire income into different countries, particularly if,
as in Karrer,3 6 the author's or inventor's compensation from a personal ser-
vice contract can be geared to the exploitation of the copyright or patent.
Conceivably, an author in England could agree simultaneously with American,
Canadian, English, French, and German publishers to write the same book
for each, with each paying for and getting the local copyright. To subdue
motivations for such arrangements and keep disparities to a minimum com-
of both? It would seem that the policies supporting the allocation of some, or all, of the in-
come from royalties on intangible property to the country of production would likewise
support a similar allocation of income from rentals of tangible property produced by the
taxpayer. The method of allocating rental income should probably also be changed if modi-
fications are made in the rules relating to royalties. Thus, the question of characterizing
the income as "rents" or "royalties" would become academic, as it is under the present
source rules.
335. See Carroll, Methods of Allocating Taxable Incomne, IV TAXATION4 OF Fo01x
AND NATIONAL ENTERPRISES 117, 126 (League of Nations, 1933).
336. Karrer v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 66 (Ct. Cl. 1957), discussed at text accom-
panying note 305 vupra.
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mensuate with their economic attributes, half, say, of the income from "licens-
ing" might be attributed to the country of production, the other half to the
countries where the property is exploited.
3 37
Some less radical refinements
It cannot easily be assumed that Congress in 1921 understood that a "sale
of personal property" within the source rules encompassed a "sale" of e.x-
clusive rights to publish a literary production in a particular medium or a
337. The basic problem considered in Part II of this article is the arbitrariness, un-
certainty, and inadequacy of the source rules insofar as they encourage a foreign taxpayer
to shift the source of his income among and between countries by the judicious use of labels
and a little foresight The proposed changes would tend to bring the results into line re-
gardless of which label was chosen. This presupposes, however, that the taxpayer stays put.
If he actually leaves the country where he created or acquired the patent, copyright, process,
or idea and travels to another country to transfer it, a prickly problem remains of determin-
ing whether the compensation he receives is for "property" or for "services." When the
taxpayer's efforts are traceable into an invention or a writing upon which a statutory
patent or copyright can be obtained, or where his efforts have been transformed into a
concrete, durable, and transferable form having value independent of the future efforts of
the creator, there may be little difficulty in determining that the income was from a trans-
fer of "property" and allocating the income accordingly. Suppose, however, that a French-
man develops, over a period of years in France, a secret process which an American com-
pany is interested in acquiring. If the Frenchman "sold" or "licensed" the process, all or a
substantial part of the income would be attributed to France under the approaches sug-
gested here. But if he casts the transaction in the form of a contract for the rendition of
"services" and agrees to come to the United States for a week to ex-plain the process and
instruct in its use, it might be argued that his compensation was solely for services rendered
in the United States, hence, entirely from United States sources. What criteria should be
employed in determining whether the taxpayer transferred "property" or merely rendered
services? When a taxpayer receives compensation for communicating an unpatentable secret
process or valuable information, how is he to be distinguished from any other taxpayer who
gets paid for his accumulated knowledge and skill? A possible answer is that unless the
taxpayer had some sort of legal monopoly, like a patent or copyright, his accumulated
skills, secrets, and knowledge do not rise to the status of "property" and any pay he gets is
for services. See Commissioner v. United Aircraft Corp., 68 Commw. L.L 525 (Austl.
1943), reproduced in part in Brrrxxa & EBB, TAxATION OF FOREIGN INcOME 149 (1960).
This is apparently not the view in the United States, however. See Duffy, Doing Business
Abroad: Use of American Know-How, N.Y.U. 20TH INsT. ox FEn. TAx 1269 (1962) ;
Rev. Rul. 55-17, 1955-1 Cum. BuLL. 388. It would seem that such factors as the legal pro-
tection given the idea or process, its uniqueness, whether it has been, or is capable of being
given concrete form, though relevant, should not be conclusive. It would seem reasonable to
consider, in determining whether "property" has been transferred, the relationship of the
amount of compensation received to the services and capital actually involved in rendering
the "service." Thus, if the Frenchman in our example received q5OO,000 for the alleged
"services" which took him a week to perform, one might conclude that the informatior he
communicated was of sufficient importance and value to be classed as "property"; that in
essence the source of his compensation was the accumulation of knowledge and the research
undertaken in France. The standard is admittedly imprecise and needs refinement Yet it
seems necessary to preserve the integrity of the proposed place-of-production factor. No
substantial contribution to the creation of the income in our example vras made by the United
States merely because it provided a forum in which to communicate the process. Arrange-
ments could have been made to communicate it in France, or Canada, or Brazil-wherever
the climate, taxwise and otherwise, was most salutary.
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"sale" of exclusive rights to manufacture, use, and sell a patented product
within a narrowly limited geographical area. Nor is the conclusion clear that
a "sale" of an intangible was understood in 1921 to include the royalty arrange-
ments now so widespread. International trade in artistic and industrial prop-
erty was then in its infancy. Piracy was still pervasive. Consumer demand
varied far more from country to country than it does today; Telstar, television,
and sound movies were things of the future. The economic value of the foreign
rights to even the most successful book or invention was often insignificant;
and taxpayer sophistication in 1921 in the use of foreign charters, letterheads,
and exploitation techniques seems to us more antediluvian in retrospect than
movies with subtitles and player pianos. It is not surprising that little thought
was given to these problems.
The congressional conception of a sale of a patent or copyright in 1921 may
have been a lump, or fixed sum transfer of all rights within a particular coun-
try, or, perhaps, throughout the world. It may also have included the notion
that a United States patent or copyright had an immovable situs in the United
States and that any sale of United States rights would necessarily occur with-
in the United States.338 It is also conceivable that the special method of al-
location for property "produced" in one country and sold in another was not
intended to apply to intangibles. 33 9 As alternatives to the complete overhaul
of the source rules already suggested, these possibilities should be considered.
A. Restrictive definition of "sale"
Congress may have intended to allocate income under the "sale" criterion
of sections 861 (a) (6), 862 (a) (6) only where the consideration was a fixed
sum and the taxpayer assigned all his rights within a particular country. This
would no doubt diminish the significance of these sections in allocating income
from patents and copyrights, since such transfers are seldom commercially
feasible, except between related taxpayers, because of the high risks involved.
Yet if this view of a "sale" is combined with the place-of-contract test, in-
vitations to manipulation are still open. The owner of the property may sell
it to a controlled corporation and negotiate the sale in a country with favor-
able tax treatment of the gain. A foreign corporation producing the property
here, for example, might avoid all United States tax by selling the rights
abroad to a subsidiary or to the controlling shareholder. The "buyer" might
then license the rights in the United States and elsewhere. The only income
attributable to the United States would be that paid for "use" of the property
338. As suggested in I.T. 2735, XII-2 CuM. BULL. 131 (1933) quoted at note 288 supra,
however, it seems fairly clear that Congress did not have this in mind, for it specified that
income from the sale of real property located in the United States was United States income,
I.R.C. § 861(a) (5). If Congress had intended to tax all income from copyrights and patents
"located" in the United States (i.e., United States patents and copyrights), regardless
of where the contracts were executed, etc., it presumably would have said so as it did in
the case of realty. An interpretation that would locate the sale in the country where the rightq
are exercisable, regardless of other circumstances, seems a bit farfetched.
339. See note 259 supra.
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in the United States. 0 Moreover, the subsidiary or the shareholder might
not even be taxed on these receipts. If the buyer is not engaged in business
here through a permanent establishment, the royalties might be exempt by
treaty. Even if the buyer were engaged in a United States business through
a permanent establishment and was taxable on the royalties, he could presum-
ably deduct a ratable portion of the cost of the property, i.e., the price paid
the seller, leaving him with little or no taxable income.
Pressures for such schemes would be diminished if "personal property pro-
duced" in the United States, within the meaning of section 863(b) (2), applies
to patents and copyrights. Then part of the income of the corporation which
created the property would be allocated to the United States regardless of
where the sale occurred. The statute could,341 and should, be so construed.
This method would still seem unsatisfactory so long as a significant factor
in the allocation formula is the place of contract. There seems no reason why
all the income should be allocated to the country of production if the contract
was made there, but only a part if the negotiations were elsewhere. All this
approach has to commend it is that income would be fragmented among few
countries and the divergent methods of allocating income of "sales" and
"licenses" would apply to different transactions. Paradox would be reduced
to anomaly.
B. "Situs" as the place of sale
The source provisions regarding sales of property "within" or "without" the
United States may have included the notion that a patent or copyright had an
immovable "situs" in the country whose laws "created" it; that a "sale" of a
United States patent could occur only "within" the United States and a "sale"
of foreign rights could take place only outside the United States. Thus if patent
rights were "sold," the income would be allocable among all countries wherein
the seller granted rights. If the property were created by the taxpayer in the
United States, all income from the "sale" of United States rights would be
domestic income. Whether any portion of the proceeds attributable to foreign
rights would be allocable to the United States would depend upon whether a
foreign patent or copyright is "produced" in the United States, as that term is
used in section 863(b) (2), by reason of the invention or artistic work having
been conceived and created here.342 If so, then a portion of the proceeds from
foreign rights would also be allocated to the United States as the place of pro-
duction. Conversely, if the property were created abroad, the United States
would claim none of the income from foreign rights and only a portion of the
income from domestic rights.
This interpretation of the statute, though founded on a fiction, would seem
more sensible than a place-of-contract test. A substantial part of the income
340. See text accompanying notes 295-99 supra.
341. See notes 257-59 stpra and related text.
342. As suggested at text accompanying note 341 supra, I.M.C. § 863(b) (2) should be
so construed, whether or not the "situs" approach is adopted for locating the place of sale.
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from worldwide rights would be allocated to the place of production, provided
the taxpayer or his donor produced the property.843 Only if the taxpayer pur-
chased the property would the treatment of "sales" coincide with the treat-
ment of licenses, the income being attributed to the countries where the rights
were "used," i.e., in which the rights were granted. The discrepancy in al-
location of income from sales and services would be reduced to tolerable dimen-
sions. But as to rights not purchased by the taxpayer there would still be ex-
treme variations, and hence attractive alternatives, between sales and services,
on the one hand, and licenses, on the other. If the taxpayer produced the
property under a contract for services, or if he produced and "sold" it, all or
a large portion of the income would be attributed to the place of production.
Yet if he "licensed" the property, none of the income would be so allocated.
Something would still have to be done with the license alternative. A "sale"
could be redefined, as earlier suggested, 44 to include only an assignment of
all rights within a particular country and without a retained royalty interest.846
This would put a price upon the choice between the "sale" and "license" de-
vices, but it would leave undisturbed the lacuna between "licenses" and "ser-
vices." A redefinition in reverse might be preferable: "sales" could be defined
quite broadly, as the Commissioner has defined the concept,8 0 to include piece-
meal dispositions on a royalty basis, leaving the "license" label for only very
minute assignments. The purpose, of course, would be to throw most assign-
ments into the "sale" category. But framing a definition to withstand the cor-
rosive pressures of tax manipulators would be a formidable feat. Under the
present administrative definition, for example, one of the conditions of "sale"
classification is that the grant be for the entire term of the patent or copy-
right.3 47 Yet it is seldom of much economic import to an author or inventor
whether he grants rights for ten years or in perpetuity. Permitting him to
determine the source of his income by choosing one method or another would
be little improvement over the present imbroglio. If the "situs" approach were
adopted for treatment of "sales," subtle distinctions between "sales" and "li-
censes" should probably be abolished. Unless the taxpayer purchased the prop-
erty, a substantial part of the income from either method of disposition should
be allocated to the country of production.
848
343. I have here assumed that since the statute does not specify the method of allocation
where the taxpayer neither produced or purchased the property, that apportionment should
be made as if the taxpayer had produced the property, i.e., the taxpayer and his transferor
would be viewed as one for purposes of the allocation. This approach is discussed at note
333 .rupra and related text.
344. See text following note 334 supra.
345. Some of the formidable difficulties presented by the necessity of allocating "sales"
price (a fixed sum) among various countries wherein the rights were granted is suggested
by the hypothetical at text accompanying note 300 supra.
346. Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 26.
347. Ibid.
348. This could not be done by re-interpretation of the statute. I.R.C. §§ 861 (a) (4),
862(a) (4) clearly forbid allocation of any income from rentals and royalties to the country
of production.
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The "situs" concept has no support in the legislative history and could come
only from a laborious interpretation of the statute.340 It does not seem ever
to have been suggested by courts or the Commissioner.:rO Moreover, for this
method to be palatable, present treatment of licenses would have to be modi-
fled. Legislation is therefore necessary.35 ' It would probably be preferable to
junk the present concepts and start over.
CONCLUSION
A number of changes and refinements in the taxing provisions are needed
whether or not the source rules are revised; whether other reforms are re-
quired in the taxing provisions depends on the changes made in the source of
income concepts. The following suggestions seem applicable in any event:
1) The provisions imposing tax on "capital gains" of aliens present here 
3 5 2
should be revised or repealed. Capital gains criteria are inappropriate for non-
resident aliens. Whatever it is that is sought to be taxed by these prescriptions,
it is not, or should not, be the heterogenous species of income grouped under
"capital gains."
2) Section 871(a) (1)'s imposition of a tax on patent assignments "de-
scribed in section 1235" should be repealed. Section 1235, providing a tax
bounty for domestic inventors, supplies no sensible criteria for taxing or ex-
empting nonresident aliens.
3) The alternative tax in section 871(b), providing for domestic rates, in-
cluding capital gains rates, on certain nonresident aliens with taxable income
of more than $15,400, needs refinement. Since capital gains concepts are in-
appropriate, a tax which is measured in part by such concepts is dubious.
4) The proviso in section 871(b) (2) that a nonresident alien not engaged
in business is taxable at a minimum rate of 30 per cent of gross income, is an
indefensible trap for the hapless alien, particularly if his gross receipts from
royalties are "fixed or determinable income." 35 3 The alien with a substantial
basis on his property should be permitted to amortize a portion of it against
United States income where gross receipts and net income are greatly at vari-
ance. Perhaps instead of requiring the alien to pay domestic rates, after
deductions, if his income exceeds $15,400 and this method produces a greater
tax than the flat rate before deductions, 354 he should be given the option of
calculating his tax at the flat rate or at progressive rates after deductions,
whichever method produces the lesser tax.
5) New definitions of the gross income of a nonresident alien or foreign
corporation should be enacted. The "fixed or determinable annual or period-
ical" concept should be scrapped along with the capital gains criteria. Over-
lapping and contradictory concepts should be eschewed and interdependence
349. See note 338 supra.
350. In fact, the Commissioner has rejected it. See I.T. 2735, XII-2 Cu. Bu.. 131
(1933) quoted at note 288 mpra.
351. See note 348 supra.
352. I.ThC. § 871(a) (2).
353. See note 58 supra.
354. As is now provided in I.R.C. § 871 (b) (2).
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of rules applicable to foreigners with those fashioned for domestic taxpayers
should be minimized.
More specific proposals cannot be made except in relation to source con-
cepts. The source rules seem larded in even a thicker coat of conceptualism
than the taxing provisions. They seem too obsolete to be patched up by statu-
tory interpretation. A new model is needed and only some rough sketches have
been offered here.
If the principal place of production of a patent or copyright were accepted
as the source of the income from such property, however, it would appear that
many of the anomalies in the taxing provisions could be eliminated in one
stroke. Nonresident aliens and foreign corporations, whether engaged in United
States business or not, could be taxed on all income from patents, copyrights
and similar property which was from United States sources. This would work
as follows:
1) If the alien or foreign corporation's principal activities in connection
with the production of the invention or artistic work occurred in the
United States, all income, whether from a "sale" or a "license,"
wherever disposed of, would be taxable by the United States.
2) If the principal activities in producing the property occurred abroad,
all income would be foreign income unless the taxpayer purchased the
property. Then his income on disposition would be taxable here if his
principal activities in purchasing, improving and marketing occurred
within the United States.
Taxing the nonresident alien or foreign corporation on all patent or copy-
right income from United States sources would also seem appropriate if a
modified place of production factor were adopted. Under the method outlined,
a dichotomy would be retained, but perhaps new names, such as "sole" and
"lacense," should be used. A "sole" would be defined to include only a transfer
of all rights within at least a single country and subject to no retained royalty
interest. Income from a "sole" would be allocated to the country of production
as above. Assignments of lesser magnitude, "lacenses," would involve a differ-
ent allocation:
1) If an alien or foreign corporation purchased a patent or copyright, or
an interest in same, and granted a "lacense," all income would be al-
located among the various countries in which rights are granted. The
place where the property was created would be disregarded.
2) If the alien or foreign corporation acquired the patent or copyright
other than by purchase, then the "lacense" income would be allocated
between the place of production of the property and the various coun-
tries wherein rights were granted.
Limitless permutations are possible. Detailed study is needed before any
radical renovations of basic concepts are enacted. That such study is needed
seems incontestable.
Obstacles to reform
Few would regard a statute regulating securities transactions which is two
generations old as appropriate for the 1960's, much less embodying immutable
verity, and there is no reason why the source rules should be so regarded.
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There are, however, a number of practical impediments to reform occasioned
by the transnational nature of the problem.
The first concern is reciprocity. If our source rules were shared by a sub-
stantial number of major countries, not only in their statement but in their
application, then it might be unwise for the United States to charge off in
different directions. There is, however, little uniformity in these matters. And
even though some countries have rules resembling ours, it cannot be assumed
that their interpretations bear more than a rough resemblance to ours, espe-
cially since our rules have remained so fleshless over forty years. Moreover, it
is not unlikely that many of the nations having rules similar to ours copied
them from us and will be willing to do so again.
Another possible barrier to statutory reform is the tax treaty structure.
Whether our treaty obligations hinder unilateral reform depends in part on
the direction the reforms take. If definitions of source are aimed at taxing
foreigners who have substantial activities in creating, marketing and managing
property within the United States and exempting those who do not, the source
rules will complement the treaties and will recognize, as the treaties do, sub-
stantial economic connection as the touchstone of taxation. As earlier noted,
the treaties commonly grant relief from taxation of royalties remitted to na-
tionals of one contracting state from another, provided there is no "permanent
establishment" in the latter country. They do not, however, require that roy-
alties be taxed by us when there is a permanent establishment here.
Existing source rules no doubt figured as background in the bargaining over
the treaties. Yet the treaties do not, generally, attempt to establish a country's
source rules; they mainly just exempt specified persons or entities and certain
kinds of income. As to persons not exempt under the treaties, each country is
apparently free to claim as much of an individual's income as its own interests
dictate.355 Whether, in spite of this, it would be within the spirit of our treaty
obligations to tax all the income of, say, a foreign corporation creating a patent
here and licensing it throughout the world, is not easily answered. If further
study reveals doubt on the matter, our treaty obligations can be excepted from
the statutory provisions. 356
355. One instance in which our source rules are arguably modified by the treaties is
when a foreign enterprise is subject to tax here because it has a branch which is a permanent
establishment. Then, in allocating income and expenses between the branch and the home
office, the treaties customarily provide that an allocation should be made as if the home office
and the branch had dealt at arms length. See, e.g., Treaty with United Kingdom, April 16,
1945, Art. 111(3), (4). These provisions would seem inapplicable to most patent and copy-
right transactions.
Some of the treaties also contain source rules relating to the foreign tax credit, but these
provisions affect only our own residents. See generally, Owens, United Stales Income Tax
Treaties: Their Role in Relieving Double Taxation, 17 RuTGERs L. REv. 428, 438-41 (1963).
356. I.R.C. § 7852(d) has this effect, as it provides that treaty obligations prevail over
provisions of the 1954 Code. See also I.R.C. § 894 (income exempt by treaty is also exempt
under the Code). A disturbing trend may be portended, however, by § 31 of the Revenue
Act of 1962, which provides that I.R.C. § 7852(d) does not apply to the 1962 Act. See
generally, Lidstone, Liberal Construction of Tax Treaties-An Anal3,sis of Congressional
and Administrative Limitations of An Old Doctrine, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 529 (1962).
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A third impediment, probably the clearest, is rectifiable. That is the para-
sitic growth and piling on of various divergent statutory provisions relying
substantially on the source rules. 0 7 New, separate rules could be enacted for
each where its policies were inconsistent with the source rules. There is no a
priori reason why the concept of foreign source income in the Western Hem-
isphere Trade provisions,358 for example, or even in the tax credit provi-
sions,359 needs to be tied to the same rules allocating income for purposes of
taxing non-nationals. It would seem salutary if these provisions were self-
contained and fresh thought was required to define their scope.
The foreign tax credit presents special problems. The credit is limited to
income taxes imposed by foreign countries upon income from foreign sources,10
according to United States concepts of source.00' Thus, if the United States
were to decide that all of the income from a patent was allocable to the United
States, where the invention was conceived and created, a foreign tax on the
royalties remitted to the United States might not be creditable by the domestic
taxpayer subject to tax on his worldwide income. There is nothing immutable
about such a result, however. The credit might be granted even though the
foreign tax was not technically on foreign source income. Or partial relief
might be granted in the form of a deduction for such foreign taxes. 02 The
only question would be whether the domestic taxpayer having such income and
such a foreign tax was deserving of a tax preference.103 On the other hand,
there may be good reasons for denying a credit for such taxes inasmuch as the
limitation might have a significant effect in encouraging reciprocal adoption of
source rules in line with ours. Taxes imposed by a foreign country have no
appreciable effect upon investment or exploitation in that country by a national
of the United States so long as the foreign tax is fully creditable. When not
creditable, as for example, when the foreign tax is upon income not deemed
allocable to foreign sources under United States law, the foreign tax acts as
a deterrent to the taxed activity. By denying the tax credit the United States
retains a hefty helpmate in the form of an indirect economic sanction to en-
courage reciprocal modifications of source of income criteria.0"
The United States, as the world's leader in foreign trade and investment,
also occupies a potent position of leadership in international taxation and
357. See note 249 supra.
358. I.R.C. §§ 921, 922.
359. I.R.C. §§ 901-05.
360. I.R.C. § 904.
361. See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(d) providing that the source rules in I.R.C. §§ 861-64
are applicable in determining source of income under the tax credit provisions.
362. Foreign income taxes, even though not creditable, are presently deductible under
I.R.C. § 164(b) (6), but only if the taxpayer does not also elect a foreign tax credit on other
foreign income taxes.
363. See generally on the rationale of the foreign tax credit, Surrey, Current Issues in
the Taxation of Corporate Foreign Investment, 56 Cox-um. L. REv. 815 (1956).
364. As pointed out supra note 239, however, the tax conventions contain provisions
which seem to limit the freedom of the United States to deny credit of taxes imposed by
many signatory countries. See also note 355 supra.
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ought to exercise it more resourcefully. The recent tax haven legislation was
a promising start but it should be merely a prelude to further rethinldng and
revision. Reams have been written on the problems of interstate taxation.
Recent federal legislation was passed, and a special study group was set up.'0 3
Yet the interstate problems do not seem so grave when compared to the inter-
national. Most states attempt to apportion on some reasonable basis. Few, if
any, are as greedy about some sources and as myopic about others as the
federal rules appear to be. Moreover, the state tax rates are much lower than
the rates of most countries and are generally creditable against the tax im-
posed by the state of incorporation. Congress should have the source rules
thoroughly restudied. It should not wait until other countries demand it. The
paucity of foreign complaints might be read as a sign that the United States
is not treating itself fairly.
The concept of nationality of business enterprise and the enchantment of the
corporate charter.are no longer adequate for today's internationality of eco-
nomic interests. There is no necessary correlation between the nationality of
a corporation and the location of its commercial interests and its economic
allegiance. The same is true, to a lesser extent, of individuals. The trend to-
ward further internationalization promises perpetuation of anonymous, ephem-
eral corporate and personal identities. As the forms and the forces for con-
fusion continue to evolve and combine, new effort is needed to maintain the
marriage of effective taxing power with economic substance.
365. See 73 Stat. 555, 556, 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84 (1962); Note, State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce: Public Law 86-272,46 VA. L. REv. 297 (1960).
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